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THESIS ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the mechanisms that might be used to determine the rights and 
obligations of Turkey, Syria and Iraq to govern the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin 
(TERB) in accordance with the international water law. In particular, it advocates for the 
protection of Iraq‟s equitable rights through the establishment of a legal and institutional 
framework for joint use of the TERB. As a contribution towards addressing the issues of 
transboundary water law at the TERB level, this thesis explores the possibilities for 
potential cooperation between the three riparian States of the TERB through forming a 
legally binding treaty under the auspices of contemporary international water law. From 
this perspective, the thesis hypothesises that international law provides a solid basis on 
which the State of Iraq can rely on for achieving its legal entitlements to the equitable 
and reasonable use of the TERB.    
In this context, the thesis first examines international law in order to establish how it 
applies to the TERB. Next, the thesis considers how the legal positions of the riparian 
States can be determined under international law. When the aforesaid requirements are 
met, the thesis makes recommendations on how international water law can strengthen 
the legal framework for equitable joint use of the TERB.  
The thesis offers the methodology and analytical framework that deals with different 
relevant issues covered within the scope of the thesis. Later on, water uses within the 
TERB are discussed, followed by a literature review of publications on contemporary 
Middle East transboundary water conflict and cooperation. Afterwords, the thesis 
examines the applicable international law and international water law to the riparian 
XII 
 
States of the TERB. Finally, it explores the legal regime of the inter-State relationships 
in order to foster improved transboundary water management of the TERB. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Fierce national competition over water resources has prompted 
fears that water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict…. If 
we work together, a secure and sustainable water future can be 
ours.” (Kofi Anan, Secretary General of the United Nations, 
March 22
nd
 2002)
1
  
“Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey‟s rivers any more 
than Ankara could claim their oil… The water resources are 
Turkey‟s, the oil resources are theirs. We don‟t say we share their 
oil resources, and they can‟t say they share our water resources.” 
(Suleyman Demirel, Turkish President, 1992)
2
 
“Water is life…Many analysts believe disputes over water will be 
a major cause of military conflict in the region. We want water to 
be a source of cooperation. We want to resolve this peacefully 
and in accordance with international law.  But if the GAP project 
goes ahead as planned and without an agreement, within five 
years more than 7 million Syrians would suffer from salt water 
pollution and damage to agriculture and drinking water. We are 
doing our best to attract Turkey to the table to negotiate and to 
prevent military conflict.” (Waleed Mu‟allim, Syrian Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 31
st
 January 2002)
3
 
                                                             
1
 UN warns of looming water crisis, 2002, BBC World News, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1887451.stm, accessed 15 May 2010. 
2 Reed, Christopher, 2005.Paradise Lost: What should-or can-be done about the environmental crime of 
the century? Harvard Magazine. Available at http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/010538.html, 
accessed 12 March 2008.  also Akanda, Freeman A & Placht, M. 2007.The Tigris-Euphrates River 
Basin: Mediating a Path Towards Regional Water Stability Annakhla, The Fletcher School Journal for 
issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Available at 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/spring2007/placht-2.pdf, accessed 24 May 2008. 
3
 The Corner House Correspondent. 2002. Downstream Impacts of Turkish Dam Construction on Syria 
and Iraq: Joint Report of Fact-Finding Mission to Syria and Iraq, Kurdish Human Rights Project, The 
Ilisu Dam Campaign. Available at 
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/document/IraqSyri.pdfccessed 20 March 2007.  
2 
 
Water is an essential resource, a source of life for humankind and every living creature 
on this planet. It is needed for drinking, personal hygiene, food production, and 
industrial activities. In addition, it has important non-consumptive uses, such as 
fishing, shipping, hydropower generation, and recreation. Although water is the most 
abundant subsistence on earth, the quantity of fresh water is globally finite. Water also 
plays an important role in cultural identity or religious beliefs of local people.
4
 
Mankind used to inhabit areas close to rivers in order to have „uncomplicated 
accesses‟ to the water.5 In history, rivers have played a critical role for mankind by 
connecting people through their navigable channels, and promoting the concentration 
of human settlement and the development of the most ancient civilisations along 
riverbanks.
6
  
1.1 Origins of River Basin Development 
The Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, Indus, and Yellow river basins were home to some of 
the world‟s earliest advanced civilisations. These rivers were considered as a 
tremendous resource as well as a potential liability for the basins‟ inhabitants, 
prompting early experimentation into methods to control their flow. More than 4000 
years ago the Sumerians, the Egyptians and later the Chinese constructed complex 
hydraulic systems for irrigation, flood control, and ultimately transportation purposes. 
The accruing economic benefits were substantial. Irrigation canals, for example, 
allowed for increased agricultural production and a greater variety of food products. 
                                                             
4
 Mostert, Eric., 2003. Conflict and Cooperation in the Management of International Freshwater 
Resources: A Global Review PCCP, Publications, at p. 3. Available at 
http://www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001332/133258e.pdf, accessed 16 November 2008. 
5
 Tanzi, A., & Arcari, M., 2001. The UN Convention on the Law of International Watercourses, A 
Framework for Sharing. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, at p. 4. also Wolf, Aaron T 
1998,Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways, Water Policy, (1), pp. 251. Available at 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/conflict_coop/, accessed 16 May 2007. 
6
 Tanzi, Ibid., at p. 4. 
3 
 
As irrigation canals were expanded to accommodate transportation needs, military, 
commercial and political advantages followed.
7
  
A significant trend towards conflict over international watercourses has been observed 
since the development of hydroelectric power,
8
 particularly in the first half of the 
twentieth century.
9
 International river basins cover more than half of the land‟s surface 
area.
10
 For example, there are nearly 300 major watercourses shared by two or more 
States in which approximately one-third of it are shared by more than two sovereign 
States.
11
 Tanzi mentions that due to diversification of human utilisation of water, for 
agricultural and industrial as well as for domestic purposes, and the high rate of world 
population growth, the level of global water withdrawal has increased by a factor of 
six.
12
 This statistic demonstrates the concerns of water specialists about the current 
global water problems, who have coined the term „water scarcity‟.13 In this regard, 
McCaffrey said:  
“…the burgeoning global population, the increasing 
concentration of people in cities, increased water user per capita, 
                                                             
7
 Meredith, Giordano A. 2002. International River Basin Management: Global Principles and Basin 
Practice. Oregon State University, at p. 1. Available 
athttp://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd30/giordano.pdf , accessed 13 July 2008. 
8
 Water conflict around the world has been attributed to social and demographic changes, especially 
population growth. Thus, an important challenge for this century‟s water managers will be preventing 
this water resource competition from escalating into conflict. Fesler, Kristel J. 2007. An Analysis of 
Water Resource Conflict and Cooperation in Oregon between 1990 and 2004.Oregon State University, 
at pp. 3-4. Available at  
http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/jspui/bitstream/1957/5700/1/KristelFeslerThesis.pdf, accessed 13March 
2009. 
9
 Also the problem grew since the introduction of systematic irrigation planning for large arid and semi-
arid areas of America, Africa and Asia. U.S. Department of State. 2002 Achieving Sustainable 
development Global Issues, International Information Programme, 7(1). Available 
athttp://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0402/ijge/ijge0402.htm, accessed 19 February 2008. 
10
 Hamner, Jesse H. & Wolf, Aaron T. 1998.Patterns “In International Water Resource Treaties: The 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database,” Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law 
and Policy, 1997 Yearbook. Available at  
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/patterns/, accessed 17 February 2008. 
11
From those 300 rivers, 19 of them involve five or more sovereign States. Ibid. 
12
 Tanzi, Supra, footnote 5, at p.6.   
13
 Ibid.   
4 
 
and the need to import water in different combinations or 
sometimes even in isolation, add a dimension to the world‟s 
freshwater problems that is of growing significance: risk of 
frictions with countries sharing the same sources of water.” 
(McCaffrey)
14
 
In addition to the abovementioned statement, it is generally estimated that in the 
forthcoming decades two-thirds of the world‟s population is likely to live in countries 
with moderate or severe water shortages.
15
 Besides that, there will be more changes in 
water quantity and quality due to intensive use of rivers within the territory of 
upstream States that passes negative deposits to the territory of its downstream 
States.
16
 As a result, this „water scarcity‟ only serves to intensify competition between 
joint users over its quantity and quality and will likely escalate tensions and the 
potential for conflict between States of diverse political boundaries,
17
 if it has not 
already happened.
18
 
Commentators who assert that water wars are imminent may have a valid basis for 
their assertions, as the United Nations Organisation (hereinafter the UN) forecasts that 
more than half of the world‟s population will suffer the direct consequences of water 
scarcity if the current development patterns continue.
19
 The rapid population and 
economic growth in many regions of the world could result in serious water problems 
                                                             
14
McCaffrey, Steven C., 2001. The Law Of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses, 
Oxford University Press, at pp. 15-16. 
15
 Uitto, Juha I., & Duda Alfred M., 2002. Management of Transboundary Water Resources: Lessons 
from International Cooperation for Conflict Prevention. The Geographical Journal 168, (4), at pp. 365-
366. 
16
 Tanzi, Supra, footnote 5, at p 5. 
17
 Giordano, Meredith A., &Wolf, Aaron T. 2003Sharing waters: Post-Rio international water 
management. Natural Resources Forum, (2) at p. 164. 
18
  The essence is that when two or more nations share the same watercourse whose water flow is not 
sufficient to meet the needs of all users, then conflicts and disputes among riparian States are prepared 
for eruption, and international peace is threatened as a result. Tanzi, Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 6-7. 
19
 Water, A Shared Responsibility. 2002. World Water Development Report, The UNEP, (2), at p.2. 
Available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001444/144409E.pdf, accessed 24 March 2007. 
5 
 
and related stress in the foreseeable future.
20
 For example, over the next fifteen years, 
in Asia alone, one billion more people will have to share the region‟s scarce water 
supplies.
21
 In the Middle East, due to the lack of clear cooperation or a good water 
governance strategy between the neighbouring States,
22
 the situation can be regarded a 
more worrying. For example, the riparian States to the Nile River have problems with 
population and economic pressures,
23
 which are growing faster than the Nile‟s 
capacity to sustain development. This mounting pressure exacerbates the pre-existing 
controversies in the theory of „conflict and co-operation‟ issues in sustaining an 
equitable management to the water resources of the Nile basin.
24
  
The nature of such a conflict could lead to a more serious situation if the available 
water is sufficient to meet all the riparian demands but one co-riparian State controls 
the river in a manner which discounts the rights of the other co-riparian States of the 
                                                             
20
 Nandalal, K.D.W., & Simonovic, Slobodan P., 2003. State-Of-The-Art Report On System Analysis 
Methods For Resolution Of Conflicts In Water Resources Management PCCP Publications, (4), at p 2. 
Available at http://webworld.unesco.org, accessed 13 February 2008. 
21
 Governments Failing to Tackle World Water Crisis, EU Water Plan Makes Feeble Progress In Four 
Years. 2006. New Report Tearfund Website. Available at http://www.tearfund.org/ accessed 17 July 
2007.  
22
 Since the 1970s, States in the Middle East have largely been unable to meet basic water needs for 
food production and industrial use. While water is a transboundary resource requiring effective 
multilateral management, such cooperation has so far been lacking in the Middle East. Jobson, Suki., 
2003.Water Of Strife: The Geopolitics Of Water In The Euphrates-Tigris And Jordan River Basins. The 
Royal Institute Of International Affairs, Middle East Programme, Briefing Paper, (4), at p.1. 
23
 The New Courier, October 2003. Averting conflict in the Nile basin. Available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
RL_ID=14364&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed March 2009.   
24
 The disparities between countries are wide and some are already faced with constraints in meeting 
domestic water demand owing to physical, socio-economic and political factors. As a result, water and 
water-supply systems may become instruments of political confrontation and objectives of military 
operations as the global population expand. Water quality has also become a crucial factor in the 
discussion over water availability, conflict and cooperation. In many countries, both developing and 
developed, current water use is not sustainable because water is poorly allocated and/or managed. The 
situation is especially grim in the Middle East and North Africa. Charier, B., Dinar, S., & Hiniker, M. 
Water, conflict resolution and environmental sustainability in the Middle East. Office Arid Lands 
Studies, (44). Available at http://cals.arizona.edu/OALS/ALN/aln44/charrier.html, accessed March 
2008. 
6 
 
shared basin.
25
 The existing problem over the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin 
(hereinafter “the TERB”) between Iraq, Syria and Turkey (hereinafter the riparian 
States) to which this thesis will be dedicated, falls under this description. It has been 
argued that if such transboundary issues are not solved in an equitable manner, 
problems are liable to escalate for the next generation because of the central role of 
water in sustaining the existence and development of States
26
 and become the twenty 
first century‟s most fundamental need.27 It has been shown from past experience that 
the mere promise, or even actual action, to increase the water flow from the upstream 
States to the downstream States does not satisfactorily represent the true meaning of 
cooperation.
28
     
It has been suggested that States could take a rigid stance with regard to the control 
and use of disputed shared watercourses, based on an extreme vision of State‟s 
sovereignty over the portion of the transboundary watercourse lying within their 
national territory. As a result, upstream States claimed absolute freedom to utilise 
transboundary waters regardless of the impact such activities could have on 
                                                             
25
 Caponera, Dante A. 2003. National and International Water Law and Administration. Netherlands, 
Kluwer Law International, at pp. 265-273. also Hirsch, Abraham M., 1956. Utilization of International 
Rivers in the Middle East, The American Journal of International Law, 50, ( 1), at p. 84. 
26
 Sustainable Development, as defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
is “the capacity to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs.” Development needs are now understood to go beyond economic issues to 
encompass the full range of social and political issues that define the overall quality of life. US 
Department of State, Supra, footnote 9, at pp.2-3. 
27
 Dellapenna wrote that water is unquestionably one of the most important of all the resources that 
depend upon for the survival and thriving of States. Dellapenna, J. W.The Customary International Law 
of Transboundary Fresh Waters, in Bogdanovic, Slavko. (Ed), Legal Aspects of Sustainable Water 
Resources Management Proceedings. Yugoslav Association for Water Law, 2002, at p. 22. 
28
 Galien, Michael van der.2009. Turkey promises Iraq double water supply, Poli Gazette, 25 March.  
Available at http://www.poligazette.com/2009/03/25/turkey-promises-iraq-double-water-supply/  
accessed October  2009.  also Iraq Demands More Water from Turkey, Syria. 2009. Circle of Blue 
WaterNews, Reporting the Global Water Crisis, September. Available at 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/iraq-demands-more-water-from-turkey-syria/ 
accessed October 2009. In response, Turkey has agreed to release more water from the Euphrates River 
to drought-ravaged Iraq. Turkey to release more water from Euphrates: Iraq. 2009. World Bulletin, 19 
September. Available at http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=47449, accessed October 
2009.  
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downstream States, according to the principle „absolute territorial sovereignty theory‟. 
Conversely, downstream States claimed the right to receive unaffected natural flow of 
waters coming from upstream States‟ territory, following the principle „absolute 
territorial integrity‟ theory.29 The above theories were categorised as underdeveloped 
and of unclear status. International water law has progressed during the last century, 
and these extreme theories are now almost obsolete since a middle course has found its 
place in the contemporary international water law and practice, termed „limited 
territorial sovereignty‟ of riparian States.30 Currently, it is believed that the evolution 
of the „limited territorial sovereignty‟ theory will have a strong impact on riparian 
States and solve the problems of the joint use of water by riparian States. It is not only 
their voluntarily acceptance to the principle, but also the circumstances that require it.  
                                                             
29
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty provides that States have exclusive sovereignty over 
their territory and that this sovereignty is unfettered by the interests of any other State, meaning that a 
State may exploit natural resources situated in its territory to the extent desired, regardless of any 
transboundary consequences. McCaffrey, Supra, footnote 14, at p. 77, also Caponera, Dante A., 1992. 
Principles of water law and administration: national and international, Netherland, Balkema, at p. 213. 
Perhaps the earliest, the most direct, and the most famous articulation of absolute territorial sovereignty 
is then U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon‟s assertion that the United States did not owe to Mexico 
a duty to desist its diversions of water from the Rio Grande so that Mexico could also enjoy the use of 
the river‟s waters. Thorson, Erica J., 2009. Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role Of 
Territorial Sovereignty. Duke Journal Of Comparative & International Law, 19(487), at p. 494. also 
McCaffrey, Supra, footnote 14, at p. 77.  
30
The Theory of Limited Territorial Sovereignty is based on the assertion that every State is free to use 
shared rivers flowing through its territory as long as such utilisation does not prejudice the rights and 
interests of the co-riparian State. In this case, sovereignty over shared water is relative and qualified. 
The co-riparian State has reciprocal rights and duties in the utilisation of the waters of their 
international watercourse and each is entitled to an equitable share of its benefits. This theory is also 
known as the „theory of sovereign equality and territorial integrity‟. Rahaman, M. Mizanur., 2009. 
Principles of Transboundary Water Resources Management and Ganges Treaties: An Analysis. Water 
Resources Development, 25 (1), at p.160. Available at 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/articles/general/Rahaman-Ganges-
Water_Res_Devel.pdf, accessed 23 May 2010. It is noteworthy that this theory has been adopted in 
1995 Agreement on the cooperation for the sustainable development of the Mekong River basin 
(Articles 4–7). Agreement on the cooperation for the sustainable development of the Mekong River 
Basin, Apr. 5, 1995(entered into force Apr. 5, 1995), reprinted in 34 I.L.M 864 (1995), also Article (2) 
of SADC protocol on shared watercourse systems. Protocol on Shared watercourse system in Southern 
African development community (SADC) region, Aug. 28, 1995 (entered into force Sep. 29, 1998), 
reprinted at http://www.africanwater.org/SADCprotocol_Original.PDF [accessed 18 May 2010]. also 
Articles (7) and (9) of the 2002 framework agreement on the Sava River Basin.  Framework Agreement 
on the Sava River Basin, Dec. 3, 2002, reprinted at   
http://www.savacommission.org/dms/docs/dokumenti/documents_publications/basic_documents/fasrb.
pdf [accessed 12 May 2010] 
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Daoudy remarked on this issue that building cooperative upstream-downstream 
relationships were becoming increasingly important in the realisation of State‟s 
national goals and that the unilateral use of resources by a neighbouring State
31
 does 
not achieve the desired objectives. Therefore, some States choose peaceful settlement 
by entering into formal agreements in the form of bilateral or multilateral treaties 
relating to their shared watercourses, although such a process can be time consuming 
and financially costly. For example, the Indus agreement took 10 years while the 
Ganges Agreement needed 30 years. For the Israel-Jordan agreement, 40 years were 
necessary to build trust and a sense of ownership of the process by the countries 
involved.
32
 In this context, the question arises, how many more years will be needed to 
build trust among the three riparian States to end the anxiety of the downstream State, 
Iraq? These issues are prompting calls for a hardworking process of legal work and 
implementation. 
Next, sometimes the required „good provisions‟ that can be the main basis for success, 
were not included in the terms of treaties. The reasons for their omission could be due 
to the obstacles of making explicit formal agreements represented in, among other 
things, the upstream and downstream considerations stated above. Nevertheless, it can 
be asserted that the signs of cooperation will exist where there is willingness among 
States to make treaty. For example, the protocol of 1987 between Turkey and Syria, 
although it was of a temporary nature and was further disputed by Iraq, can be 
considered as a good example for the two riparian States to cooperate and solve their 
                                                             
31
 Daoudy, Marwa, Water-Sharing Between Syria, Iraq and Turkey, Negotiation, Security and Power 
Asymmetries, A Fascinating Inquiry into Troubled Waters. Available at 
www.cnrseditions.fr/Doc/Depliants/D227106290X.pdf  accessed 15 June 2007. 
32
 International Decade for Action, Water for Life 2005–2015, The United Nations. Available at 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/pdf/waterborders.pdf, accessed 15 May 2009. 
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water issues together,
33
 despite a lack of implementation. Another example is the 
Water Allocation Agreement between Syria and Iraq, the Protocol of 1990, which led 
to the Three-Stage Plan between the riparian States.
34
  Further discussion in this regard 
will be given in subsequent Chapters.  
1.2 Addressing the thesis issue 
In principal, it can be accepted that legal agreements on joint water use have been 
negotiated even among bitter enemies and maintained even as conflicts have persisted 
over other issues. For example, in the East and Southeast of Asia, Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand and Vietnam, supported by the UN, have been able to cooperate since 1957 
within the framework of the Mekong River Commission, formerly known as the 
Mekong Committee, and technical exchanges continued throughout the Vietnam 
War.
35
 In Central Asia the Indus River Commission, established with World Bank 
support, survived two wars between India and Pakistan.
36
 In Middle East, since 1955 
Israel and Jordan, with United States involvement, have held regular talks on the 
                                                             
33
 Article 7 of the protocol states that the two sides shall work together with the Iraqi side to allocate the 
waters of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris in the shortest possible time. Article 8 states that “the two 
sides agreed to expedite the work of the Joint Technical Committee on Regional Waters. Kibaroglu, A., 
2002. Building A Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin. London, Kluwer Law 
International, at pp. 249-250. 
34
 The Three-Stage Plan came from  what Iraq formulated during one of the Joint Technical Committee 
Meetings, the following plan to share the waters of the Euphrates: At the first step, each riparian States 
will notify its water demand for each of its completed projects as well as for the projects under 
construction or planned, as the second step, hydrologic data will be exchanged on the Euphrates and 
Tigris waters, and finally, after gathering all relevant data, the Joint Technical Committee will first of 
all, calculate the demands of water for projects under operation, then for the projects under 
construction, and finally for the planned projects. The determination of needs for these projects will be 
made separately by each riparian.  Ibid., at pp. 251-252. Turkey Stated that it has taken all the necessary 
measures in order not to cause significant harm to the downstream riparian, yet there are disputes 
between the parties on the apportionment between them of the Euphrates water. McCaffrey, Supra, 
footnote 14, at p. 81. 
35
 Jacobs, Jeffrey W. 2002. The Mekong River Commission: Transboundary Water Resources Planning 
and Regional Security. The Geographical Journal 168 (4), at p. 357. 
36
 Campana, Michael E. 2009.We Won‟t Let Each Other Go Thirsty. SEED Magazine. Available at 
http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/the_truth_about_water_wars/ accessed 22 December 2009. 
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sharing of the Jordan River, even as they were until recently in a legal state of war.
37
 
Finally, in Africa, a framework for the Nile River Basin, home to 160 million people 
and shared among 10 countries, was agreed in February 1999 in order to fight poverty 
and spur economic development in the region by promoting equitable use of, and 
benefits from, common water resources. This initiative, supported by the World Bank 
(hereinafter the WB) and the UN Development Programme (hereinafter the UNDP), is 
a transitional arrangement until a permanent framework is put in place.
38
 The nine 
Niger River Basin countries have agreed on a framework for a similar partnership.
39
  
These cases reveal two important elements of cooperation under the term 
„international water resources management‟, they are: firstly, the need for building an 
institution that effectively develops the process of engagement over time, and 
secondly, inviting a well-established third-party support trusted by all factions.
40
 In 
such a context, it is argued that there is something missing in most of the UN and other 
nongovernmental organisations‟ reports regarding the TERB to date. Nobody has 
discussed in detail the nature of establishing any formal institution sponsored by a 
third party that would manage the TERB between the riparian States. Even where such 
an idea is mentioned, it is dealt with in a pessimistic and overwhelmingly negative 
manner. It is therefore justified to underline the present situation which emerges and to 
                                                             
37
 Morel, B., Security and the Environment in the Middle East Water Issues. in NATO Security through 
Science Series. (Ed), Environmental Security and Environmental Management: The Role of Risk 
Assessment. Netherland, Springer, 2006, at p. 24. Available at  
http://www.springerlink.com/content/n7w34hju517u/?p=de3956906c434af6a06e7de46061f334&pi=0, 
accessed 22 February 2010. 
38
 Water Without Borders. 2003. International Year of Fresh Water. Available at 
http://www.wateryear2003.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=3679&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed 16 February 2010. 
39
 Water Without Borders, International Decade for Action, Water for Life 2005–2015, The United 
Nations. Available at http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/pdf/waterborders.pdf, accessed 16 February 
2010. 
40
 Ibid. 
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call for immediate action by the riparian States to achieve a better form in 
management the TERB. 
In addressing the thesis issue, as far international agreements vis-à-vis the nature of 
conflict is concerned, the downstream State of Iraq is identified as one of the five 
countries where water supplies for irrigation are most threatened and where that threat 
could exacerbate regional instability.
41
 Notwithstanding the recent years of serious 
droughts in the region, Wolf identified Iraq as one of those countries that rely heavily 
on irrigation and whose agricultural water supplies are threatened either by a decline in 
quality or quantity. Furthermore, the list of countries most threatened coincides 
precisely with current global security concerns: India, China, Pakistan, Iran, 
Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Egypt.
42
  Turkey, the upstream co-riparian TERB 
State started building dams on both Tigris and Euphrates for hydroelectric energy and 
for agriculture purposes since 1950s while lacking any binding, single and 
comprehensive agreement between the riparian States over the joint use of the 
TERB.
43
 In addition, the construction and operation of dam projects in Turkey 
continue to threaten the use of waters in Syria and Iraq that could potentially intensify 
the conflicts more between Iraq and Turkey due to reconstruction process in Iraq
44
 and 
                                                             
41
 Statement by Thomas Chrisman, a professor of environmental engineering at the University of 
Florida who worked extensively on water projects in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Lowy, Joan., 
2004. Conflict With Iraq: Post-War Iraq Will Face Big Water Problems. Naples Daily News. Available 
at http://www.naplesnews.net/03/04/naples/d913454a.htm, accessed 23 July 2007. also
 
Onion, 
Amanda., 2004.  Postwar Iraq Faces Big Water Problems in Near and Far Future. ABC News. Available 
at http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=97667&page=1 accessed March 2010. 
42
 Wolf, Aaron T., 2007. Shared Waters: Conflict and Cooperation. Oregon State University, Corvallis. 
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077219, accessed 13 March 2009. 
43
 Ibid.  
44
 Iraq has undergone 26 years wartime devastation, which led basic services significantly deteriorating 
especially in water supply, fuel, and electricity, inadequate shelter, sanitation, and medical care are 
creating hardship for many Iraqis.  Ibid. also Sanford, Jonathan E., 2003. Iraq‟s Economy: Past, Present, 
Future. Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Division. Available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31944.pdf, accessed February 2008. 
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especially once the hydropower projects in Turkey reach completion which is believed 
to be in about 2014.
45
  
1.3 Thesis Question 
As a contribution towards addressing the issue of transboundary water law in the 
Middle East, this thesis will investigate potential cooperation over the TERB. Two key 
factors led to the building of the thesis key hypothesis. They are international 
institutions and international relations. From the view of international institutions 
regime, such institutions have influence in the resolution of freshwater conflicts, while 
international relations theory holds that these institutions, as Hafterndorn argues, 
enable the exchange of information between States, thereby increasing confidence and 
resulting in the cooperative solving of conflicts. Based on these theories, the key 
hypothesis of the current thesis asserts that international law is the principal basis for 
the State of Iraq to rely on for the purpose of achieving its legal entitlements to 
equitable and reasonable use of its transboundary waters.  
From the above mentioned hypothesis, the thesis question can be driven to consider: 
How can international water law assist Iraq in securing an equitable and reasonable 
share of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin 
In other words, how Iraq, as a new Federal State
46
 can identify its legal rights and 
obligations in sharing water with its neighbours, and further to discover the maximum 
                                                             
45
 Daly, John C. K., 2008. Turkey‟s Gap Project: A Mixed Blessing For Country And Its Neighbors. 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 5(135). Available at 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33807, accessed October 2009. 
Upon this, the possibility of conflict increases in such cases where this construction has harmful 
consequences for the lower-lying states such as water shortages. Haftendorn, Helga., 2000. Water and 
„International Conflict‟. Third Water Quarterly, 21(1), at p. 52.  
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benefit possible naturally provided by the international law for the new Iraq 
concerning the use and equitable access of shared water from the neighbouring 
countries. 
1.4 Thesis objective   
To consider the mechanism by which rights and obligations of the riparian States of 
the TERB shall be determined under international law, the thesis presents the 
following three key objectives, they are:  
Firstly, examining international law in order to establish a context by which to 
understand how international water law might be applied to the TERB, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Four.  
Secondly, to investigate and determine the legal positions of the riparian States under 
the application of the international law; Chapters Five and Six will carry out this 
obligation pursuant to Chapter Four.  
Thirdly, providing recommendations on how international water law can strengthen 
the legal framework for equitable utilisation of the TERB as a potential cooperation 
between the riparian States.  
Pursuant to the above three main objectives, synopsis of the key political, social, 
economic and environmental issues relating to the sharing of the TERB will be sub-
objective of the thesis to which Chapter Two is dedicated. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
46
 Article 1 of the New Iraqi Constitution, which States: “Article (1): The Republic of Iraq is an 
independent, sovereign nation, and the system of rule in it is a democratic, federal, representative 
(parliamentary) republic.” Constitution of Federal Republic of Iraq, 2005, reprinted at 
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf, [accessed 23 February 2010]. 
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1.5 Thesis Justification  
Once the above thesis question is understood, the justification of the thesis is quite 
obvious. There are two important elements for the thesis justifications; firstly, to 
consider why there is a need for international law in the reform of the management of 
the TERB, and secondly, why this should be examined in a PhD thesis? To address the 
first issue, for two decades Iraq has undergone wars and economic sanctions, and is 
currently under occupation.
47
 As a consequence, water infrastructure and services have 
deteriorated throughout Iraq and have left many Iraqis experiencing water shortages.
48
 
Since there is a new democratically elected government, and the country is currently 
under the reconstruction process, Iraq will need security of water supply in order to 
meet its domestic, industrial and agricultural needs. Both the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers have been, and continue to be, the most essential component of Iraq‟s economy, 
especially for irrigation, for thousands of years. Without such water security, tensions 
between the riparian States like of the January 1990 could most likely arise again. In 
that case, Turkey restricted the flow of the Euphrates River to Syria and Iraq in order 
to fill the reservoir of the Ataturk Dam
49
 that led water shortages for both Syria and 
Iraq. Thus, it is suggested that unless there is a comprehensive treaty between the 
riparian States on how to manage their joint use of the TERB, future conflict seems 
                                                             
47
Military, Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Global Security Forum. Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm, accessed 14 February 2008.  also The 
situation between Iraq and Kuwait Resolution 661, Aug. 2, 1990, U.N.S.C. at its 2932nd meeting, 
S/21470 (1990), reprinted at [accessed 26 May 2010]    
48
For example according to a report published by IRIN News website on February 6
th
 2006, residents of 
Baghdad‟s suburbs have been experiencing serious water shortages for a month due to poor 
infrastructure, leaking pipes and wastage, according to experts. Iraq: Severe water shortage hits 
Baghdad suburbs. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2006. IRIN News. 
Available at 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=51559&SelectRegion=MIddle_East&SelectCountry=IR
AQ, accessed 25 June 2008. 
49
 Al-Rubai‟i, Sahib. 1999. The Crisis of The Tigris and Euphrates Valleys and the Contrast between 
Waters and Desertification. Damascus, Dar Al-Hasad For Printing, Publishing and Distribution, at p.54. 
also Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi dispute over water, Fertile Crescent Region Analysis. 1997. Arabic News. 
Available at http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/971208/1997120807.html, accessed 12 
February 2008. 
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inevitable between Iraq and its co-riparian States particularly Turkey. So, there is a 
need to emphasise on the role of international law to strengthen the legal framework 
for managing transboundary waters.   
As for the need for a doctorate research in this field, some observers argue that water 
scarcity is not only the water problem in the Middle East, but there are greater 
problems such as lack of institutional and legal framework to determine how 
cooperation is institutionalised.
50
 Accordingly it is imperative to identify how and 
under what conditions cooperation can occur in the TERB region. While it is true that 
water is the central issue for the riparian States, the researcher believes water became 
subordinate to political issues such as the Kurdish problem. During the process of 
information collection and data analysis it was increasingly evident that legal analysis 
at the TERB level is extremely important to the riparian States as most of the key 
writers in the field have diverted their discussions to hydropolitical issues rather than 
exact legal issues. Some of the writers are implicit about the legal positions of the 
riparian States, probably trying to avoid controversial issues or due to the lack of 
updated data from the riparian States. Thus, very little updated legal analysis of the 
TERB has been made, which encouraged the researcher taking the key role and 
contribute to the field from the assumption that the rules of international law as one of 
the strongest mechanisms can support Iraq‟s legal entitlement to waters from the 
TERB. 
                                                             
50
 Jägerskog, Anders., 2003. Why states cooperate over shared water: The water negotiations in the 
Jordan River Basin. Sweden, Linköping University, Linköping, at pp. 20-21.   
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1.6 Thesis Methodology and Analytical Framework 
Considering the current the situation in Iraq, the contributions pursued by this thesis 
should have been initially prioritising the focus on the national water law and policy 
inside Iraq rather than the role of international water law to Iraq‟s joint use of water 
from the TERB. However, researches on water law and management at national level 
for a country like Iraq are not presently viable within a framework of one thesis.
51
 This 
is due to a number of factors related to internal security situations and the reluctance of 
government departments to share data, an attitude inherited from the previous regime. 
However, the researcher undertook vigorous research to obtain information from all 
possible channels and public domains  such as relevant treaties, academic books, 
articles and reports from both governmental and non-governmental organisations 
(hereinafter the NGOs) to daily news reports.
52
 Although interviewing individuals 
whose expertise is on this region could provide a significant input to this thesis, it not 
viable or a complicated task to undertake due to involving factors like security issues, 
travelling abroad and limited financial resources.  
In forming the thesis methodology, the choice of a research strategy depends on the 
purpose of the study, because it will guide to the information to the interested 
                                                             
51
 The researcher had difficulties to effectively partake, research and contribute to the field directly. The 
researcher had tried his best to obtain some information from the Iraq‟s water ministry officials for the 
cause of the current thesis while attending the World Water Forum 5, held in Istanbul, Turkey, from 
March 16
th
 to 22
nd
 2009. The researcher was told that all these information are neither subject to the 
access in public domains nor are they available for academicians and researchers to view. The reason 
was that they must be kept confidentially since most of them are connected to political deals.    
52
 The national water management, law and policy can, sooner or later, be improved and standardised if 
two barriers are removed. The first barrier is the improvement of security nationwide, which only a 
synopsis of it is given in this thesis. The second barrier is the water supply to Iraq. As it is known that 
Iraq receives water mainly from the TERB, it is reasonable to argue that advocating Iraq‟s right to 
water under the international water law becomes more imperative at the time of writing this thesis. 
While some comparative legal analysis is pursued in some areas of the thesis as a result of discussing 
applicable case studies from different parts of the world, the intention of the researcher is to mainly 
focus on the TERB. 
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individuals.
53
 In the current thesis, the researcher investigates what rights and 
obligations of the riparian States of the TERB should be subject to under international 
law, and to identify the Iraq‟s legal rights to the joint use of water subsequently. In 
other words, it is an analysis that focuses predominantly on international water law, 
but also how cooperation can be achieved in this part of the world as an outcome. 
Moreover, the thesis draws on the discipline of international law and international 
water law background, which enriches the theoretical framework for the thesis and 
supplements it with perspectives from both legal and theoretical studies. Thus, this 
kind of research needs to employ „qualitative approach‟54 within a „case study‟55 
technique
56
 that will be applied in this thesis. Moreover, it is argued that in the 
qualitative case study one will gain in terms of in-depth knowledge and lose in terms 
of the possibility of making generalisations.
57
  
As to the accuracy of the available information or sources searched for this thesis, it 
should be noted that most of the information the researcher has gathered or received 
from the respondents were written in English language. Some documents were 
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 Jägerskog, Supra, footnote 50, at p. 24. 
54
 Key regards qualitative research as a generic term for investigative methodologies which can bring 
emphasis on the enquiry at variables in the natural setting in which they are found. Key, James P., 1997. 
Research Design in Occupational Education. Oklahoma State University. Available at 
http://www.okstate.edu/ag/agedcm4h/academic/aged5980a/5980/newpage21.htm accessed 16 
December 2009. This approach is frequently criticized for not allowing generalizations to be made, and 
this argument has some validity. However, other observers argue that „generalisability‟ need not be a 
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comparative studies there is an apparent trade-off between their respective advantages.  
55
 Edson argues that „qualitative enquiry‟ is a form of „moral discourse‟ which means an attempt to 
understand ourselves in relation to the larger world. Sherman, Robert R. & Webb, Rodman B., 1988. 
Qualitative Research In Education.USA, Routledge, University of Florida, at p. 2. A case study is an 
intensive study of a specific individual or specific context. There is no single way to conduct a case 
study, and a combination of methods such as unstructured interviewing or direct observation…etc, can 
be used. Trochim, William M.K., 2006. Research Methods Knowledge Base, Web Center for Social 
Research Methods. Available at http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/order.php, accessed 15 
March 2009. 
56
 Ibid., Sherman, at p.4. 
57
 Ibid. 
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translated information from both the Arabic and Turkish languages
58
 while most 
writers who shared their expertise in the field are already native English speakers or 
able to communicate in English Language.   
1.7 Scope of the thesis 
In order to reach crucial elements in the process of the analysis and conclusion, it 
should be always recognised that water issue is inherently linked to other political 
issues such as ethnic minority issues. This issue can have a great impact on interstate 
relations of the States joint use the same water. For example Turkey and Syria have 
exchanged angry threats over the Great Anatolia Project (hereinafter „GAP‟). When 
Syria realised that it is too weak relative to Turkey, to balance the situation directly, 
Syria has given sanctuary to guerrillas of the Kurdish Workers Party (hereinafter the 
PKK), which has long been waging an insurgency against the Turkish government in 
eastern Anatolia. From the view of the Turkish government, Syria might be exploiting 
the PKK‟s position to gain leverage in bargaining over Euphrates water. As a result, in 
October 1989, the Prime Minister Turgut Ozal suggested that Turkey might impound 
the rivers water although he later retracted the threat.
59
 If Syria had not restrained the 
PKK‟s activities, the tensions between the two States would not have been calmed so 
easily. Wolf argues that international law only concerns itself with the rights and 
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 The researcher can communicate in Arabic language, but the security situation in Iraq has impeded 
the researcher‟s capability in obtaining original text from the Universities, libraries and the departments 
concerned in Baghdad for the downstream State. Moreover, the researcher cannot communicate in 
Turkish language, therefore, the preferred information gathered from the Turkish Writers are mostly 
written in English language, such as Kıbaroglu, a prime academic writer in the field. 
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 Homer, Dixon & Thomas, F., 1999. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. USA, Princeton University 
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responsibilities of States, which makes some political entities who might claim their 
water rights are not represented,
60
 such as the Kurds along the Euphrates.  
Despite the above, hydropolitical issues do have some probative value to water issues 
in the region, the researcher avoids discussing any particular ethnicity‟s right to water 
because they are considered as issues related to non-sovereign entities, that if 
considered, it might directly prejudice the main thesis hypothesis which is all about the 
application of international law. Therefore, Kurdish and other specific population 
rights will not be addressed unless it is necessarily relevant. The thesis will rather 
consider the people of the region as a whole, because water should be shared by every 
human being without favouring any race or nation.  
It is worth mentioning that the thesis also in part provides some historical background 
of water related issues in the region, as well as an account of the process of 
implementation of the water related parts of the respective agreements between the 
riparian parties of the TERB. 
1.8 Chapters of the Thesis 
After a short introduction in chapter One, a general literature review about the origins 
of river basin development is presented so as to focus on the thesis issue. The thesis 
issue was followed by the thesis question, objectives, justifications, methodology, 
scope and the outline of the thesis.    
Chapter Two highlights the three riparian States‟ need for water in connection to their 
uses of the TERB. The chapter will discuss the physical characteristics of the TERB 
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 Wolf, Supra, footnote 5, at p. 254. 
 
20 
 
such as the hydrography and geography of the TERB. The chapter then examines the 
riparian States‟ development projects on the TERB more spesifically analysing the 
economic impacts of the GAP in Turkey, followed by the environmental impacts of 
the GAP to the lower riparian States with particular attention to the social impacts by 
the GAP in Turkey. Before the conclusion of the chapter, there is a section which 
describes the reality of the new Iraq due to the invasion, including three issues of 
Iraq‟s internal water problems, water quality and the status of the agriculture sector in 
Iraq will be addressed.  
Chapter Three discusses transboundary water issues in TERB region under current 
international water law which is the main literature chapter of the thesis. The chapter 
makes a distinction between the application of international relations in comparison 
with the application of international law. The importance of this chpater is to 
demonstrate that although the former could have direct influence on transboundary 
water managment, the latter can be a direct force if the riparian States seek to a long-
lasting solution to the problem. In this context, the chapter will firstly address issues 
around water conflicts in the Middle East, such as water scarcity, food and energy 
security issues. Next, it will define the theories of conflict and cooperation. Besides 
the definitions of those two theories, types of conflicts over water resources will be 
discussed. Later on, cooperation under international politics will be analysed in detail 
through applying hegemony, hydro-hegemony and balance of power theories. Finally, 
the importance of the application of international law to the balance of power theory 
will be conferred.  
Chapter Four covers the application of international law to the riparian States. This 
chapter is the core chapter of the thesis. It endeavours to identify the rights and 
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obligations of the riparian States under international law. It starts with the definition of 
international law, and the requirements pertaining to subjects of international law. 
Also, it will examine the status of sovereignty of Iraq after the US-led invasion. 
Secondly, as the main task of the chapter, it will identify what States‟ rights are under 
international law by means of examining State‟s rights of sovereignty, independence, 
legal equality and peaceful coexistence. In the same way, States‟ obligations under 
international law will be identified by the means of States‟ obligations of self-
discipline, peaceful dispute settlement and cooperation. To regulate both States‟ rights 
and obligations under international law, there is a necessity to refer to the sources of 
international law that will be under subheadings; treaty, international custom, general 
principles of law and judicial decision and juristic opinions.  
Treaties will be defined and the role of treaties elucidated; when States are bound by a 
treaty and treaties that are not entered into force yet will also be addressed. Next, the 
chapter will analyse the formation of international custom and its elements, State 
practice and opinio juris. Lastly, the chapter will discuss the enforcement of 
international law, including the distinction to be made between international 
agreements of (general) nature and international agreements of (particular) nature, and 
the function or importance of international law. Under the enforcement section, 
particular agreements made between the riparian States and the reasons for which they 
were not successful in terms of regulating their interstate relationships will be 
discussed. 
Chapter Five is another core chapter of the thesis, mainly about the application of 
customary international water law to the TERB. The chapter will start with 
introducing the work of the International Law Commission (herineafter the ILC) on 
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the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (hereinafter the UNWC 1997), and then focuses on the application of the 
UNWC 1997. In doing so, the chapter will examine the scope of the UNWC 1997, 
substantive norms such as equitable and reasonable utilisation, obligation not to cause 
significant harm, obligation to inform, consult and engage in good faith negotiation, 
followed by the implementation instruments and dispute settlement mechanisms in 
relations to the riparian States of the TERB. Finally,  the issue of the Turkish 
persistent objection to the UNWC 1997 in relation to its treaty practice will be 
considered, which will lead to the posing arguments for the competency of the UNWC 
1997.  
Chapter Six is the thesis‟ analysis chapter, and identifies the legal positions of the 
riparian States of the TERB. Later, considerations by the Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi 
governments to the TERB will be separately discussed. In addition, compliance of 
international obligations and the application of lex lata and lex ferenda will be 
discussed in order to show that equitable utilisation, no significant harm, procedural 
rules and dispute settlements are the main keys to determine legal positions of the 
riparian States under the customary international water law.               
Chapter Seven will discuss the proposal of establishing the TERB Commission. This 
chapter is based on the main findings of the previous chapters. This chapter is more 
than a recommendation Chapter, it includes more detail than a mere recommendations 
because it discusses the importance of independent technical and legal committees to 
the management of the TERB. In this chapter, subjects like States‟ relationships, joint 
technical committee and treaty making will be discussed as a legal and institutional 
framework guideline for the riparian States‟ future management plans for the TERB. 
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Chapter Eight will be the conclusion of the thesis, re-emphasising the conclusions 
conveyed in all chapters, and followed by recommendations with the expectation of 
bringing the intended contribution to the knowledge in the field. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
WATER USES WITHIN THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES RIVER BASIN 
2.1 Introduction 
As the thesis is about Iraq‟s joint use of water from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers with 
Turkey and Syria, this chapter will discuss hydrographical structure of the TERB to 
support the discussions in the following chapters. The information provided in this 
chapter describes the physical and environmental context of the TERB and shows how 
the TERB is used by all the riparian States through examining the physical 
characteristics of the TERB, how the GAP affects the downstream riparian States‟ use 
of the TERB, and the status of water resources in Iraq since 2003 US invasion.   
In this chapter, the proportion of the TERB that extends into the territory of each 
riparian State will be examined, and the physical and social geography of the TERB 
will be presented. Subsequently, the chapter will provide hydrological details of the 
TERB, in terms of water availability, variability, quality and contribution of water to 
the TERB by each riparian State. Finally the impacts of existing water uses on the 
downstream riparian States of the TERB will be assessed.  
It is notable that from the 1970s onwards, the three riparian States have pursued large-
scale irrigation and hydropower projects within the TERB.
1
 With the commencement of 
these large-scale projects, it is suggested, water has become a source of discord between 
the riparian States of the TERB. The rapid implementation of GAP by Turkey has 
                                                             
1
 Tomanbay, Mehmet., 2000. Turkey's Approach To Utilization Of The Euphrates And Tigris Rivers.  
Arab Studies Quarterly, 22(2), at p. 1. Available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_2_22/ai_65653665/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1, accessed 17 
June 2008.  
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exacerbated this discord.
2
 It is the insufficiency of available water resources to sustain 
rapid population growth and industrialisation, coupled with pollution that has brought to 
the forefront the problem of water scarcity.
3
  Thus, some studies suggest that Turkey, 
with its snowy mountains and climate characterised by relatively abundant precipitation, 
holds the key to the solution for the Middle East water shortages.
4
  
2.2 Hydrographical context of TERB  
Both the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers are the longest rivers in Southwest Asia that 
extend beyond more than one State. Under this section, the general physical and 
geographical nature of the TERB will be described, together with details of the length 
and flow contributions to the TERB within each riparian State, and details of the 
availability, precipitation and evaporation of water in the TERB will be given. 
However, only surface water will be regarded and transboundary groundwater like the 
groundwater between Turkey and Syria will not be considered.
 5
  
Regarding the nature of the TERB, Kliot mentioned that both the Tigris and the 
Euphrates rivers are international rivers shared by Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, which 
have almost completely separate basins which unify only in their last 160 km
 
at the 
Shatt al-Arab.
6
 Although both rivers originate in the mountains of eastern Turkey, 
within about 40 km of each other, they take completely separate paths until they meet in 
                                                             
2
 Ibid., at pp.1-2. 
3
 Challenges of Water Scarcity, A Business Case for Financial Institutions. 2005. The United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and Stockholm International Water Institute 
(SIWI,), at pp. 10-19. Available at 
http://www.siwi.org/documents/Resources/Reports/Challenges_water_scarcity_business_case_study_200
5.pdf9, accessed 10 March 2009.  
4
 Ibid.  
5
 There is an international aquifers located in the border between Turkey and Syria, but they are little used 
to the present time. Sofer, Arnon & Copaken, Nina., 1999. Rivers of fire: the conflict over water in the 
Middle East. Rowman & Littlefield, at pp. 227-233. 
6
 Kliot, Nurit., 1994. Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. UK, Biddles Ltd, Guildford and 
King‟s Lynn, at p. 100. 
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Source: Klaas, Erwin E., 2003. Potential for Water Wars in the 21st Century. Presentation, 3 
April. The World Turned Upside Down, Iowa State University. Available at 
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~mariposa/waterwars.htm, accessed 20 May 2010.  
 
 
 
Shatt al-Arab 
Euphrates River 
Tigris River 
southern Iraq to form the Shatt al-Arab and flow into the Persian Gulf.
7
 However, the 
Turkish government considers that the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers form one basin 
because of their integration in the Shatt-al-Arab waterway shortly before entering the 
Persian Gulf as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. This consideration by 
Turkey will be further analysed in Chapter Six. See Figure 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin (Modified) 
 
The Tigris River is 1840 km length, of which only 22% is through Turkey, 1% through 
Syria and 77% through Iraq. However, due to its natural catchment distribution, the 
river receives 53% of its water from Turkey, while the remaining 47% of the Tigris‟ 
                                                             
7
 From the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers up to the Persian Gulf the river is known as Shatt 
al-Arab. 
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water comes from western Iran and Iraq.
8
 There is no contribution of water from Syria 
to Tigris River.  
The length of the Euphrates on the other hand is 2700 km, 40% of this length runs 
through Turkey, 20% of the through Syria, and another 40% through Iraq. The 
Euphrates River receives between 88% and 90% of its water from Turkey
9
 and the 
remaining 10% to 12% comes from Syria;
10
 Iraq‟s contribution to the river is nil. See 
Figures 3 and 4 below.   
Figure 2:  Length of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin in each riparian State. 
 
                                                             
8
 Iran‟s contribution is between 5.9% and 16%, while the rest comes from Iraq. Altinbilek, Dogan.,  2004. 
Development and Management of the Euphrates–Tigris Basin. Water Resources Development, Êjjk 
Carfax Publishing 20(1), at p. 19. Available at 
http://classshares.student.usp.ac.fj/GE203/2007/informal%20sector/conflicts/Development%20and%20m
anagement%20in%20the%20Tigris%20Basin.pdf, accessed 28 May 2009. also Kliot, Nurit., 2002.Water 
Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge, at p. 115. The long-term average annual 
natural flow of the Euphrates is between 29 and 35 billion cubic meters (bcm) and of the Tigris is 
between 49 and 50 bcm. 
9
 Kolars argue that Turkey contributes 98 per cent of the water potentially carried by the river. According 
to the official estimates Syria contributes around 12 per cent of the total, however, as Kolars noted, 10 per 
cent of that 12 per cent originates from the northern tributaries, the Khabur and the Balikh, and both have 
their catchments in Turkey. The observed average annual flow across the Turkish Syrian border is 29.8 
bmc. The natural flow of the river can be given as 33.4 bmc annually. No other tributaries flow into the 
Euphrates after the Khabur, except in Iraq, where some of the Tigris' waters are added to the Euphrates. 
Kolars, John F. & Mitchell, William., 1991. The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia 
Development Project. Southern Illinois University Press, at pp. 87-89.   
10
 This 12% is a disputed figure, since some of the water feeding Syrian tributaries comes from Turkish 
aquifers. Recently Turkey increased its consumption from these aquifers and consequently the springs 
feeding the Euphrates tributaries within Syria are drying up. The existence of these aquifers along the 
international border has led some to argue that Turkey contributes about 98% to the Euphrates. Altinbilek, 
Supra, footnote 8, at pp. 19-22. 
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Figure 3:  Annual Contributions to the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin by the 
riparian States. 
 
The Tigris River flows through Turkey until the border city of Cizre; from there, it 
forms the border between Turkey and Syria for 32 km, then crosses into Iraq at Faysh 
Khabur. Within Iraq, it gathers several tributaries such as the Greater Zap, the Lesser 
Zap, the Adhaim, and the Diyala from the Zagros Mountains to the east. The Euphrates 
River enters Syrian territory at Karkamis, downstream from the Turkish town of 
Birecik. It is joined by its major tributaries, the Balik and Khabur, as it flows southeast 
across the Syrian tablelands before entering Iraqi territory near Qusaybah. As the 
abovementioned details show, Turkey is the upstream co-riparian State, and the main 
controller of both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, while both Syria and Iraq are the 
downstream co-riparian States. Furthermore, Syria becomes the midstream co-riparian 
State as far as the Euphrates River is concerned because it is located between the 
Turkey and Iraq, and therefore, Iraq becomes the extreme downstream co-riparian State 
of the Euphrates River.   
There is some controversy over the drainage area of the TERB due to disagreement on 
the length of the Tigris River and the share by each co-riparian State. However, this 
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thesis uses the most accurate data. The Tigris River drainage area is measured to be 
235,000 km
2
, of which 105,750 km
2
, about 45%, is in Iraq. However, according to 
Dolatyar, and Gray, Iraq‟s share of the Tigris is 78%, Turkey‟s share is 20% and Syria‟s 
share is 2%.
11
 See figure 4 below, which is according to Dolatyar‟s claim.  
Figure 4: The drainage area of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin in each riparian 
States 
The drainage area of the Euphrates is widely accepted to be 444,000 km
2
. However, the 
share by each co-riparian State is disputed. Some authorities put the Turkish share at 
28%, with Syria at 17%, Iraq 40% and Saudi Arabia 15%. See the above figure 5.  
Others apportion the relative shares according to the length of the river in each country.  
The flow of both Rivers is characterised by high annual and seasonal variability. The 
average flow for Tigris River is 520 m
3
/s at the border between Turkey and Syria, which 
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 Dolatyar, M. & Gray, T.S., 2000. Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict or Co-
Operation? Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, at p. 121.  also Downstream Impacts of Turkish Dam 
Construction on Syria and Iraq: Joint Report of Fact-Finding Mission to Syria and Iraq. 2002. Kurdish 
Human Rights Project, The Ilisu Dam Campaign The Corner House, at p. 4. Available at 
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is about 16.2 billion m
3
/year.
12
 The lowest flow was 9.6 billion m
3
 in 1973, and the 
highest was 34.3 billion m
3
 in 1969. Meanwhile flow in April is normally about 1433 
m
3
/s, while the driest month is September at a flow of 113 m
3
/s. According to the 
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (hereinafter the „DSI‟), the average 
annual flow of the Tigris at Cizre in 2005 was 16.6 billion m
3
/a in which more than half 
of the flows occur during the wet season, essentially between March and May.
13
 When 
the river reaches the middle part of Iraq, around Baghdad, the average flow becomes 
about 1236 m
3
/s,
14
 or 39 billion m
3
/a, of which 55 % originates from tributaries in Iraq. 
As to the Euphrates River, its actual annual volume can reach 35.9 billion m
3
/a, 
according to the official reports.
15
  
The average annual discharge of the Euphrates is 32 billion m
3
/a. As for the Tigris and 
its tributaries, the average annual discharge is 50 billion m
3
/a. Such a quantity is said to 
be fairly enough for vital needs of the three riparian States.
16
 Yet, during the technical 
negotiations the riparian governments declared their needs from both rivers, which 
indicated that total demand of the three riparian States far exceeds the supply of each 
river especially in the case of the Euphrates.
17
 Hence, there is a mismatch between 
supply (average discharge) and demand for water from the TERB. Moreover, the Rivers 
have extremely high seasonal and multi-annual variance in their flow. The natural flow 
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 This figure can be various from one year to another. For example, if in year 1 we get 520 m3/s, the 
annual flow will be over 16.3 billion m3/y. This calculation is made by the researcher as follows:  60 
seconds X 60 minutes X 24 hours X 365 days = 31.536.000 X ~520 m3/s= 16.398.720.000 m3/year 
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 Ilisu Consortium, Ilisu Dam and HEPP. 2005.  Environmental Impact Assessment Report. Available at 
http://www.dsi.gov.tr/ilisu/ilisu_ced_eng_ek1.PDF, accessed 19 December 2009. 
14
 Williams, Philip & Associates. A Review of the Hydrological and Geomorphic Impacts of the Proposed 
Ilisu Dam, Report for the Corner House, San Francisco. in Downstream Impacts of Turkish Dam 
Construction on Syria and Iraq: Joint Report of Fact-Finding Mission to Syria and Iraq. 2002. Kurdish 
Human Rights Project, The Ilisu Dam Campaign. The Corner House. Available at 
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15
 Ibid. 
16
 Tomanbay, Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 1-2. 
17
 Kibaroglu, A., 2002. Building A Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin. London, 
Kluwer Law International, at p. 70.  
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of the river passing from Turkey to Syria and from Syria to Iraq does change due to 
irrigation and energy projects that the riparian States have already initiated. The rapidly 
increasing populations of these countries and the importance given to agricultural 
development and food production necessitate further utilisation of the TERB.
18
 The 
scarcities in these major river basins of the Middle East constitute the background of the 
transboundary water politics in the region, which is analysed below through consecutive 
historical episodes in the 20
th
 century.
19
  
As to the relative irrigable land area between the riparian States, according to 
Tomanbay, Iraq has a larger irrigable area than Syria, but through the dependence on the 
canals like Thartar Canal which link the Euphrates and the Tigris, Iraq may have the 
option of using water from the Tigris for irrigation, instead of from the Euphrates; water 
which would otherwise flow unutilised.
20
 Consequently, a transfer of water from the 
Tigris to the Euphrates is considered as a method to alleviate the water shortage in Iraq. 
Furthermore, as is the case with Syria, most of Iraq‟s land is low-lying and afflicted by 
deposits of gypsum and salt. A large portion of the Iraqi territory rarely exceeds 300m 
elevation, with only 15 percent reaching as high as 450 m. This topography limits Iraq‟s 
ability to impound the waters of the Euphrates behind high dams; consequently, they 
empty into the Gulf without being put to use. 
In the Turkish territory, an area of nearly 2.5 million hectares were expected to be 
efficiently irrigated from the Euphrates and the Tigris within the scope of the GAP, due 
to 67 % of good land quality that would benefit from efficient irrigation. It is suggested 
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 Kibaroglu, A., 2008. The Role of Epistemic Communities in Offering New Cooperation Frameworks in 
the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers System. Journal of International Affairs, 61( 2), at p.183. 
19
 Kibaroğlu, A., 2007. Politics Of Water Resources, In The Jordan, Nile And Tigris-Euphrates: Three 
River Basins, Three Narratives, Perceptions. Available at 
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that an area of 1,796,568 hectares of land can be efficiently irrigated from the 
Euphrates, and not from the Tigris, within the scope of GAP. The area Turkey plans to 
irrigate from the Euphrates within the scope of GAP is 1,091,203 hectares. Given these 
facts, a comparison of the surface areas to be irrigated by Syria and Turkey from the 
Euphrates would be useful. The good quality land which, though irrigable from the 
Euphrates, is not included within the scope of GAP irrigation schemes is 705,365 
hectares.
21
  
In Syria, as indicated, the total area irrigable from the Euphrates is 482,000 hectares, 
which is only 0.77 % of its irrigable land of which a good part is already under 
irrigation. As it can be seen from these figures, Turkey's claim on water for irrigation is 
stronger since it has approximately four times more irrigable land than Syria which can 
be irrigated from Euphrates. It is estimated that Turkey has almost seven times more 
irrigable land than Syria if the entire Basin region is taken into account.
22
  
As to the case for Iraq, according to the official statement from the University of 
Michigan, Iraq‟s irrigable lands is estimated to be about 1,950,000 hectares, while 
according to John Kolars, Iraq‟s irrigable land is only about 1,290,000 hectares.23 
However, if an average between the two estimations, 1,620,000 hectares, is used, the 
amount of the irrigable land in Iraq is relatively close to that of Turkey. If the security 
situation in Iraq stabilises, and the new government inaugurates developing the 
agriculture sector, then upon new researches and technology, the data for irrigable land 
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 Ibid., at p. 3. 
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in Iraq may show that Iraq has a greater irrigable land  than in Turkey. This puts Iraq in 
a more controversial position when negotiating  on its joint shares of the TERB with 
Turkey and Syria on the grounds of the equitable utilisation principle. See Figure 5 
below.      
 
 
 
Figure 5: Lands irrigable from Euphrates flows (million hectare) 
It is noteworthy that these very general data provide some bases for rational and 
reasonable use of the Euphrates by the riparian States. Yet, according to Kolars, Syria 
has been criticised or claiming a portion of the Euphrates flow even though the barren 
land within its territory is not irrigable and the water would flow through its territory 
with no significant benefit.
24
 Although Syria‟s claim is not accepted by the upstream 
State of Turkey, the Syrian claim has more merits in the case of Iraq. The reason is that 
Iraq demands a flow which can satisfy the irrigable lands that Tigris River alone cannot 
serve.  
Interestingly, official data given by the riparian States to non-governmental firms and 
organisations are inconsistent on the total irrigation project areas fed by the Euphrates. 
Such inconsistent data misleads analysts
25
 attempting to determine how much water 
exactly is needed by any riparian State. For example, various sources have stated that 
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the actual irrigation coverage planned by Syria range from as low as 400.000 to 1 
million hectares, but the final estimations shows a total coverage between 400.000 and 
800.000 hectares. Thus, if irrigable land in Syria is taken to be 400.000 hectares, and 
assuming that the production of one tonne wheat needs 1200 m
3
, as Bilden argues, then 
the total water consumption needed is 4.8 bm
3
, however, when Syria claims 773.000 
hectares of irrigable land, it means 9.3 bm
3 
is required.
26
 If that is the case for Syria 
which is relatively in a better position in terms of security and developments compared 
to Iraq, it can be argued that the scenario for Iraq would be worse on the grounds of 
nearly three decades of war and devastation that will be mentioned in this chapter. 
2.3 Water development projects in TERB region by the riparian States. 
Kliot suggested that major projects on the TERB were carried out between 1960s to late 
1980s while some are still under construction. For Kliot, lack of coordination among the 
riparian States, and competition over the Euphrates River in particular, has increased the 
need for integrated planning of the TERB particularly when realising that the main 
objective of building those dams were for multipurpose water projects such as 
irrigation, flood control, water storage and hydro-electricity.
27
 Although the purposes 
behind these projects are similar in each riparian State, the lack of coordination has led 
each State to prioritise their own interests rather than considering the interests of the 
TERB as a whole. Table 1 below shows the completion of dam construction projects 
over the Euphrates River by the riparian States. One important matter is the large 
storage capacity issue. Each riparian State prefers to develop water storage capacity 
within their own territory instead of sharing the TERB water resources. Thus, Turkey 
has accumulated for itself a storage capacity of 90 to 100 billion m
3
 with Keban, 
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Karakaya and Ataturk dams. Syria has developed a capacity of 12 billion m
3
, while Iraq 
has a storage capacity of 100 billion m
3
.  However, it is suggested that the Euphrates 
Rivers does not have such a capacity to fill all the present and planned reservoirs, and 
the 1974, 1988 and 1989 drought years experiences showed that each Turkey and Syria 
have preferred to follow their own self interests by filling their own reservoirs instead of 
sending the water downstream to Iraq.
28
  
The year 2008 was considered as another severely dry year in the whole Middle East. 
That year was regarded as a year of drought and sand storms across Iraq that has 
devastated the country‟s crucial wheat crop and created new worries about the safety of 
drinking water. The dry weather has even affected Kurdistan‟s wheat fields in northern 
Iraq to pomegranate orchards, orange groves and wheat fields just north of Baghdad.
29
 
To reduce the adverse effects of such a dry year on Iraq, the Iraqi government has 
opened talks with Turkey and Syria with the ambition to increase the flow of the 
Euphrates and alleviate Iraq from severe water shortages.
30
 Nevertheless, there is no 
guarantee that in future drought years, Turkey and Syria will not prioritise their own 
interests before considering the water resource needs of Iraq. 
Another important feature of these reservoirs is the amount of water lost due to 
evaporation. The potential water losses for all the reservoirs in Turkey are estimated at 
1.5 to 2.0 billion m
3 
per year; the 630 million m
3 
per year water loss estimated for the 
Tabqa Dam represents about 2% of the annual flow of the Euphrates. However, water 
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loss in Iraq is much higher than Turkey and Syria. It is estimated to be about 4.79 
billion m
3 
per year from the evaporation calculations at Haditha Dam, Lake Habbniya, 
Abu Dibbis and Tharthar which are located in regions of high evapor-transpiration.
31
 In 
fact, Iraq loses 7% of water from the Tigris River and 8.5% from Euphrates through 
evaporation.
32
 That is equal to 15.5 % of the total amount of water lost in Iraq from the 
TERB.  
Despite the above significant factors and water problems between the riparian States, 
Turkey has bright additions to the struggle for the water. Turkey established the GAP in 
the early 1980s which, once completed, will cause Syria and Iraq to face more serious 
water shortages. The following section will discuss the economic and environmental 
impacts of GAP on the riparian States. 
2.4 Economic benefits of GAP to Turkey 
According to the claims made in Turkey and by Turkish writers, the main objective of 
the GAP is to reduce regional economic inequality between the western and the 
underdeveloped southeastern areas of Turkey by mobilising regional resources, 
increasing productivity and creating employment opportunities for the local people.
33
 
The ultimate aim of increasing per capita income is to encourage political and social 
stability in the region.
34
 Southeast Anatolia is the third largest agricultural region in 
Turkey, with a total land area of 7.4 million hectares, of which 40% is under cultivation. 
Currently 129,740 hectares are under irrigation and 2,628,700 hectares are so-called 
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„rain-fed agriculture‟. However, agriculture is not highly mechanised in this area.35 To 
support the economic benefits of the area, the GAP includes plans for irrigation and 
domestic water supply and hydroelectric energy plants. Seven projects are located in the 
Euphrates river basin and six are in the Tigris river basin. It is expected that on 
completion, the GAP will regulate 28% of Turkey‟s total water potential and enable 1.7 
million hectares to be irrigated, approximately 50% of the total irrigated area in Turkey. 
Economic development in the region is expected as a result of improved irrigation so 
that the region can contribute to, rather than be a burden on, the national economy. The 
objective is to encourage commercial farming in order to develop the production of cash 
crops and agro-industries, such as food processing for export. 
Within the GAP, two major dams Karakaya and Ataturk together generate a 
considerable share of electricity entering into the national grid system.
36
 The monetary 
value of energy generated by Karakaya and Ataturk dams is equivalent to 9.3 billion US 
Dollars, which in terms of alternative sources of energy, can correspond to the fuel 
importation of 38.8 million tons of oil or 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas.
37
  The 
total population of the region is 5.2 million – 9.2% of the total Turkish population 
according to 1990 census. Urbanisation has been rapid in recent years and 56% of the 
population live in urban areas. The fertility rate in the region is high at 5.7%, compared 
with the national average for Turkey of 3.4%.  
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The GAP project was scheduled for completion in 2010, but this deadline has now been 
extended due to financial problems. Former State Minister Salih Yildirim has stated that 
the economic steps do not fit the regional realities and several mistakes have been made 
in determining the priorities of the region. He has pointed out that “politicians put their 
political calculations before the realities in the region”. Table 2 below exhibits the 
nature of the projects of each dam on both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. 
Up until the 56
th
 Turkish government,
38
 eight economic plans had been put in place for 
the GAP. In these plans some important goals were set forth,
 39
 and were reached on 
time.
40
 This plan was particularly laid down after Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was 
arrested the government tried again to give more importance to the GAP by 
implementing economic measures for the development of the region.     
2.5 Negative impacts of GAP on the riparian States 
Other than the prospective economic benefits of GAP for Turkey, it is imperative to 
discuss GAP‟s negative impacts on the riparian States. Without detailed discussions on 
the environmental impacts og the GAP to the riparian States, this section will only focus 
on declining water quality due to erosion, salinisation, sedimentation and wastewater for 
the downstream States, then discussing impacts on the archaeological places and the 
social life within Turkey. The justifications for not discussing environmental issues in 
details come from the fact that most of the environmental damage in Iraq was due to the 
two decades of wars and economic sanction imposed on Iraq. Next, there are no clear 
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and reliable data to identify the how exactly the environment is affected by the GAP 
project, in which it is not completed yet, and how it will further causes environmental 
damage in the future when the project completes. Finally, brief relevant environmental 
impacts on Iraq‟s marshlands will be discussed in the next section. The total GAP area 
is 7.4 million hectares, of which 5.5 million hectares are affected by moderate to very 
intensive water erosion. According to Sahan, this area is steep volcanic terrain and 
erosion has been significant enough to expose underlying sub-soils and rock structure. 
Furthermore, an area of 4 million hectares now has a problem with this increased 
bedrock exposure. Farmers in the area still attempt to cultivate their land by removing 
the loose stones.
41
 The impact of erosion weakens the Turkish government‟s argument 
that they possess a better quality of irrigable land than Syria and Iraq, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Six,
42
 because this land may soon no longer be suitable for 
agriculture.   
Next, because of inappropriate and excessive irrigation there has also been an increase 
in salinisation. In the Harran valley, part of the GAP area, 150,000 hectares is already 
suffering from aridity due to salinisation even though irrigated agriculture only started 
in this region in 1995.
43
 Furthermore, the higher volume of salinity in the upstream 
watercourse created by human activity could seriously damage the agricultural land in 
downstream States.  
The erosion in the upper reaches of the TERB has also caused sedimentation problems. 
For example 10% of the volume of the Ataturk Reservoir has been filled with sediment. 
However, complete sedimentation will take 500 years in this reservoir because of the 
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Keban and Karakaya dams which are located above the Ataturk dam. This differs from 
the sedimentation rate of other dams in Turkey, many of which only have a 50 year 
lifespan. Soil erosion, due to insufficient forest and vegetation cover, is also a problem 
in the GAP region. Together these reasons explain why 72.3% of the region is facing 
intensive soil erosion.
44
 Thus, sedimentation problems do not give a long life to the 
dams within the GAP region other than Ataturk, Keban and Karakaya, that makes the 
whole project economically and practically inefficient for the government of Turkey 
bearing in mind the project has not been completed yet.     
Another matter is that wastewater from the surrounding catchment flows directly into 
the Ataturk reservoir, which is used as a drinking water source. However, there is not 
enough data to evaluate the situation. Experience with reservoir projects indicates that 
present health education programs and the setting up of laboratories will not be 
sufficient to protect the affected people from waterborne diseases.
45
 If the wastewater is 
not properly treated before being discharged into the reservoir, the quality of the water 
will deteriorate potentially causing ecological and health issues for both Syria and Iraq 
downstream. 
It is worth mentioning that water quality in the Euphrates is affected by return flows 
from irrigation projects in Turkey and Syria, and is expected to worsen as more land is 
turned to irrigated. Within Iraq, much of the return flow is now drained into the Arab 
Gulf through the Main Outfall Drain, but considerable saline return flow enters the river 
system. On the Tigris River, the quality is further degraded with flood flows diverted 
into off-stream storage in the highly saline Tharthar Lake, and later returned to the river 
system carrying salts washed from the lake. Irrigation practices since historical times 
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have contributed to salinisation of farmland. Not only do increased salts accumulate in 
the soil profile but water quality directly impacts crop yields. 
With regards to archaeological impacts, there are some settlements of historical 
importance in the region that will be submerged by the construction of dams. For 
example, the Birecik Dam would flood Zeugma, Apamea, Urima and Halfeti where the 
planners indicate that only two-fifths of Halfeti will be under water. It was also decided 
that water from this dam will be used as drinking water, not only for irrigation and 
energy. Because of this, the rest of the settlement must be abandoned because of the 
laws about the protection of drinking water sources. So, people from this area would 
have to relocate.
46
 Except for the town citadel and its castle and palace, Ilisu Dam will 
submerge Hasankeyf, a first degree archaeological site. Other structures, which are 
unique to the region such as monumental bridges and many man-made caves carved 
into the rocks, will be lost under the Ilisu Dam Reservoir.
47
  
For social impacts in this region, the majority of inhabitants are of Kurdish origin, but 
are bilingual Kurdish and Turkish. The elder generation in this region mainly speaks 
Kurdish.
48
 However, an interesting matter reveals when talking about the land 
distribution. In fact the land is not equally distributed among the population of the 
Southeast Anatolia. The most distinguishing feature of the GAP region is the large-scale 
landowners in a country characterised by small family farms. This is because land was 
given to tribal leaders for political support during the Ottoman Empire. These land 
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holdings have since been passed on down the family line.
49
 So, abuse in human rights 
issues will be raised if the government of Turkey proceed with the GAP and attempt to 
relocate people while ignoring the consequences of such relocation.
50
 Past experience 
showed that the resettlement plans were very poor. The worse scenario now is for the 
Ilisu dam, there are no detailed resettlement plans; this causes the local people to 
distrust the government.
51
 This plan, if implemented without a careful consideration,
52
 
could jeopardise Turkey‟s status for acceding the European Union.  
Finally, the impact of the GAP will be more serious on Iraq if the full development is 
achieved because the water flow of the Euphrates will decrease substantially.  
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Besides the GAP, Turkey has the capability of supplying water to all the regions it may 
need for irrigation provided that financial and technical difficulties are no longer 
obstacles. The reason is that Turkey can be regarded as self-sufficient in water due to 
the many rivers inside its territory, although some writers from Turkey claim the 
opposite. The „Peace Water Pipeline‟ proposed by President Turgut Özal in 1986 is the 
evidence supporting the researcher‟s claim. Gruen said:  
“The concept of exporting Turkish water to promote regional peace 
and economic development in the Middle East has been a constant in 
Turkish foreign policy since the late President Turgut Özal in 1986 
proposed an extensive "Peace Water Pipeline" This was a $21 
billion project to bring vast quantities of water from the Seyhan and 
Ceyhan Rivers via two pipelines to supply the major cities in Syria, 
Jordan, and the Arab Gulf states. The pipelines could convey 10 
million cubic meters of water every day, which was estimated as 
sufficient to meet the needs of 15 million persons.”53 
Although the Turkish proposal was rejected by the Arab States due to the Arab-Israel 
conflicts, it can be said that such a massive project could in fact promote great and 
exemplary regional stability. Such a proposal shows that the availability of water in 
Turkey may be greater than its national demand for water.  
2.6 The reality of the new Iraq 
Under this section, Iraq‟s national struggles for water as a result of Gulf Wars I and II, 
economic sanctions and the current occupation by the allied forces will be discussed. 
The justification is to identify how GAP could worsen the situation in Iraq.  
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2.6.1 Iraq’s internal water problems   
Two devastating wars, a decade of debilitating sanctions, and a recent lawless spate of 
looting have left the Iraqi water infrastructure struggling and, for the most part, failing 
to provide Iraqis with potable water. According to Dahr , the UN reported that prior to 
the 1991 Gulf War (GW I), Baghdad received about 450 litres per person supplied by 
seven treatment plants withdrawing water from the Tigris River. The rest of the country 
had about 200 to 250 litres per person per day, purified and supplied by 238 water-
treatment plants and 1,134 smaller water projects. However, with the bombing from the 
U.S.-led coalition during the GW I widespread destruction of power plants, oil 
refineries, water treatment facilities and manufacturing plants for water treatment 
chemicals occurred. In addition, all facilities which depended on electricity for 
operation went out of service. As a result, the supply of water per person in Baghdad 
dropped to less than 10 litres per day.
54
 
When the GW I ended, recovery efforts improved supplies but only to a level less than 
ten percent of the previous overall supply. Fuel for backup generators was in short 
supply, as were parts and manpower necessary to run backup devices. Bomb-damaged 
water treatment facilities and the associated power facilities were unable to operate, 
thereby allowing the release of untreated sewage directly into the Tigris River, which is 
the primary source of water for Baghdad and most of the rest of Iraq‟s water treatment 
plants.  
During the following decade, the effect of the GW I and the strict sanctions on the water 
supply in Iraq led to a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions. The sanctions 
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prevented Iraq from importing much specialty equipment on which it depends for 
processing the brackish water found in the region. Chemicals used to treat water, such 
as chlorine, were also barred from entering the country.
55
 
According to UN Children‟s Fund (hereinafter the UNICEF), the cripplng sanctions‟ 
effect on water services resulted in the deaths of some hundreds of thousands of Iraqi 
children. In a 1991 United States Defence Department document, declassified in 1995, 
the Pentagon revealed that it had predicted the crisis and acted to limit Iraqi potable 
water capability anyway. The document says, “Failing to secure supplies will result in a 
shortage of pure drinking water for much of the population. This could lead to increased 
incidences, if not epidemics, of disease.
56
  
Furthermore, the lack of clean drinking water in Iraq is fundamentally changing the way 
typical Iraqis lead their everyday lives. Households find themselves suffering from 
health problems associated with bad water quality, and their lives increasingly defined 
by the pressures exerted by the scarcity of water. Most of the foreign companies who 
were contracted to provide water services to the Iraqis have failed to operate for various 
reasons. For example repairs are often constrained by lack of security while many of the 
water and sewage treatment plants are dependent on electricity for their normal 
operations.
57
 Besides that the Tigris River has long been described by local 
environmentalists as a graveyard of bodies. In addition, the water level is decreasing as 
pollution increases. The pollution in the River is caused by oil derivatives and industrial 
waste as well as Iraqi and US military waste. Previously Tigris River was considered as 
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one of the main sources of water, food, transport and recreation for the local population 
but after four years of war and pollution, it is now considered as a stagnant sewer.
58
  
The report mentions further that some back-up generators exist but many of these 
systems are plagued by the lack of spare parts and normal maintenance, vandalism, and 
lack of fuel. In addition, there is a general lack of trained manpower to operate the 
treatment plants on a regular basis while solid waste collection and disposal is hampered 
by a lack of a trucking fleet and excavators. The report‟s assertion that there was no 
wastewater treatment and very little water treatment prior to GW I is an extreme 
exaggeration.  
Finally, the situation in the middle and northern parts of Iraq is no less worrying. In the 
capital, for instance, the Tigris River is at its lowest level since 2001, with broad areas 
of reeds exposed on each bank. To the north of Baghdad the flow in some irrigation 
canals, particularly in Diyala province, is considered to be so low that it is too salty and 
unfit for human consumption, or even for use on plants and by animals. Further north, 
there are many dry canals and barren fields to be seen. In Kurdistan, some villagers 
have left their homes and headed to cities because the village wells have dried up. 
Disease has become widespread in the north of Iraq as well; cholera has broken out, the 
disease is typically spread by contaminated water, a higher risk when rivers are stagnant 
and wells low.
59
 Thus, Iraq can be considered as in the grip of a severe drought and 
desperately needs more water for drinking and agriculture. Such a dire situation calls for 
immediate tripartite negotiations and a sole treaty on the management of the TERB with 
                                                             
58
 The river is gradually being destroyed and there are no projects to prevent its destruction. Iraq: River 
Tigris Becoming A Graveyard Of Bodies. 2008. IRIN Report, Humanitarian News and Analysis, A 
Project of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available at 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=72023, accessed 13 May 2009. 
59
 Iraq in water talks with Turkey, Syria as rivers run dry. 200. The Raw Story website. Available at 
http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Iraq_in_water_talks_with_Turkey_Syr_05272008.html, accessed 23 July 2008. 
47 
 
Turkey and Syria notwithstanding that neither Turkey nor Syria can be fully blamed for 
this situation. It was the war and internal conflicts created this mess. However, such a 
bad status can be mitigated if the riparian States are willing to increase the quantity and 
to some degree the better quality of the waters entering Iraq.    
 2.6.2 Status of the Marshlands in Iraq 
The marshlands in southern Iraq are considered as the largest wetland ecosystem in the 
Middle East and Western Eurasia. In addition to that, they are seen as crucial part of 
intercontinental flyways for migratory birds; they support endangered species, and 
sustain freshwater fisheries, as well as those of the Persian Gulf. Also they are unique 
from the global perspective of human heritage as they have been home to indigenous 
communities for millennia and are regarded as the site of the legendary „Garden of 
Eden‟.60  
These marshlands have been seriously damaged during the last two decades by 
dewatering of the area to foster agricultural production as well as to divert waters away 
from the marshes for political reasons.  This has had an adverse impact on the 
ecosystem and the indigenous populations. Furthermore, the total area of 17 000 km
2
 
has shrunk to about 3 000 km
2
 by middle of 2009 attributable to the construction of a 
number of dams upstream whether inside Iraq, Syria or in Turkey.
61
 According to the 
UNEP, the serial satellite images confirm a loss of around 90 percent of the area of lake 
and marshlands. Accordingly, this rapid decline represents one of the most significant 
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environmental events to have occurred globally during the past three decades.
62
 
Although attempts at restoration were made after the 2003 invasion, the potential 
success of these restoration efforts depends primarily on the availability of sufficient 
quantities and satisfactory quality of water to the marshland. The loss of such an 
important habitat illustrates the pressures on wetlands in the region, which are likely to 
intensify in future as demand for water continues to increase. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The Tigris and Euphrates are the main focus of development by the three riparian 
States. From what has been shown in this Chapter, it can be concluded that all the 
riparian States have affected the development of the TERB particularly in terms of 
utilising and polluting the TERB. It is submitted that with the commencement of large-
scale projects in the TERB has become a source of discord between the riparian States. 
For example, the rapid implementation of the Turkey‟s GAP has caused a further 
deterioration in the relationship between the riparian States. 
Although no major projects on the Euphrates inside Syria were mentioned in this 
Chapter, it can be assumed that the natural flow of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers do 
change as they pass from Turkey through Syria to Iraq, due to irrigation and energy 
projects that the riparian States have already initiated. Another input to this problem is 
that rapidly increasing populations of these countries and the importance given to 
agricultural development and food production necessitate further utilisation of the 
TERB.  
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Although there is no consensus on the relative irrigable land area between the riparian 
States, from the available data it can be concluded that Iraq has a larger irrigable area 
than Syria. Moreover, the amount of the irrigable land in Iraq is relatively close to that 
of Turkey. Perhaps, if the situation in Iraq stabilises and actual development carried out, 
the irrigable land in Iraq could be greater than that of Turkey. This gives an advantage 
to Iraq when negotiating their share of the TERB resources with Turkey and Syria based 
on the equitable utilisation principle.  
It was argued that lack of co-ordination among the riparian States, and competition over 
the Euphrates River in particular, has increased the need for integrated planning of the 
TERB. Furthermore, the main objective of building the dams were for multipurpose 
water projects such as irrigation, flood control, water storage and hydro-electricity.  
In terms of environmental impacts, it was concluded that the GAP has caused erosion, 
salinisation, sedimentation and pollution potentially affecting the riparian States 
especially Iraq as the downstream co-riparian State. Besides that, it has or will lead to 
mass displacement in the GAP region that has adverse effects for the local communities 
in the area and has impacted on important archaeological sites..  
Inside Iraq, due to 23 years of wars, economic sanctions, the US-led invasion and lack 
of security, the water infrastructure has been left in a dismal state, despite some 
improvement efforts since 2003. Also the water quality of both rivers has deteriorated 
mainly as a result of pollution created by all the actors. Next, the government‟s 
interventionist agricultural policies since the 1980s, have meant that, economically, 
agricultural outputs have not been commensurate with investments. Last but not least, 
the southern marshlands in Iraq are in their worst state for three decades and will face 
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further adverse consequences as a result of water shortages when the GAP 
implementation is complete.       
Finally, many observers consider the Euphrates as a regional water resource capable of 
overcoming water shortages in the region. However, most of the studies to date have 
focussed on the State policies pertaining political and social issues that directly or 
indirectly influence the inter-State relationships at the TERB level. There has been far 
less observation and application of international law towards solving this significant 
issue for the people of the region, although some prominent writers like McCaffery and 
Wolf have referred to the position of international law on the issue. What is important 
here is to examine how international law can solve this problem between the riparian 
States rather simply the setting out of legal positions. In other words, guidance is needed 
from international law on how to implement better water management in the region. 
Such guidance should be capable of attracting all the riparian States towards real 
cooperation.  
Hence, in light of the recent developments given in this Chapter, it is imperative to 
theoretically examine all the factors that contribute to strengthening international law 
and future cooperation between the riparian States in the management of the TERB. 
These factors include the importance of the TERB to the riparian States, power 
asymmetry issues vis-a-vis States‟ rights and obligations under international law, the 
legal positions of the riparian States under the current international water law, and how 
to introduce a legal framework for managing the TERB. Each of the above issues will 
be examined separately in different chapters.   
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Next Step 
The following Chapter Three will analyse whether Turkey as the upstream State of the 
TERB can be considered as a State exercising hegemony; does it impose its policy in 
the region since there is a situation of power asymmetry between the riparian States?  
How does international law respond to this situation? These issues will be examined 
through considering transboundary water issues in the TERB region under current 
international water law.  
52 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
‘TERB’: TRANSBOUNDARY WATER QUANDARY BETWEEN THE THREE 
RIPARIAN STATES 
3.1 Introduction  
Writers from many different disciplines have covered various themes in respect of the 
TERB. For example Zeitoun
1
 and Haftendorn
2
 have covered the political aspects of the 
TERB through examining the theories of hegemony and hydro-hegemony. The 
surrounding economic and scientific topics close to this subject are written by 
Professors Allan
3
 and Wolf.
4
 On the other hand, McCaffrey,
5
 a prominent international 
water law writer, has written significant articles and books on the application of 
international water law, and applied it partly to the TERB and other transboundary 
rivers in the world. He has discussed political issues at the TERB level without 
significant deviation from the main subject of international water law. Finally, Wouters 
and Vinogradov
6
 have proposed the third approach, which is in fact unique from the 
                                                             
1
 Zeitoun, Mark & Warner, Jeroen., 2003.Transboundary water conflicts in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Water Communicating International Development Research, ID 21 Natural resources Highlights. 
Available at http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/, accessed 17 May 2010. also Vagts, Detlev F., 2001. Hegemonic 
International Law. The American Journal of International Law, 95(4), at p. pp. 843-848. also Christopher, 
Chase-Dunn.,1994. Hegemony and Social Change. Mershon International Studies Review, 38(2), at pp. 
361-376. also Lake, David A., 1993. Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked 
Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential? International Studies Quarterly, 37(4), at p. 459-489. Also 
Loewenstein, Karl., 1954. Sovereignty and International Co-operation. The American Journal of 
International Law, 48(2), at pp. 222-244. also Lipsitz, George., 1988. The Struggle for Hegemony. The 
Journal of American History, 75(1), at pp. 146-150. also Mares, David R., 1988. Middle Powers under 
Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement. International Studies 
Quarterly, 32 (4), at pp. 453-471. 
2
 Haftendorn, Helga., 2000. Water and „International Conflict‟. Third Water Quarterly, 21(1), at pp. 52-
55.  
3
Allan, Antony J., 2002. Hydro-Peace in the Middle East: Why no Water Wars? A Case Study of the 
Jordan River Basin. SAIS Review, 22(2). Available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/toc/sais22.2.html, accessed 10 May 2010.  
4
 Wolf, Aaron T., 1996. Middle East Water Conflicts and Directions for Conflict Resolution. Food, 
Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 12, International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C. Available at http://www.ifpri.org/2020/dp/dp12.pdf, accessed 10 August 2008. 
5
 McCaffrey, Steven C., 2001.  The Law Of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses.Oxford 
University Press, at p.17.  
6
 Wouters, Patricia., et al. 2005. Sharing Transboundary Waters: An Integrated Assessment of Equitable 
Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model. International Hydrological Programme, IHP VI, Technical 
Documents in Hydrology, (74).  also Wouters, D. P.,1999. The Legal Response to International Water 
Scarcity and Water Conflicts: The UN Watercourses Convention and Beyond. Natural Resources Forum, 
Dundee, The African Water Page. Available at http://www.africanwater.org/pat_wouters1.htm#_ftnref2, 
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others. Their approach is to focus on the role of water law both nationally and 
internationally in the development of an integrated water resources management 
strategy. According to Wouters and Vinogradov, only when States successfully 
recognise and observe their rights and obligations under international law, will the other 
issues be resolved. The current thesis continues in this direction without disregarding 
other writers‟ approaches. Hence, the purpose of this literature review is to consolidate 
the hypothesis and rationale of the thesis, which addresses the main research question to 
demonstrate that international law is the principal instrument to support Iraq to achieve 
its legal entitlements to equitable and reasonable use of its transboundary waters.  
Pursuant to the abovementioned hypothesis, the overall framework of the chapter 
elaborates on the issues mentioned in the above paragraph, before discussing the 
application of international law in the TERB. Thus, this chapter presents a theoretical 
foundation using theories of international relations, and the understanding of both the 
„Rambo theory‟7 and the „balance of power‟8 theories. Subsequently it will highlight the 
role of international water law in minimising such political factors that may strengthen 
the roots of international conflicts on water resources management. For example, 
Macquarrie has described the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness signed 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
accessed 24 February 2008. also Wouters, P., Salman, M. A. & Jones, Patricia., 2000. The Legal 
Response to the World‟s Water Crisis: What legacy from The Hague? What future in Kyoto? World 
Water Forum, The African Water Page. Available at http://www.africanwater.org/documents.htm, 
accessed February 2008. 
7
 Rambo theory comes to application whereby there is a state or states that control a river‟ s source or 
upper flow placing the lower lying riparian states at a disadvantage. As such a state or states would profit 
from this situation it would be in their interest to maintain the status quo and not to attempt to reach an 
understanding with the lower-lying riparian State. Haftendorn, Supra, footnote 2, at p.52. 
8
 The theory of Balance of Power has certain key aspects that have been agreed upon throughout the 
literature on the subject. It starts from the main objective of States.  According to the Balance of Power 
theory is to secure Sates‟ own safety, consistent with political realism or the realist world-view. Then 
states reach equilibrium because of the objective of self-preservation. States, by trying to avoid the 
dominance of one particular state, will ally themselves with other states until equilibrium is reached. 
Partha, Chatterjee., 1972. The Classical Balance of Power Theory. Journal of Peace Research, 9(1), at pp. 
51-55.  
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between Iraq and Turkey in 1946
9
 relating the cooperation over the shared water as “a 
chaotic regime of claim and counterclaim governed more by political than legal 
concerns.”10 This statement demonstrates the necessity of examining the concepts of 
conflict and cooperation through consideration of international politics vis-à-vis 
international law. Whilst considering the relevant literature, some drawbacks in the 
legal regime of the TERB will be identified. Cognisance of the drawbacks in the current 
legal regime of the TERB will allow the riparian States to move towards potential 
cooperation.
 11
 The contribution offered by this Chapter is to identify how lack of 
reciprocity could contribute to growing conflicts and how it restricts the chances for real 
cooperation.     
3.2 Water Conflicts in the Middle East   
Regardless of any regional context, one of the problems with the management of water 
is its transitory character. Whether temporary or permanent, rivers, lakes and aquifers 
are very unevenly distributed across one hundred and forty-five political boundaries 
without passports or documentation.
12
 Wolf describes water as “not only ignoring our 
political boundaries, it evades institutional classification and eludes legal 
                                                             
9
 Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey, Mar. 29, 1946 (entered into 
force May 10, 1948), U.N.T.S. (1949), reprinted at 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/1/39/00001912.pdf [accessed 27 May 2010]  
10
 Patrick, Macquarrie., 2004. Water Security In The Middle East Growing conflict over development in 
the Euphrates Tigris Basin. Thesis, M.Phil International Peace Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, 
at p. 34. Available at 
http://waterwiki.net/index.php/Water_Security_in_the_Middle_East:_Growing_Conflict_over_Developm
ent_in_the_Euphrates-Tigris_Basin, accessed 10 March 2009.  
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Rivers have figures in common, such as; they cross one or more State boundaries or even as boundary 
itself. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis. 2006. Human Development Report, 
United Nations Development Programme, at pp. 203-205. Available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf, accessed 26 May 2010. 
.  
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generalisations”.13 Frequent and regular rainfall in some regions provides an abundance 
of fresh water, contrasting sharply with prolonged drought in other regions where 
growing conflicts over increasingly scarce freshwater resources emerge.
14
 Bearing in 
mind that most countries have institutional rules and regulations for allocating water and 
resolving disputes within their boundaries, cross-border enforcement and other 
mechanisms are much weaker, and the mix of water scarcity and flimsy institutions can 
carry a real risk of conflict.
15
 As such, the international character of water has brought 
complexities to riparian States on different levels and whilst effective cooperation on 
fresh water management still remains important,
16
 fact finding remains indispensable.
17
  
In the Middle East, water does not escape from the reality of the abovementioned 
character and scarcity. The Middle East is a strategic region in the world in connection 
to religion and energy resources, though water has become a major factor in recent 
years.
18
 A World Bank reports revealed that there is widely recognition that the Middle 
East and North Africa region is by far the driest and most water scarce region in the 
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 Wolf, Aaron T., 1998. Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways. Water Policy 1, at p. 
251. Available at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/conflict_coop/, accessed 11 
November 2007. 
14
 Vinogradov, S., Wouters, P.K., Jones, P., 2003. Transforming Potential Conflict in to Cooperation 
Potential: the Role of International Water Law. PCCP Publications, 2, at p. 2. Available at 
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 Cooperation over water is more pervasive than conflict and more essential than ever. Beyond scarcity, 
Supra, footnote 12, at pp. 227-228. From the 145 treaties which govern the world's international 
watersheds, four-fifths have no enforcement mechanism. Hamner, Jesse H., & Wolf, Aaron T., 1998. 
Patterns In International Water Resource Treaties: The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. 
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http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/patterns/, accessed February 2008. 
16
 Mostert, Eric., 2003. Conflict and Cooperation in the Management of International Freshwater 
Resources: A Global Review. PCCP Publications, 19, at pp. 3-4. Available at 
http://webworld.unesco.org, accessed 28 February 2008. 
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 Beyond scarcity, Supra, footnote 12, at p. 229. 
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 Selby, Jan., 2005. The Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East: Fantasies And Realities. Third World 
Quarterly, 26(2), at pp. 330-331. It is also stated that water has become a commodity as important as oil. 
Ofori-Amoah, Abigail., 2004. Water Wars and International Conflict. University of Wisconsin-Eau 
Claire, USA. Available at http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/OFORIAA/ accessed 2 February 
2008.  also NiMr.od, Raphaeli., 2002. Regional Economic News. The Middle East Media Research 
Institute, 28. Available at 
http://meMr.i.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=economic&ID=EA2802, accessed 2 February 
2008. 
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world which will increasingly affect the economic and social development of most 
countries of the region. One of the reasons is the population percentage which is five 
percent of the world population in parallel with less than one percent of the available 
world‟s freshwater resources.”19 See table 1 below.  
Source: World Bank, 1992.
20
 
                                                             
19
 Sector Overview and Development Context: Water Scarcity Is a Serious Development Challenge 
Facing the Region. World Bank Report, para. 1. Available atwww.worldbank.org, accessed 22 February 
2008. 
20
 World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment. Oxford University Press New 
York for World Bank.  in  Tomanbay, Mehmet., 2000. Turkey's Approach To Utilization Of The 
Euphrates And Tigris Rivers. Arab Studies Quarterly, at p.12. Available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_2_22/ai_65653665/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1, accessed 17 
June 2008. 
A B C D E 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 7.1 8.0 16.0 
East Asia and the Pacific 9.3 5.3 less than 1.0 6.0 
South Asia 4.9 4.2 0.0 0.0 
Eastern Europe  
and former USSR 
4.7 11.4 3.0 19.0 
Other Europe 2.0 4.6 6.0 15.0 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
0.3 1.0 53.0 18.0 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
10.6 23.9 less than 1.0 4.0 
Canada and the 
United States 
5.4 19.4 0.0 0.0 
World 40.9 7.7 4.0 8.0 
Legend for Chart: 
A. Region 
B. Annual internal renewable water resources Total (thousands of cubic meters) 
C. Annual internal renewable water resources Per capita (thousands of cubic 
meters) 
D. Percentage of population living in countries with scarce annual per capita 
resources Less than 1000 cubic meters 
E. Percentage of population living in countries with scarce annual per capita 
resources Between 1000 and 2000 cubic meters 
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Table 1: Availability of Water, by Region in the World.  
Fox suggested that that the relevant parties to the dispute, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq on 
one hand, and Israel (including the Occupied Territories), Jordan and Syria on the other, 
all view water as a fundamental strategic asset, a bargaining tool and a potent political 
weapon with the potentially significant influence on the regional balance of power.
21
 
Thus, in order to achieve cooperation between the riparian States, the definition of 
„conflict‟ should be well established so that the precise meaning is understood and 
unequivocal responses for cooperation can be garnered.
22
 However, prior to entering the 
main discussions and explanations regarding conflict and cooperation, it is important to 
bear in mind three relevant and interrelated scenarios that are the most frequent causes 
of transboundary conflicts not only in the Middle East, but globally. These scenarios 
are: water security for agriculture and industrial use, hydro-geographical diversities, and 
energy security, as will be discussed below. 
3.2.1 Water security  
The term „water security‟ aims to capture the complex concept of holistic water 
management and the balance between resource protection and resource use. Achieving 
water security is a key component in meeting agreed international development targets 
related to reducing poverty alleviation, improving health and maintaining environmental 
resources. Although they are not binding in nature, it is worth mentioning the 
ministerial declarations in both World Water Forums 3 and 5 (WWF3 & WWF5) about 
water security. The Ministerial Declaration in WWF3 has mainly emphasised meeting 
                                                             
21
 Fox, Jason D., 1993. The Politics of water scarcity in the Euphrates and Jordan River Basins. Simon 
Fraser University, Burnaby BC, atp.9. Available at 
http://www.ppl.nl/passcat.php?sig=WATER_b15282995.pdf, accessed 14 May 2009.   
22
States have different means to protect their national interests and international legal rights. The word 
„conflicts‟ carries wide and general meaning that can be on anything. In which conflicts on water can 
cover a small part of that meaning, as it will be discussed in the following sections in this chapter.     
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basic needs, securing the food supply, protecting ecosystems, sharing water resources, 
managing risks, valuing water and governing water wisely.
23
 In the Ministerial Process 
Statement at WWF5 in Istanbul, the need to achieve water security was reiterated and 
that, to this end it was emphasised that, it is vital to increase adaptation of water 
management to all global changes and to improve cooperation at all levels.
24
 
Considering water security in the regional context, the subject of water security was 
brought into sharper focus after the impact of Gulf War I and subsequent UN Economic 
sanctions against Iraq. Such impact made many States in the Middle East follow a 
national security approach to secure more water based on the notion of food security. 
Recognition of their vulnerability to economic sanctions and the importance of food 
security
25
 and industrial development
26
 heightened the importance of water security in 
                                                             
23
 The third element of the declaration provides for achieving water security that they declared to face the 
following main challenges: 
1. Meeting basic needs: to recognise that access to safe and sufficient water and sanitation are basic 
human needs and are essential to health and well-being, and to empower people, especially women, 
through a participatory process of water management.  
2. Securing the food supply: to enhance food security, particularly of the poor and vulnerable, through the 
more efficient mobilisation and use, and the more equitable allocation of water for food production. 
3. Protecting ecosystems: to ensure the integrity of ecosystems through sustainable water resources 
management. 
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5. Managing risks: to provide security from floods, droughts, pollution and other water-related hazards. 
6. Valuing water: to manage water in a way that reflects its economic, social, environmental and cultural 
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This approach should take account of the need for equity and the basic needs of the poor and the 
vulnerable. 
7. Governing water wisely: to ensure good governance, so that the involvement of the public and the 
interests of all stakeholders are included in the management of water resources. Ministerial Declaration 
of The Hague on Water Security in the 21st Century, The Hague, The Netherlands, Mar. 22, 2000, 
reprinted at http://www.waternunc.com/gb/secwwf12.htm [accessed 27 May 2010]   
24
 Ministerial Process Istanbul Statement, Istanbul, Turkey, Mar. 22, 2009, reprinted at 
http://www.freshwateraction.net/web/d/doc_443.pdf  [accessed 18 April 2009]. 
25
 Serageldin, Ismail., 2000. Towards Water Security: A Framework for Action. Global Water 
Partnership, Sweden, at pp. 11-12. Available at 
http://www.gwpsudamerica.org/docs/publicacoes/doc_78_en.pdf, accessed March 2008. also Snowden, 
Lori., 2001, The Hydropolitics of the Tigris and Euphrates: International Law. Resource Diplomacy and 
Turkish State Formation, at pp. 195-196. Available at 
http://www.research.deakin.edu.au/performance/pubs/reports/cd/2005/output/comp/comp2001.htm, 
accessed 12 July 2008.  
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many States in the region. The challenges facing states in the Middle East include the 
need for irrigated agriculture, which requires tremendous amounts of water,
27
 water 
pollution
28
 and satisfying the demands of domestic and industrial use particularly in the 
dry climate of the Middle East.
29
 To avoid repeating the Iraqi scenario of food 
insecurity, the upstream States tend to manage their territorial water and to utilise us 
much water as possible. In such circumstances, the upstream-downstream negotiations 
towards an equitable utilisation of their joint use of water may carry more difficulties to 
the proper „settlement‟ than prior to Gulf War I in 1991.  
The problems start from the point where all the riparian States of the TERB shifted from 
being net exporters of grain to net importers, yet Syria and Iraq have even less ability to 
produce sufficient quantities of food staples. Despite its comparative food security, 
Turkey‟s goal for GAP is to turn its south-eastern region into a breadbasket. For both of 
the lower riparian States, Turkey‟s water-intensive development threatens their irrigated 
agricultural potential. Self-sufficiency in the agricultural sector has long been aspired to 
in Syria and continues to be so, particularly with respect to staples such as wheat, 
cotton, and olives. In Iraq, past policy has emphasised the reduction of foreign 
dependency on foodstuffs. Although emphasis on self-sufficiency has lessened due to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
26
 It was estimated that world water withdrawals for industry is 22% of total water use. The high-income 
countries: 59% of total water use, whereas the low-income countries: 8% of total water use. The annual 
water volume used by industry will rise from 752 km³/year in 1995 to an estimated 1,170 km³/year in 
2025, in which the industrial component is expected to represent about 24% of total freshwater 
withdrawal. Ibid.  
27
 International experts have figured out that almost 70% of all available freshwater is used for 
agriculture. It takes an enormous amount of water to produce crops. For example, one to three cubic 
metres to yield just one kilo of rice, and 1,000 tons of water to produce just one ton of grain. Facts and 
Figures: The Different Water Users 2003. International Year of Fresh Water, para. 3. Available at 
http://www.wateryear2003.org/en, accessed 10 February 2009. 
28
 The experts have also found that the high-income countries contribute 40%to the food sector to the 
production of organic water pollutant, whereas the low-income countries contribute about 54%. More 
than 80% of the world's hazardous waste is produced in the United States and other industrial countries. 
In developing countries, 70% of all industrial waste is dumped untreated into waters where it pollutes the 
usable water supply. Ibid.   
29
 Anderson, Ewan W. & Fisher, William B., 2000. The Middle East: geography and geopolitics, (8
th
 
Edition), Routledge, at pp. 30-33.  
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present conflicts within the country, it has been stated as the long term goal for the 
sector as reconstruction efforts begin.
 30
 
3.2.2 Hydro-Geographical diversities 
In theory, the most logical approach to effective transboundary water management 
would be for co-riparian states to trading agricultural resources, hydropower and other 
services according to their comparative advantage in water use. To take an obvious 
example, hydropower is more cost-effective in mountainous regions where rivers drop 
in elevation over short distances while irrigation is more efficient in valleys and plains. 
Trading hydropower for agricultural goods is one way of tapping into this comparative 
advantage. Yet in practice, most river basins lack the institutions to resolve differences 
and coordinate shared resources, and factors such as trust and strategic concerns weigh 
heavily in government policy.
31
  
3.2.3 Energy security 
Hydroelectric power has influenced the strategic plans for fulfilling the energy demands 
in both Syria and Turkey. In Iraq, the abundance of alternative energy resources make 
the upstream control of flows less essential to internal energy supply. Turkey‟s 
reluctance to rely heavily on external sources of energy is largely financially motivated. 
Turkey wishes to reduce its dependency on expensive imports by producing at least 40 
percent of its required energy from domestic hydroelectric production. The GAP 
hydroelectric development was projected to save the country about 28 million tons of 
oil imports annually. In 2001, Syria and Iraq were net exporters of crude oil as opposed 
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 Akanda, Freeman A & Placht, M., 2007.The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin: Mediating a Path Towards 
Regional Water Stability. Annakhla, The Fletcher School Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and 
Islamic Civilization, at p.3. Available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/spring2007/placht-
2.pdf, accessed 31 May 2008. 
31
Beyond scarcity, Supra, footnote 12, at p. 206. 
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to Turkey, which, significantly, had to import approximately 63 percent of its fuel. Yet, 
growing cooperation has been observed in recent years between Iraq and Turkey on 
energy supply, transportation and production. 
32
 Despite the fuel reserves that Syria 
possesses, hydropower is their predominant source of electrical energy. This places 
Syria in a vulnerable position because Turkey has the potential to exert control over 
Syria‟s primary electricity source, further exacerbating an already contentious issue.33 
The above previous two scenarios place the upstream States in an advantageous 
position. That is how geological asymmetry is observed in the Tigris and Euphrates 
River Basin. For example, both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers spring out from the 
mountainous area in South East Anatolia, where it supports constructing hydropower 
dams in the region despite some scientific defects, as been mentioned in Chapter Three. 
In both Syria and Iraq, the land is flatter and suitable for agriculture and the rise of 
temperature in the summer would make life nearly impossible without sufficient water 
flows from the TERB. If Turkey utilises all the water it plans to for its irrigable lands in 
the TERB, life in both Iraq and Syria will become much more difficult.  
As Turkey has the hydro-geographical advantage and can control the flow in the Tigris 
and Euphrates, the situation warrants the return of financial or political benefits to the 
disadvantaged downstream states through an agreement.
34
 Iraq is a weak State 
compared to Turkey in terms of both military might and economy due to 23 years of 
Gulf Wars 1 and 2, and the consequent economic sanctions, it will be harder for Iraq to 
force Turkey to comply with its international obligations towards Iraq and Syria without 
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 According to Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler, Turkey and Iraq will build thermal power stations. 
Their number will be decided after bilateral talks but I can say one will be in Iraq and one will be in 
Turkey. Iraqi PM Discusses Energy, Security in Turkey, Turkey agreed to expand energy cooperation 
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crucial beneficial return. This is the Rambo situation, which will be discussed later. To 
illustrate the existence of the scenario, the concepts of conflict and cooperation will be 
discussed in the light of international politics and law in the following section.   
3.3 Definitions and Theories of Conflicts  
It is not the main purpose of this section to expand upon the differences between the 
definition of „conflict‟ and that of „cooperation‟, but rather to examine why conflicts 
arise between two States over their common interests?  
The term „conflict‟ is defined as an act to come into collision or disagreement, or to be 
contradictory, at variance, or in opposition and clash.
35
 It is an all-embracing notion 
covering the entire spectrum of possible situations where the interests of States may 
collide from minor differences in opinion to the other extremity of situations of tension 
and hostility that may threaten international peace and security.
36
  
With regards to term „conflicts‟ in international water law it often involves interactions 
between various actors particularly water users and stakeholders in the water resources 
management process,
37
 which further involves numerous uncertainties associated with 
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 Garner, Bryan A., 2004. Blacks Law Dictionary, (8
th
 Ed). St. Paul, Minn. See the word „Conflict‟. 
36
 Vinogradov, Wouters & Jones, Supra, footnote 14, at p. 25. However, the term conflict should not be 
confused with dispute. Blacks Law dictionary defines the term dispute as a conflict or controversy, and a 
conflict of claims or rights. Garner, Supra, footnote 35. Many international disputes arise from 
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two persons. The Judgment of Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine 
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1924. Case concerning the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Greece v. Britain, Aug. 30, 1924. PCIJ, 
Ser. B., No. 3, 1924.  
37
 Water resources management is the integrating concept for a number of water subsectors. Use of an 
integrated water resources perspective ensures that social, economic, environmental, and technical 
dimensions are taken into account in the management and development of surface waters (rivers, lakes, 
and wetlands) and groundwater. Water Resource Management. World Bank Online Publication, 
Available at 
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the physical process, available data, and expertise. Therefore, uncertainties as well as 
scarcity are typically the reasons why conflicting scenarios arise among stakeholders.
38
 
According to Wolf, when a river basin traverses across multiple legal, political, and 
international boundaries, the number of potential stakeholders and their specific 
interests increase making the conflict solution process increasingly complicated.
39
  
The nature of conflicts varies, as different situations may lead to different types of 
conflicts. In the past, different interpretations over the use of international fresh water 
resources have generated a great number of international conflicts in various parts of the 
world, most significant have been those conflicts over access to water resources in arid 
regions where there is not enough water available to satisfy all needs.
40
 To describe the 
range of possible conflicts; sometimes it is minimised by the riparian States to such a 
low level as to be regarded a “standard dispute” and a way to long-term cooperation.  
This is especially likely when there is a convergence in political direction in the 
government of the riparian States in dispute, as was the case with the 30 year Ganges 
water agreement in which both India and Bangladesh have finally guarantee each other 
a fair share.
41
 However, in many cases, the cumulative demand on water by different 
users of a shared watercourse exceeds the total volume of available water. In some 
extreme cases, over-exploitation of the river by upstream States could result in a 
situation where downstream States are prevented from enjoying a fair share of the 
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beneficial uses of the water
42
 that could lead to violence. There are not many examples 
of such a scenario.  
3.4 Definition and theories of Cooperation  
Cooperation literally means an instance of working or acting together for a common 
purpose or benefit.
43
 In the Jordan River case, the overall spirit of the transboundary 
water agreement is one of cooperation. The areas mentioned therein specifically 
include, development of existing and new water sources and increasing the water 
availability, prevention of contamination of water resources, mutual assistance in the 
alleviation of shortages, transfer of information and joint research and development in 
water related subjects.
44
 Cooperation over transboundary water can be after various 
levels of conflicts; or sometimes conflict was outweighed by cooperation. For example, 
in the past fifty years, there have been thirty-seven cases of reported violence between 
States over water, of which seven took place in the Middle East. At the same time more 
than two hundred treaties on water were negotiated between countries in the same 
period, says the Human Development Report.
45
  
Throughout history, cooperation over shared water resources has been the rule, not the 
exception. It is argued that with more people than ever competing for resources, more 
ambitious and less fragmented approaches to water governance are in the interest of 
everyone‟s long-term security.46 However, cooperation will not come about quickly if 
the asymmetrical nature of transboundary water conflicts is not internationally 
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recognised. Focusing on the social, political, geographical, historical and economic 
circumstances of each State will challenge the one-size-fits-all approach that is so 
common in development cooperation circles and generally fails to meet expectations for 
cooperation.
47
 Here, it becomes imperative to examine the relationship between 
international politics and international law once the type of conflict applicable to the 
thesis is identified.  
3.5 Types of conflicts over water resources  
Experts have overwhelmingly classified conflicts over water resources into three 
categories; they are conflicts over quantities of water, conflicts over quality of water, or 
conflicts over both the quantity and quality of water. The first, sometimes termed 
“conflicts over water use” arises from the lack of accessible water due to extreme 
drought climate or arid condition, like the case of Mexico,
48
 or lack of water available 
for human consumption, irrigation or power generation, in a less arid climate, like the 
case of Jordan and the Nile.
49
  
Conflicts over water quality generally arise where pollution occurs as a result of certain 
water uses; this may be the case in dry or rainy climates, such as the Rhine River case.
50
 
However, when conflicts occur over both the quantity and quality of water arises, 
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whatever climate and hydrology or economies are involved, the nature of the conflicts 
will be multi-dimensional and will carry complex social, political and geographical 
issues. The nature of the conflict over the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin between 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq is a good example of this type of conflict. Various factor have 
led to poor governance between the riparian States of the TERB. Zeitoun and Warner 
have highlighted that “poor governance of international transboundary water resources 
often results in water conflicts of varying intensities.”51  
3.6 Cooperation under International politics  
In the hydropolitical context, managing shared water can be a force for peace or 
conflict, but it is politicians who decide which course is chosen.
52
 Given that 
development is about prioritisation, it is a profoundly political process because it 
determines who gets what, when, where and how.
53
 The reason for emphasising politics 
in relation to water law in this section is that, as Mollinga mentions, “we still live in an 
era in which it is necessary to explain that water resources management is an inherently 
political process.”54  
In the context of the international politics, although no international sovereign body like 
the UN stands ready to enforce the terms of international agreements, States can realise 
their common interests,
55
 even though cooperation can be difficult.
56
 Therefore, 
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governments try to bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of action through 
tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and multilateral negotiation, and the creation of 
international regimes.
57
 Thus, it can be argued that when conflicts between two or more 
States occur, the States may not have aggressive intentions.  
The pattern of such argument comes from everyone‟s first choice of cooperation. For 
example, water management of the Jordan River since the 1990s, which ensured that 
water remained high on the agenda in both Palestine and Israel, despite the 
overwhelming social and security disruptions since September 2000,
58
 is an example of 
State‟s intention to cooperation. In South America, Brazil and Paraguay resolved a 100-
year-old boundary dispute by signing the Itaipu Accord.
59
 The Southern African 
Development Community has led a process of basin-wide cooperation for the region‟s 
fifteen transboundary rivers, focusing on collecting information and developing 
infrastructure to improve energy and food security for the vulnerable in addition to 
strengthening the capacity of river-basin organisations to protect their quality of and 
access to water.
60
 All are a good example of State‟s mutual intention to cooperate.  
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In support of the earlier argument that cooperation still remains difficult and requires 
hard work there are two points: firstly, as the number of actors increases, cooperation 
becomes more difficult, which necessitates strategies for promoting cooperation among 
a smaller number of actors on specific points of common interest.
61
 Secondly, the 
actions of States betray a psychological configuration in favour of hegemony and 
overtly demonstrates hegemony as an inherent character of State.
62
  
When a stronger State does not demonstrate sufficient endeavours towards cooperation 
and chooses a hidden “no-responses policy” with the purpose of achieving its goals, it 
can be described as hegemony, or in the context of water issues hydro-hegemony; as 
will be explained in the next subsection. Subsequently, unilateral cooperation by the 
other State will court disaster as the cooperating State will be left in a state of 
uncertainty about other States‟ intentions, and this will lead to further defensive non-
cooperation.
63
 Hence, the weaker States need to increase their power to compel the 
hydro-hegemon riparian to give some consideration to cooperation. Such an ambition 
could be achieved if certain measures are taken to balance the powers in the region. The 
next subsection will discuss both theories of hegemony and hydro-hegemony, and 
balance of power in order to determine the role of international law in strengthening 
Iraq‟s right to its shared water with Turkey and Syria.  
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3.6.1 Hydro-Hegemony v. Balance Of Power Theory  
Within international politics, powerful countries seek to construct international political 
economies through converting resources into outcomes.
64
 As well as political will, 
access to crucial raw materials, including full access to transboundary water resources, 
is vital in order for a State to increase its power in a particular region.
65
 These are the 
elements to achieve a status referred to as a „State‟s hegemony‟.66 Vickers presented the 
status of hegemony as “that which takes account of the interests and tendencies of the 
groups over which hegemony is to be exercised so that certain equilibrium can be 
reached.” 67 It is nonetheless concluded that in a hegemonic system, a State is able and 
willing to determine and maintain essential rules by which relations among States are 
governed.
68
 Thus, it can be stated that a hegemonic State can not only abrogate existing 
rules to prevent the adoption of rules it opposes, but it can also play the dominant role in 
constructing new rules
69
 that may prejudice the rights of other States.  
In many transboundary river basins, political power is asymmetrically distributed, 
which has given rise to the concept of „hydro-hegemony‟. This is where a particular 
riparian maintains a dominating position within a basin, in the absence of a basin wide 
agreement, and comes to the position of receiving more than its equitable share of the 
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available water resources.
70
 The hydro-hegemony framework identifies the factors 
behind each State‟s ability to use these resource-control strategies. For example, 
countries exercise power through military or economic means, by providing incentives 
for weaker countries to comply, or using propaganda to justify control.
71
  
A particular riparian position within a river basin whether upstream or downstream will 
not necessarily determine whether a State becomes a hydro-hegemon. However, it is 
interesting to observe that two major river basins are dominated by hydro-hegemons 
who are upstream riparian States; Turkey maintains a hegemonic stance in relation to 
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and China has a similar role in the Mekong River 
system.
72
  In such circumstances, Turkey as the upstream riparian state of the TERB 
may fall in the position of using the available water to wield more power.
73
 Similarly, 
Israel has taken a dominant position in relation to the waters of the Jordan River basin 
from a mid-stream vantage point, whilst the extreme downstream State of Egypt is 
clearly the hegemon in the Nile River basin.
74
 In such a downstream position, Egypt 
uses other forms of power such as the threat of military action or exercise of political 
power to get more water and has used delaying tactics in the past to prolong its 
dominant position.
75
  
Regarding cooperation at the TERB level of the Tigris and Euphrates, Kirstin, Phillips, 
and Woodhouse describe the Turkish hydro-hegemony as patronising and lacking any 
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clear goal, and lacking any form of co-riparian States‟ institutional mechanism76 which 
leaves sufficient leeway Turkish hydro-hegemony to grow.  
Jervis believes that, in the contemporary political world, States take advantage of any 
opportunity to make competitive gains at others‟ expense; but when their immediate 
interests are threatened, they jump to consult other States and employ tactics of surprise 
and duplicity,
77
 leaving little room for the international law of shared responsibility, or 
the necessity to preserve the States‟ rights and obligations. Based on this argument, it 
can be said that Turkey plays the role of Rambo in the region. The Rambo situation 
denotes a circumstance where State or States control a river‟s source or flow, placing 
the downstream riparian States at a disadvantage. As such, the controlling State or 
States profit from this situation and it is in their interests to maintain the status quo and 
not to reach an understanding with the weaker Riparian State or States.
78
 The US-led 
invasion of Iraq was another factor that consolidated Turkey‟s status as hydro-hegemon 
and contributed towards prolonging the status quo.  
Thus, if the concept of hegemony or hydro-hegemony connotes the dominance of one 
State over another, in order for the former to maximise its power, there is little room for 
international law to function properly since this necessitates the balance of power. For 
Russet, States need to cooperate and interact in a regularised manner particularly in the 
context of contemporary global economic and environmental issues that require action 
                                                             
76
Kirstin, Phillips & Woodhouse., 2004. Intensity of Cooperation/Intensity of Conflict. Second 
International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, Briefing Paper 3, London Water Research Group, at p.  5. 
77
 Jervis, Supra, footnote 56, at p. 718.  
78
 Haftendorn, Supra, footnote 2, at p.52. 
72 
 
by more than one State.
79
 Coplin believes that such regulation can curtail the State‟s 
drive for power 
80
 provided that international law is adhered to.  
Jervis regards the „balance of power‟ as too simplistic; that it should be seen as being 
much more varied, drawing excessively stark contrasts between balance and a managed 
system.
81
 The word „balance‟ calls for restraint, and the denial of immediate self-
interest, which requires the subordination of State‟s interest to „balance of power‟.82 
In applying the theory to the regional context of the TERB, one can suggest that the 
occupied and currently weak Iraqi State and a less weak Syrian State may be in the 
position to join together in coalition to dispute the potential Turkish hydro-hegemony so 
that water supplies for both downstream states can be secured. However, it is not the 
purpose of the thesis to foster political issues between the riparian States, but to review 
the application of the theory in the political world in order to examine the role of 
international law in conveying the balance of power from the legal standpoint.  
It is easy to assume that in the balance of power theory there is the likelihood of war 
against a potential hegemon. However, war is no longer seen as a normal tool of 
statecraft, because experience has shown long-term fighting can forge unusual bonds 
between the States, such as the Iraqi-Iranian War from 1980 to 1988.
83
 Accordingly, to 
avoid further wars, diplomacy has eased the pressure of checking power by power; the 
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need to maintain new and more cooperative arrangements has become more important 
to States despite significant conflicts of interest between States.
84
  
In summary, effective international relations support the transformation of potential 
conflicts into cooperation potential. The reason is that the concept of self-interest has 
evolved, and states now prefer to keep close friendly relationships with each other. 
While the balance of power is individualistic in its premise that each State will try to 
advance its own interests, the cooperation theory requires that States not only think of 
their own survival, but are also willing to interchange benefits and trust other States, 
whom they expect to act the same. In such circumstances a high level of regulated and 
mutually reinforcing behaviour will be required in order to reassure the weaker parties, 
which in turn requires national leaders to attend not only to possible threats to 
themselves but also to whether their actions-or inactions-threaten the vital interests of 
others and thereby the entire system.
85
 Such a system to maintain States‟ behaviour is 
regularised today by international law, which will be discussed in the following section.  
3.6.2 International Law v. Balance of Power Theory 
As explained earlier, international politics is a struggle for power and as such all States 
seek to increase their power.
86
 However, since the nineteenth century
87
 international law 
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has been characterised as a collection of rules governing relations between States 
relating to their rights of self-preservation, sovereignty,
88
 independence, legal equality 
and security in their territorial possessions,
89
 which will be elucidated in Chapter Four.  
In order to meet all these rights for all the member States simultaneously, rules to impart 
a degree of order, predictability and stability to relations are essential.
90
  
By the early twentieth century those principles became more settled, particularly as 
inter-State legal and political relations developed, and the idea of how to manage all 
those relationships was born. After World War II, in order to maintain international 
peace and security,
91
 international law was thought of as a “body of rules” which are 
accepted by the nations,
92
 required as an instrument of direct control.
93
 All these factors 
led to the establishment of the UN in 1945.
94
 
Today, the purpose of international law is understood as a degree of order resulting 
from two fundamental principles. Firstly, security is the primary immutable imperative 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
recognise may be referred. It is to the two latter that the rights which it ought to claim may be referred. 
Janis, M. W., 1984. Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law”.  The American Journal 
of International Law 78( 2), at pp. 405-418. also Bentham, J., Objects of International Law. Essay I. 
Available at http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/pil/pil.e01.html, accessed 19 February 2006. 
88
 Sovereignty will be discussed in more details in the next chapter.  
89
 Fenwick, Charles G., 1918.Codification of International Law. The American Political Science Review 
12(2), at p.  302.   
90
 Charney, J. I., 1993.Universal International Law. The American Journal of International Law 87(4), at 
p. 532.  
91
 Nowadays international peace and security is set forth today in the purposes of the Charter of the UN.  
92
 The term „acceptance by the nations‟ is evidence d by their formal statements and consistent usage, and 
considered opinio juris and State practice. Fenwick, Supra, footnote 121, at p. 302. Opinio juris and State 
practice will be discussed in detail later in the next chapter.  
93
 Writers of this conception derived their arguments on the way law functions in domestic communities 
are the same applicable analogy of the relationship between international law and political action. So for 
them international law should develop friendly relations among nations, cooperate in solving international 
economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.  
Coplin, Supra, footnote 62, at pp.617-618. 
94
The Charter of the UN was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the UN 
Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter. U.N. Charter, Jun. 29, 1945 (entered into 
force Oct. 24, 1945), 1 U.N.T.S. xvi 
75 
 
for State action.
95
 Notwithstanding certain limits to what can be accomplished due to the 
decentralised character of international law, international law has an important role to 
play.
96
 Secondly, the international system is a method of maintaining a minimal system 
of order among States.
97
 Thus, in order to avoid conflict that could disrupt the system, 
international law legitimises forming coalitions to counter any threat of hegemony,
98
 in 
order to achieve the balance of power. Based on such an argument, both Iraq and Syria 
can become allies against Turkey on the legitimate ground of preventing Turkish hydro-
hegemony so as to maintain equilibrium between downstream States Iraq and Syria, and 
upstream State Turkey.  
3.6.3 Evolution of international water law 
Just as international law has developed over the last century, so has international water 
law. Over time, customary rules developed with regard to riparian rights to international 
rivers, although these were not extensive.
99
 Custom played an important role in 
international relations among States concerning the development, conservation and the 
use of the water resources of international or shared rivers and basins.
100
 Inter-
governmental relations concerning river basins have further developed according to 
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certain water uses
101
 such as transportation, irrigation, and domestic uses.
102
 State 
practice on those issues developed into customary principles concerning the freedom of 
traffic on international waterways, the border between opposite riparian States, the 
control of water flow, and related maintenance works.
103
 The main impetus for the 
progressive development of international water law was that States needed to develop 
their resources.    
After World War II, State governments had to be prepared to participate actively in any 
program of rehabilitation which may be necessary.
104
 Since much of the war took place 
in Europe, the Western European States were especially badly affected, regardless of 
who were the winners or losers in the war. It was suggested that they delivered 
economic growth at a pace that the world had never before seen, which allowed 
remarkable progress through the final stages of structural transformation to an industrial 
economy and society.
105
 To meet such a goal, they needed to strengthen the institutional 
mechanisms to regulate their intergovernmental relations, and particularly how to share 
and utilise their transboundary water. Thus, one could argue that customary 
international water law developed in tandem with the said transformation process in 
Europe.  
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Governments in the Post-War Era.  The American Political Science Review, 36 (6), at pp. 1103-1108. 
105
 Bradford, DeLong, J., 1997. Post-WWII Western European Exceptionalism: The Economic 
Dimension. University of California at Berkeley, and National Bureau of Economic Research. Available 
at http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/Econ_Articles/ucla/ucla_marshall2.html, accessed 11 March 2008. 
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In the Middle East, however, the impact of the World War II was not as great as in 
Europe, and the downstream States of Iraq and Syria were still underdeveloped. While 
Turkey, the upstream State was not strong enough in implementing policies to join the 
industrialised world until the late 1960s.
106
 After the end of Cold War, Gulf Wars I and 
II, and the wave of globalisation, the States of the region found incentives in joining the 
new competitive world economy. Hence, intergovernmental relationships became 
crucial for the management of their transboundary natural resources. Again, water plays 
a major role in the development of their economies. The States in the Middle East are 
far behind the European States in implementing customary international water law, thus 
there is a need to emphasise the role of international law and international water law in 
the regional context.       
Customary international water law started to get more attention in Europe 
notwithstanding that serious international river disputes took place elsewhere,
107
 raising 
the question, what is the law on the utilisation of an international river?
108
 The question 
led the International Law Association (hereinafter ILA) to begin its work on the law 
governing the utilisation of international fresh water resources in 1954.
109
 The ILA is a 
private organisation of international lawyers,
110
 and a professional organisation which 
has made a significant scholarly contribution to the enrichment of the law of 
international water resources by adopting the 1966 Helsinki Rules.
111
 The 1966 Helsinki 
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 Lack of such development was partially that the Turkish State was still under recovery process due to 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924.  
107
 For example, the dispute between India and Pakistan over the Indus, Between Egypt and the Sudan 
over Nile, between Israel and its neighbours over the Jordan, and Between the USA and Canada over the 
Columbia. Bogdanovic, Slavko., 2001. International Law of Water Resources, Contribution of 
International Law Association (1954-2000). London, Kluwer Law International, at p. 3.   
108
 Bourne, C. B., 1997. International Water Law. International Law of Water Resources, Contribution of 
International Law Association (1954-2000). London, Kluwer Law International, p. 233. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 Shaw, Supra, footnote 99, at p. 616. 
111
 Kaya, Ibrahim, The Euphrates-Tigris basin: An overview and opportunities for cooperation under 
international law. Available at http://ag.arizona.edu/OALS/ALN/aln44/kaya.html#geography accessed 28 
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Rules, furthermore, identified the basic rule on the subject: the principle of equitable 
utilisation
112
 and the beneficial use of the waters, and that all States are obliged to 
prevent new forms of water pollution that could cause substantial injury in the territory 
of other basin States.
113
  
3.7 Conclusion  
It is noteworthy that water not only does not respect transboundary limits, but has 
evaded institutional and legal generalisation. Directly or indirectly water can be 
expressed as conflict-sensitive natural resource particularly in the strategic location of 
Middle East.  The main cause is the region‟s arid climate with only one percent of the 
world‟s available fresh water, geological and hydro-geographical diversities between 
the riparian States. 
The water shortages faced by Iraq as a result of devastating wars and economic 
sanctions prompted many States in the Middle East to implement national water security 
programmes to prevent a similar occurrence in their territories. As a result, States are 
endeavouring to secure more water with less consideration to the possible negative 
impacts on the co-riparian States, which leads to conflict. However, it is only when the 
riparian States are willing to work together to find solutions to such conflicts that the 
meaning of cooperation will become evident. The spirit of cooperation is stifled by 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
February 2008. also Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, adopted by the ILA 
at the 52
nd
 Conference, Helsinki, Finland, Aug 1966, reprinted in Bogdanovic, Slavko., 2001. 
International Law of Water Resources, Contribution of International Law Association (1954-2000). 
London, Kluwer Law International.  
112
 Article IV of the Helsinki Rules provides: Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a 
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial use of the water of an international drainage basin.   
Bourne, Supra, footnote 140, at p. 281.  
113
 Shaw, Supra, footnote 99, at p. 616. Pollution includes “any artificial change in the natural quality of 
any particular natural water,” rather than a more narrow definition in terms of use or damage.  These are 
only preliminary definitions, and they are not, of course, intended to delimit the area of international legal 
liability. Lester, A. P., 1963. River Pollution in International Law. The American Journal of International 
Law, 57(4), at p. 829. 
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hegemony, and only a balance of power between States can reduce this barrier. In the 
case of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin, a set of complicated legal, political and 
geographical issues are identified exacerbated by a poor perception of the role of 
international law and lack of legal institutions to govern the TERB. It can be argued that 
this has yet further impeded cooperation between the advantaged and disadvantaged 
riparian States. 
In the political world, it is true that States are psychologically tempted to power. When 
a State is controlling crucial resources and particularly water resources with stronger 
economic and military power compared to the co-riparian States, the controlling State 
can easily exercise hegemony, as can be obviously seen in the regional context between 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq. At the upstream level, the researcher concluded that Turkey has 
the tools to exercise hydro-hegemony, which makes the case necessary to recourse to 
the role of international law in this context.  
Next Step 
Having examined the present literature on the relevant political theories in the regional 
context of the TERB, there is a lack of emphasis on the applicable international law on 
water resources management at the TERB level. Whether or not this situation is a 
deliberate choice by the riparian States is irrelevant. Chapter Four will re-examine the 
role of international law in improving such circumstances. This will be done through 
examining what is international law, subjects, sources, enforcement of international law, 
while the examinations of all political theories and applications will be ignored. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE RIPARIAN STATES OF THE 
TERB 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The topic of international law is too broad to be discussed fully in this thesis; however, 
the relevant literature on international law in the context of the main thesis question and 
hypothesis is discussed here. When considering the sharing of transboundary water 
resources between the riparian States, there is a clear international element which must 
be properly understood. Accordingly, this Chapter will examine State‟s rights and 
obligations under international law. In this context, the Chapter will consider what 
rights and obligations apply to Iraq according to the principles of international law for 
the management of its shared fresh water resources. This will be followed by examining 
subjects, Iraq‟s sovereignty as a new Federal State,1 but under occupation, sources and 
enforcement of international law.  
4.2 General background of International Law 
The term international law has been defined by Hiller as “the body of rules, which are 
legally binding on subjects of international law in their intercourse with each other.”2 In 
a broader statement, Shaw described international law in this way, “…basically 
international agreements create binding rules upon the signatories, whereas customary 
rules are supplementary patterns of conduct to which one must comply”.3 From Shaw‟s 
perspective, international agreements along with the customary international law are the 
                                                             
1
 The New Iraqi Constitution, state that “Article (1): The Republic of Iraq is an independent, sovereign 
nation, and the system of rule in it is a democratic, federal, representative (parliamentary) republic.” 
Constitution of Federal Republic of Iraq, 2005, reprinted at 
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf, [accessed 23 February 2010]. 
2
 Hiller, Tim., 1998. Sourcebook on Public International Law. London, Cavendish Publishing Ltd, at p.5. 
3
 Shaw, M. N., 1997. International Law. (4
th
 Ed). Cambridge University Press, at p. 6. 
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most important elements of international law. The term “signatories” converts those 
States that sign a particular rule from being exempt from the rule to being bound and 
subject to it. For example all the signatory States of the UN Charter, which governs 
general international law, are bound by the Charter which further make them subjects of 
international law. Verdross stated;  
 “Study of the relations between general or universal international 
law, binding upon all States, and the Charter of the UN seems at first 
sight to be a very simple question. For the Charter was agreed upon 
in the form of an international treaty binding on the basis of general 
international law. It therefore pre-supposes the continued validity of 
general international law; a thesis supported by the presupposition 
that its Members are subjects of international law.”4  
Pursuant to the above subject, further researches on the subjects of international law 
follow.      
4.3 Subjects of International Law 
It is widely accepted in the field of international law that “States” are the principal 
subjects of international law.
5
 In theory, a „State‟ is an institution that politically unifies 
people occupying a defined territory, and has a government which exercises control 
over persons and properties within the said territory.
6
 The word „State‟ is further defined 
                                                             
4
 Verdross stated further that “The continued validity of general international law is, in fact, expressed in 
the Charter itself. In the preamble, the UN undertake to establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. 
In Article I, paragraph I, the UN agree to settle their disputes in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law. The same idea is found in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, itself an integral part of the Charter. Verdross, A., 1954. General International Law and the UN 
Charter. International Affairs 30(3), at pp. 243-245.  
5
 Hiller, Supra, footnote 2, at pp.185-186. There are other subjects of international law other than States 
such as international organisations and individuals. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the chapter 
only focuses on States and the primary subjects of international law.    
6
 Brierly, J. L., 1963. The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, at p. 127. 
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as an association of a considerable number of people living within a defined territory, 
constituted in fact as a political society and subject to the supreme authority of a 
sovereign. Redman states that “although this explanation was written in 1918, it is still 
considered to be the most widely accepted and most frequently cited source of the 
formal definition of Statehood”.7  
Before the establishment of the UN in 1945, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Obligations of States 1933 (hereinafter the MCROS 1933)
8
 specifically 
defined the word “State” as a person under international law that should possess the 
qualifications of: (a) a permanent population;
9
 (b) a defined territory; (c) government; 
and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States.
10
 From the general 
viewpoint of UNWC 1997, Redman emphasises the point that “although only 19 States 
singed the MCROS 1933, it should be regarded neither as an inefficient, nor conclusive 
convention, but a standard value should be given to it.
11
 Over time, customary practice 
                                                             
7
 Redman, M., 2002. Should Kosovo Be Entitled to Statehood? The Political Quarterly, Blackwell 
Publishing 73(3), at p. 338-343. 
8
 The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Obligations of States was a treaty signed at Montevideo, 
Uruguay on December 26, 1933, at the Seventh International Conference of American States. It was 
signed by 19 States, 3 with reservations. It later on entered into Force on 26 December 1934. Article 8 
reaffirmed by Protocol, 23 December 1936. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States, Dec. 26, 1933 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1934), reprinted at 
http://www.molossia.org/montevideo.html [accessed 23 February 2008] 
9
 It was argued that the term „permanent population‟ had been inserted in order to differentiate between 
established or fixed populations and nomadic ones. Next, the qualification of a defined territory could be 
criticised on the grounds that boundaries of some States had not yet been defined. This qualification and 
the succeeding one were objective facts and thus preferable to qualifications (a) and (d). Explanations on 
Montevideo Convention, Article 1, Definition of Statehood and Factors Undermining Separatists Claim to 
Create Separate States. University of Western Sydney Library. Available at 
http://www.library.uws.edu.au, accessed 22 February 2008.   
10
 As to the last qualification, it is presumed that the term „capacity‟ in (d) meant legal capacity. which 
case the application of international law to that State was presupposed. Speech by Mr.. Alfaro. Summary 
record of the 9th Meeting. 1949. ILC Work, A/CN.4/SR.9, at p. 68. Available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm, accessed 11 February 2008.  
11
 UNWC 1997 is efficient as long as no serious attempt to codify a definition of Statehood since 1933 is 
made, conceivably due to States‟ reluctance and political concerns to form objective criteria. Redman, 
Supra, footnote 7, at p. 340. However, the argument to make UNWC 1997 inconclusive source is based 
on customary practice.” One undisputable fact is that for any theory to operate the basic requirements set 
out in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention is a prerequisite. There are instances in world history that 
the claim for Statehood had been successful even without fulfilling these basic requirements. Israel was 
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has attributed additional criteria to the quality and nature of State, such as 
independence, self-containment, self-determination and impermeablility.
12
 
Notwithstanding critics
13
 of the above, these discussions build the concept of Statehood 
in contemporary international law into a clearer form. Although it is not stated in the 
Draft Declaration on the Rights and Obligations of States (DDROS) 1949,
14
 Hiller still 
considers the four criteria provided under the Article 1 all together as an accurate 
statement of customary international law
15
 The fourth element is the essential condition 
in order for the first three elements to realise the attribute of sovereignty,
16
 which in turn 
empowers a State to enter into international relations.
17
 Finally, Hiller argues that the 
essential characteristics of a “State” are now well settled,18 although the UN General 
Assembly (hereinafter UNGA) found difficulties in agreeing a precise meaning of a 
“State”.19 In this case, it is essential to examine the sovereignty of Iraq in the current 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
admitted as a member state of the UN in May 1949, notwithstanding that its boundaries were not then 
defined with precision, pending negotiations regarding demarcation. Ibid. 
12
Also it is cited from the GA that the practice of States, judicial decisions, doctrine, legislation and the 
practice of the UN indicated sufficiently how to re-appreciate certain traditional conceptions of the term 
„State‟. Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1949. Report A/CN.4/SR.8, at p. 1. Available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_sr8.pdf accessed 1 March 2010. 
13
 It is important to refer to the critics made to the Article of the Montevideo Convention. It was stated 
that nowadays, the process of recognition of States became much more complicated than before the 
World War II. At present, the world State practice supports that mere compliance to the requirements set 
in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention is totally insufficient to claim Statehood, sine recognition of 
other States has became the predominant character of the recognition of States. Explanations on 
Montevideo Convention, Supra, footnote 8.  
14
 It is noteworthy to mention that at the time of drafting the rights and obligations of States in 1949, by 
the ILC, no reference to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention was made. As was pointed out by Mr.. 
Alfaro that „he had avoided devoting an article of his draft to a definition of that type because he had 
thought the definition of the State had no place in a declaration on the rights and obligations of States. He 
recalled that in his explanatory note he had indicated that if a country did not satisfy the conditions 
required for the existence of a State, it was not a State and, consequently, it could not have the rights of a 
State; on the other hand, if a State existed, that meant that it fulfilled the conditions necessary for its 
existence and that it could not be called upon to fulfil those conditions‟. Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, Supra, footnote 12.  
15
Ibid, Article 1.  
16
 Article 3, Capacity to Make Treaties, Supplement: Research in International Law.1935.The American 
Journal of International Law, (29), at pp. 705-710.  
17
 Hiller, Supra, footnote 2, at pp.185-186. 
18
 Ibid., at p. 181.  
19
 At the time of discussing the Draft Article of the Rights and Obligations of States by the General 
Assembly in 1949, it was emphasized the difficulty of defining the words “State” and “nation”, and felt 
that the Commission should thoroughly study the draft Declaration and examine it paragraph by 
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circumstances of occupation by the foreign power since April 2003. Subsequently, the 
Chapter will analyse Iraq‟s key rights, and obligations under international law.    
4.3.1 Sovereignty of Iraq under International Law   
Sovereignty means the exclusive right to exercise supreme political authority,
20
 for 
example legislative, judicial, and executive authority over a geographical area, group of 
people, or oneself.
21
 In reality, sovereignty is criticised for being uncertain and 
inaccurate from the legal standpoint that is contrary to the theory of social nature of the 
international system.
22
 Karnad argues that the concept of sovereignty is not absolute and 
no State exists in an isolated autarchy, surviving entirely on its own and by itself. 
Therefore, the exercise of sovereignty becomes limited by international law and by the 
differential in the power of States.
23
 As a result, sovereignty and international law have 
no choice but to integrate with one other
24
 given that States consent to become subject 
of international law,
25
 and now are creators and enforcers of this law.
26
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
paragraph. Some favoured the inductive method of codifying specific subjects first and deducting general 
principles from them. Summary record of the 9th Meeting, Supra, footnote 12, at p. 63.   
20
 Coplin, W. D., 1966.The Function of International Law: An Introduction to the Role of International 
Law in the Contemporary World. Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, at p. 172. 
21
 Brus, Marcel Bridging the Gap between State Sovereignty and International Governance: The 
Authority of Law. in Kreijen, Gerard. (Ed), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance. New York, 
Oxford University Press Inc, 2002, at p. 3. 
22
 From the standpoint of legal technique, there are a number of difficulties which prevent the notion of 
sovereignty and analysed at present form being accepted as a valid means of explanation. The concept is 
regarded as fundamentally anti-juridical, as it is contradictory to speak of a subject of law as being 
sovereign. Larson, A., 1965.Sovereignty Within The Law. London, Stevens & Sons, 1965, at p.48. 
23
Karnad, Bharat., 2008. Security and Sovereignty, Globalization and Environmental Challenges. Berlin 
Heidelberg, at p.  421. 
24
 It was added that in modern doctrine the interpretation generally given of sovereignty is regarded as 
contrary to the facts should make common idea of sovereignty false, since every State‟s sovereignty 
encounters in the international sphere other sovereignties equal to itself. Such circumstances strips the 
notion of its positive content, which is the power to give unconditional orders, because of de juri equality 
of States, and of negative content, which is the right not to take orders from any other human authority, 
because of their de facto inequality. Thus, instead of regarding sovereignty as supra-legal concept, the 
prevailing doctrine has endeavoured to present it as strictly juridical notion, consisting essentially in a 
power limited by law. Ibid., pp. 48-49.   
25
 Nijman, J., 2002. Sovereignty and Personality: A Process of Inclusion State Sovereignty and 
International Governance.Oxford University Press, at p. 109. 
26
 Brus, Supra, footnote 21, at p.3. 
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In the prevailing international system of sovereign States, Karnad advocates that it is the 
sovereignty of weak States that is most in peril.
27
 States have always treated sovereignty 
as an asset to be bargained with; surrendering portions of it in return for substantial 
benefits or compromising it under duress.
28
 A good example of this scenario is the 
Turkish-Syrian relationship in 1998 when Turkey demanded Syria stop sheltering PKK 
members.
29
 Only once Syria had complied with Turkish demand, Turkey showed 
interests for cooperation with Syria in 2001. Several meetings were held between the 
two States‟ delegations, which led to an agreement between the GAP Administration 
and Syrian General Organization for Land Development (hereinafter GOLD). The 
agreement allows for three training programs enabling Syrian experts to attend 
international training courses of the GAP, for example.
30
 
Although Iraq is not better than Syria in terms of control and power, but still should 
enjoy sovereignty over its territories like any other sovereign State, and bound by the 
UN Charter. Also by virtue of the UN Charter, Iraq should have reciprocal rights and 
obligations to its neighbours, and be bound by all bilateral and multilateral treaties that 
it ratified and signed before the fall of Baghdad. Finally, the UNSC Resolution 1483 
which reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq grants the Iraqi people 
the right to freely determine their own political future and control their own natural 
resources.
31
  In fact, when the US-led invasion took place in 2003, a fundamental 
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 Karnad, Supra, footnote 23, at p. 421. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 This Thesis, infra, Annex III (1) and (2). 
30
 It was stated further that GAP will organise custom-made courses to be attended by Syrian experts, and 
the two parties will organise joint courses. What is remarkable in this agreement is that the name of 
Euphrates River and its joint management was not explicitly mentioned although Syria is in the most need 
to solve this matter.  This Thesis, infra, Annex IV. 
31
 Resolution 1483, May 23, 2003. U.N.S.C. at its 4761st meeting, S/RES/1483 (2003), reprinted at 
http://www.uncc.ch/resolutio/res1483.pdf [accessed 26 May 2010] 
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question was posed about the impacts of the occupation and its consequences on Iraq‟s 
capacity to freely enter into international obligations. They will be discussed below: 
First of all, according to the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV 1907and the 
Geneva Convention IV 1949, Article 42 of the RHC 1907 provides that a territory is 
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army.
32
 
This would suggest that occupation is therefore a matter of fact, rather than hinging on a 
declaration by the occupier. In other words, if a territory is actually placed under the 
authority of another country then it is occupied. In addition, the occupation need not be 
a matter of controlling the whole of another State‟s territory, but arises when authority 
is established over any portion of its territory.
33
  
Next, Jennings argued that “in a chaotic situation the real power is too often found in 
the hands of individual and individualistic warlords who are both well armed apparently 
free to behave both irresponsibly and just as they please. And their ambition of power 
do not always seem to include any ambition to wield that power as a reasonable 
government, the result has frequently been so chaotic that it is even inappropriate to 
dignify by the term „civil war‟.” 34 Certainly, if Jennings had made this argument after 
the 2003 US invasion, he would have included similar comments on Iraq.
35
  Moreover, 
corruption can be suggested as another form of disorder in Iraq although it is not a new 
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 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,  1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910), 
reprinted at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4374cae64.html [accessed 26 May 2010]      
33
 Brown, Paul., 2001. Ilisu dam in jeopardy as Balfour drops out Mortal blow for controversial £1.25bn 
project flooding Kurds' land. The Guardian. November 14. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2001/nov/14/politics.politicalnews, accessed March 2007. also Ibid.  
34
 Jennings based his argument on Bodin‟s (1576) formulated doctrine of sovereignty, who stated that „a 
confusion of uncoordinated independent authorities must be fatal to a State, and that there must be one 
final source and more than one from which its laws proceed. Jennings, Robert., Sovereignty and 
International Law. in Gerard, Kreijen. (Ed), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance. New 
York, Oxford University Press Inc, 2002, at p. 27. 
35
 In his argument, Sir Robert Jennings has referred to the current cases in Somalia, East Timor, Rwanda 
and some other countries in Asia and Africa that currently undergo civil war and chaotic situation. Ibid., 
at p. 30. 
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phenomenon. Numerous reports indicate that corruption is rife throughout the entire 
country, which under Jennings definition would make Iraq as a „non-reasonable 
government‟. Corruption is no less serious a problem than civil war; in civil war usually 
people are the casualties, but in the case of corruption human resources and skills are 
ravaged. Civil war will destroy communities; while corruption destroys the government 
institutions by allowing unqualified personnel to abuse the positions they are given.  
As a remedy to the above, Article 43 of the RHC 1907 gives an overview of the 
occupying power‟s responsibilities, which states that “the authority of the legitimate 
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the 
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, 
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” Article 
64 of Geneva Convention IV gives a more discursive statement of the same principle:  
“….the occupying power may subject the population of the occupied 
territory to provisions which are essential to enable the occupying 
power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to 
maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the 
security of the occupying power, of the members and property of the 
occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the 
establishments and lines of communication used by them.” 36  
In the case of occupation, the occupying power‟s authority in relation to the occupied 
State‟s sovereignty significantly affects the latter‟s ability to freely enter into 
international obligations. It is stated that the law on occupation during and after conflict 
is based on the principle that the occupying power is precluded from alienating 
sovereignty (effectively, annexing territory) by means of the use of force. It is 
responsible for administering occupied territory, but it may make changes to existing 
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 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), 75 U.N.T.S287, reprinted at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36d2.html [accessed 26 May 2010] 
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institutions only where necessary for the maintenance of order and security. However, 
in Iraq the real fact shows that not only certain institutions are changed by the first 
government, which was established under full supervision of the Coalition forces, but 
the entire country‟s structure has been changed. As a result, it can be argued that the 
present Iraqi government fell under the undue influence of the occupying power that 
puts Iraq in the dependence circle rather than being a politically independent State. Such 
a loss of independence for Iraq shifts the onus to the occupying power for protecting 
Iraq from other States‟ hegemony especially when refereeing to Iraq‟s equitable right to 
water resources, as will be discussed later.  
State‟s peaceful co-existence is another important factor for Iraq.37 As suggested by 
O‟Brien, Iraq should benefit from this doctrine that in essence requests respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference in internal 
affairs based on the principle of equality of status.
38
 However, this doctrine does not 
appear to be practised in the Tigris and Euphrates region. Turkey, the upstream State 
has recently used military aggression within Iraqi territory, against the PKK militants on 
from the northern border.
39
  Although the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, in 
his visit to Iraq in 2008, pledged to boost ties with Iraq and urged the region to do more 
to help the Baghdad government to rebuild the war-torn country, relations between the 
two States have often been strained by PKK rebels who use northern Iraq to launch 
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 Article 4 of the DDRDS 1949 reads „Every State has the obligation to refrain from intervention in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State. Draft Declaration on the Rights and Obligations of States, 
Fundamental rights and obligations of States, May 15, 1949, U.N.G.A., 23rd meeting, A/CN.4/SR.19, I., 
reprinted at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1949_v1_e.pdf 
[accessed 26 May 2010] 
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 O‟Brien, J., 2001. International Law. Routledge Cavendish, at p. 152. 
39
 John, Mark EU's Solana: Turkey incursion “not best response”. 2008. The Reuters Website, 22 
February. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL2247927720080222, accessed 13 
July 2008. 
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attacks into neighbouring Turkey.
40
 However, the Turkish interference in Kirkuk and 
attacks against the PKK are not the concern of this thesis, but more importantly the 
Turkish incursion against the Iraq‟s sovereignty and political integrity disregards Iraq‟s 
right of peaceful co-existence with its neighbours.  
When discussing the obligations of States prescribed by international law, both the UN 
Charter and the DDROS proscribe States from resorting to war as an instrument of 
national policy and from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State.  
The obligation to peaceful dispute settlement is another important area to discuss. 
Kelsen considers there to be a process to prevent conflicts and settle disputes by 
peaceful means imposed by Article 2 (6) of the UN Charter, and Article 8 of the Draft 
Declaration. However, there is another argument that defends a State‟s freedom to 
resolve their disputes over international watercourses by any peaceful means they deem 
fit. In the case of the TERB, so far there is no treaty completed between the riparian 
States to establish a dispute settlement mechanism between the riparian States. Thus, it 
can be considered that there is no legally defined dispute from the very beginning 
between the riparian States, but it rather can be characterised as discrepancies or 
conflicts over the Basin. If Kelsen‟s view is followed, then Article 2 (6) of the UN 
Charter and Article 8 of the Draft Declaration implicitly stipulate that the riparian States 
must sign a special treaty to manage the Basin which codifies dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Alternatively, if a State is free to choose the method of dispute settlement, 
the issues of power asymmetry between the riparian States bring the negotiation efforts 
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for cooperation back to the very beginning of the topic. Hence, there is no guarantee 
that Turkey, the upstream and powerful State will discontinue exercising hegemony.  
Finally, co-operation is another obligation under the UN Charter; States have the 
obligation to co-operate with one another, irrespective of the differences in their 
political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international relations. 
Maintaining international peace and security, international economic stability and 
progress, the general welfare of nations, and the promotion of non discriminative 
attitudes of the State are the primary reasons behind setting such an obligation.
41
 Hence, 
such an obligation puts Turkey, Syria and Iraq under the international obligation which 
can enable the drafting of treaties and the mechanism for their application.   
If the above State‟s rights and obligations are not observed, then the entire region will 
most probably continue in the same quandary and effective co-operation cannot be 
achieved. This is especially true when one considers that, compared to Turkey and 
Syria, Iraq is in turmoil in all aspects of economic and infrastructure development that 
would widen the gap of power asymmetry and hegemony of the stronger State. 
However, this situation does not negate Iraq‟s sovereignty but rather makes Iraq weaker 
to defend or enforce its rights, and despite the US presence, it can be conclude that Iraq 
does have sovereignty under international law. According to the DDROS 1949,
42
 it is 
well established that sovereign States enjoy the rights to be independent, equal and live 
in peaceful co-existence, as discussed below.   
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4.4 Rights of States under International Law  
To examine Iraq‟s rights under international law properly, this section specifically will 
focus on Iraq‟s legal and political independence, legal equality and peaceful coexistence 
in three different subsections below.   
4.4.1 Legal and Political independence  
Independence is the outstanding characteristic of State, as defined in the DDROS 
1949.
43
 Under this declaration, it was stated that every State has the legitimate
44
 right to 
provide for its own well-being
45
 and to develop free from domination by other States.
46
  
Political independence is another criterion of statehood. Political independence under 
international law means that one State cannot be forced to pursue a certain strategy to 
satisfy another State because it breaks down both States‟ rights of equality and peaceful 
co-existence. As a result, Turkey not to exercise hegemony against Iraq would include 
pressure to acquiesce to the GAP developments even when they could damage Iraq‟s 
development opportunities.  An example of this is the dramatic change in the Iraqi 
Government‟s position on the Ilisu Dam; from strongly opposing the project to 
supporting it.
47
 It is generally known that the Iraqi government disagreed with Ilisu Dam 
Project, fearing future shortages of water from the upper and middle reaches of the 
River Tigris; in fact, there are many questions relating to the reasons for the change 
position. Accordingly, it can be argued that the political independence of Iraq falls 
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under Turkish influence and there is no transparent relationship between the two 
riparian States.  
4.4.2 State’s Legal equality 
Legal equality of States is another familiar and frequently reiterated principle of modern 
international law.
48
 The doctrine of equality was introduced into the theory of 
international law by the naturalist writers.
49
 Every State has the right to equality in law 
with any other State.
50
 Apart from legal equality, the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
1970 (hereinafter the DPILCFRCS 1970) called for the right of equal sovereignty.
51
 
Shaw explained that „legal and sovereign equality‟ is a concept of law and should not be 
confused with political equality.
52
 Thus, it is equality of legal rights and obligations; for 
example, Malta is a sovereign State just as much as is the United States. Hence, within 
the UNGA the doctrine is maintained by the rule of one State, one vote, irrespective of 
the realities of power.
53
 Like any other country, Iraq is enjoying this right by virtue of 
the UN Charter and therefore no further research is necessary in this aspect.  
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4.4.3 State’s right to peaceful coexistence 
Peaceful co-existence is the third profound right of States.
54
 It has been developing over 
the last twenty or more years. Its preservation obviously is related to political 
developments and the recognition that the world system emerging gradually from a 
bipolar Soviet-American context into a rather less secure multi-polar situation with a 
number of power centres.
55
 O‟Brien said: 
The doctrine of peaceful co-existence was as much a political 
doctrine as a legal principle but it drew upon traditional stands in 
international law and reworked them to meet the anxieties of the 
Cold War and the nuclear age. In essence the doctrine requested 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, and 
non-interference in internal affairs based on the principle of equality 
of status. (O‟Brien 2001) 56 
Peaceful co-existence is an important doctrine for Iraq;
57
 to demand respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference in internal 
affairs based on the principle of equality of status.
58
 In recent years this doctrine has not 
been observed in the Tigris and Euphrates region; in particular Turkey has occasionally 
used military aggression against the PKK militants within Iraqi territory.
59
   
In short, States are the primary subjects of international law, and thereby granted three 
profound rights other than the territorial sovereignty, they are: independence, legal 
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equality and peaceful co-existence. Additionally, political power could interfere with 
legal issues under international law, to affect the peaceful co-existence of States.  
4.5 Obligations of States under international law  
Since the right of one State presupposes the corresponding obligations of another State, 
three main obligations upon Iraq should be mentioned. They are: obligations to refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any other State, to settle disputes amicably, and to co-operate with other States. 
4.5.1 State’s Obligations to refrain   
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter stipulates the obligation of members to refrain from the 
threat or use of force. The Article‟s wording was criticised by Kelsen in the sense that it 
allows the use of force in the case of self-defence and there are other cases where, under 
the UN Charter, States are not forbidden to use force. Therefore, the obligation to which 
Article 2 (4) refers should be formulated to include individual or collective self-defence 
against armed attack.
60
 Other than the UN Charter, Article 9 of DDROS 1949 provides a 
similar principle. It states that “Every State has the duty to refrain from resorting to war 
as an instrument of national policy and to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with international law and order”.61 The wordings of the above two articles 
show that threat or use of force are not only confined to armed attack, but rather it 
composes of a wider meaning to include abrogating a rule that restrains State‟s 
hegemony, especially in the latter article which specifically mentions political 
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independence. Nevertheless, in the case of self-defence the above principles may not 
function entirely, which could be a good excuse for Turkey to escape from this 
obligation.  Further discussions on this issue will follow in Chapter Seven.  
4.5.2 State’s Obligation to peaceful disputes settlement  
Generally States are at liberty to resolve their disputes over international watercourses 
by any peaceful means they deem fit.
62
 However, as far as international peace and 
security are concerned, international law in general imposes an obligation to prevent 
conflicts and settle disputes by peaceful means.
63
 The obligation to settle disputes by 
peaceful means in Article 8 of DDROS 1949 
64
 is formulated by the UN Charter, by 
virtue of Article 2 (6), and has the character of general international law.
65
 Like the 
doctrine of legal equality, this doctrine is also clear and no further research is required 
in this aspect.  
4.5.3 State’s Obligation to cooperate  
In accordance with the UN Charter, States have the obligation to co-operate with one 
another, irrespective of the differences in their political, economic and social systems, in 
the various spheres of international relations. This principle generally set out by the 
exchanging of data and information, on notification, consultation and negotiating 
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planned measures: it is part of „protection, preservation and management‟ and no 
harmful conditions and emergency situations, as will be discussed in Chapter Six. The 
reasons for creating such an obligation are firstly, to maintain international peace and 
security, secondly, to promote international economic stability and progress, thirdly to 
promote the general welfare of nations, and fourthly, to uphold international 
cooperation free from discrimination based on such differences.
66
 This obligation puts 
not only Iraq, but the neighbouring States of Turkey and Syria under the international 
obligation to cooperate in order to safeguard the above four approaches highlighted 
under the DPILCFRCS 1970. 
In short, under international law, States are obligated to refrain, peacefully settle 
disputes and put cooperation into practice. In the case of fulfilling these obligations, 
they should be fulfilled fairly. Lukashuk argues that non-fulfilment or unfair fulfilment 
of obligations under international law entails international legal responsibility.
67
 
However, these three obligations are not the only ones; there are other important 
obligations that will be covered by other sections of this chapter, such as good faith and 
non harm principles. 
Once the main rights and obligations of States under the international law have been 
identified, another question arises: where do those rights and obligations originate? Did 
they came into existence spontaneously upon the declaration of the UN in 1945, or did 
they come into existence as the process of the development of law? Also, how can those 
rights and obligations crystallise when two or more States need to settle disputes 
regarding their joint natural resources in light of international law? All these questions 
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need to be answered through analytically examining the sources of international law, 
which is in the following section.  
4.6 Sources of international law 
Having considered the definition of „international law‟ and the „subjects‟ of 
international law, this section will identify the advantages international law provides to 
the Riparian States of the TERB, through examining the sources of international law. 
This section maintains that Article 38 of the statute of the International Court of 
Justice
68
 (hereinafter ICJ) provides an authoritative statement on how to convey the best 
interest to the riparian States by virtue of international law.
69
 Article 38 (1) of the 
Statute of ICJ provides a list of the sources of international law: 
i. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting States. 
ii. International custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law.  
iii. General Principles of Law recognized by civilized nations.  
iv. Judicial decision and the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.  
This chapter will consider two matters related to this Article; firstly, the determination 
of Article 38 in terms of content; and secondly, the determination of Article 38 in terms 
of application by the ICJ. As to the content of Article 38, it is important to illustrate how 
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international law provides for enduring basin management at regional between the 
riparian States.  Then the application of international law in the regional context of the 
TERB will be explained. The next section will focus on the determination of Article 38 
in terms of content. 
4.6.1 Determination of Article 38 in terms of content 
This section will discuss all the four sources of international law provided by Article 38 
in detail.  
a. International Conventions and Treaties 
This section presents analysis of how treaties and conventions may affect the rights and 
obligations of Iraq under international law. Within this section, five important questions 
will be discussed: What do “treaties or conventions” connote?  What are the roles of 
treaties? At what stage is a State bound by a treaty? What is the significance of treaties 
when they are not entered into force yet?  
International conventions or treaties will be only examined here in so far as they 
constitute a source of law. International conventions or treaties are often ranked as the 
principal source of international law.
70
 This definition is in line with Shaw‟s opinion 
that international law as international agreement.
71
 The word „convention‟ literally 
means a large formal assembly of a group with common interests such as the States in 
the UN General Assembly. A „treaty‟ literally means a formal agreement between two 
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or more States.
72
 Treaty in legal terminology, according to the Article 2 of Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties in 1969 (hereinafter VCLT 1969)
73
 means “an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and irrespective of its particular designation.” Finally, treaties can be 
bilateral or multilateral.
74
  
Treaties involve contractual obligations for the parties concerned, and consequently, 
create law for the purpose of ratification only for the parties agreeing to the provisions 
of the treaty duly signed. For example, Law No.14 Of 1990, Ratifying the Joint Minutes 
Concerning the Provisional Division of the Waters of the Euphrates River.
75
  There are 
four important components to bring a treaty into life. Firstly, a treaty is a binding 
instrument, which means the contracting parties intend to create legal rights and 
obligations. Secondly, the State parties with treaty making power shall conclude the 
instrument. Thirdly, treaties must be governed by international law, i.e. it shall be 
clearly stated in the treaty signed that international law is the law that shall govern the 
treaty in terms of implementation of its provisions. Finally, a treaty must be made in 
writing.   
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Treaties play several significant roles. Firstly, a treaty provides the most concrete 
evidence of the existence of rights and obligations between States.
76
 It may also provide 
evidence of customary international law
77
 and provisions formulated in a treaty can, in 
certain circumstances, be binding even on non-parties to the treaty, especially when the 
provisions articulate what is already customary international law.
78
 Secondly, a treaty is 
binding on the parties upon signing.
79
  Before a State is prepared to ratify a treaty 
thereby binding itself to that treaty, it will ensure that nothing is done which would 
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
80
  
It is important to consider at what stage States are bound by a treaty. First and foremost, 
treaties mean relinquishment of sovereignty.
81
 States must voluntarily accept obligations 
provided in the treaty for it to be valid, although in certain circumstances some political 
duress may be exercised. The said acceptance is an implicit recognition of certain 
limitations to sovereignty; that the protection of State‟s own interests cannot ignore 
other States‟ rights. However, upon signing a treaty, States not only accept obligations, 
but also acquire rights. As a result, State‟s sovereignty settles in equilibrium so that 
State‟s rights and obligations are both protected. Hence, a different kind of sovereignty 
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will be established that may be called „soft sovereignty‟.82 This kind of flexibility makes 
the three principles of independence, legal equality and peaceful co-existence
83
 work in 
best practice.  
Even though a State may have deposited its ratification of a treaty, it may still not be a 
party to it until it enters into force.
84
 The treaty may not come into force until certain 
other ratifications are likewise deposited.  Therefore, such a ratifying State, like Iraq or 
Syria, are not bound by UNWC 1997 and they could probably even withdraw or vary 
their ratification prior to UNWC 1997 entering into force.
85
 However, the significance 
of this Convention in particular is that it is considered by the ICJ as a reflection of 
customary international law.
86
 Further details in this regard are provided in Chapter 
Five. 
b. International Custom  
In the international law system, there is no legislature, i.e. no formal method of making 
and enforcing laws, a consistent and uniform usage on one hand, and States consent and 
regard as obligatory on the other, plays an important role in regulating conduct between 
States.
87
 Thus, international custom can create new norms or change or abolish existing 
norms.
88
 Article 38 (b) of the ICJ Statute provides that international custom, as evidence 
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of general practice accepted as law, is to be considered as the second source of 
international law.
89
 However, Thorpe states that international customary law is rarely 
found in an explicit written form,
90
 although some rules have been codified by 
international conventions in recent years.
91
  
Normally, for States decisions of national and international courts, national legislation, 
diplomatic correspondence, the opinion of national legal advisors and the practice of 
international organisations denote some classical
92
 and general forms of evidence of 
customary international law.
93
 For Falk, because of various interests pursued by States, 
customary international law will be formed as a result of the process of their assertion 
and counter-assertion of claims.
94
 Charney went further by deeming political decisions 
necessary steps to form a rule of law, and that the pressure on the objecting State may 
be viewed as part of that process.
95
 Both States‟ assertions and political decisions have 
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become an increasingly significant source of modern international law in important 
areas such as human rights obligations.
96
  
Customary international law changes in content depending upon new circumstances.
97
 
Guzman stated that it seems eminently plausible that States interacting with one another 
over time would develop norms to guide behaviour, and that some those norms would 
come to be regarded as „law.‟98 Nowadays, boundaries are limited by law and States 
have their own agenda for development, and disputes arise between them when they 
share water resources. The establishment of new regulations to manage the shared 
waters peacefully between co-riparian States at global scale thus should have an 
important value.  
International custom is comprised of two elements; they are State practice and opinio 
juris.
99
  
State practice, can be described as any act, articulation, or other behaviour of a State 
which discloses the State‟s conscious attitude or recognition concerning a customary 
rule.
100
 Caponera conveys the view that the origin of every international rule must be 
traceable.
101
 However, Fidler argued that it is no longer possible to analyse State 
practice properly since the number of States has increased there is too much of it. 
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Besides which, the selective approach could be misleading because it claims to be 
finding general and uniform State practice accompanied by opinio juris that creates a 
legal obligation for all States on minimal evidence.
102
 Fidler‟s argument is deliberated 
further by D‟amato, who believes that international law is largely concerned with 
conflicting international claims as a matter of daily practice, which may articulate a 
legal norm but cannot constitute the material component of custom.
103
 However, when 
there is „practice‟, whether positive acts or omissions, in times of peace or war, it must 
have been continued and repeated without interruption,
104
 but not necessarily be 
„ancient‟.105 Moreover, general practice under international law requires sufficient 
participation by the overwhelming majority of States, especially on the part of States 
whose interests are likely to be most affected.
106
 However, the degree of such 
participation does not have to be completely uniform
107
 or unanimous.
108
  
With regards to the term opinio juris, it means a belief or opinion of law or of 
necessity;
109
 it is also known as the „subjective element‟ of customary international law 
and is one of the two requirements for the existence of a rule of customary international 
law.
110
 A wealth of State practice will usually carry a presumption that opinio juris 
exists, unless a State can demonstrate the absence of opinio juris in the activities being 
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relied upon by the other States.
111
 Thus, opinio juris refers to the conviction of States 
that the consistent practice is supported by a legal obligation,
112
 which is the factor that 
turns practice into a custom and renders such a custom part of the rules of international 
law.
113
  
Considering how closely State practice and opinio juris should be interrelated in order 
to establish customary international law, there are three different views. The first argues 
that both State practice and opinio juris must be equal in order to constitute international 
custom.
114
 The second view argues that State practice and opinio juris are never 
objectively evident.
115
 According to this view, it is difficult to draw a distinction 
between the two components, especially when there are factors other than State practice 
and opinio juris that often play a central role in shaping customary international law. 
Among those factors are for example; multilateral forums; views expressed by States in 
UNGA,
116
 Security Council (hereinafter UNSC), Regional Organizations; and standing 
and ad hoc multilateral diplomatic conferences.
117
 Moreover, major developments in 
international law often begin with or receive substantial support from, proposals, 
reports, treaties or protocols debated in such forums.
118 
 The third view argues that State 
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practice is different from opinio juris especially in the case of highly consistent State 
practice which can establish a customary rule without recourse to opinio juris. Only 
when the frequency and consistency of State practice declines, a stronger attendance to 
opinio juris is crucial.
119
 The third view, in fact, considers the trade-off
120
 between State 
practice and opinio juris not to be of equal value, but rather it depends on the 
importance of the activity in question and the reasonableness of rule involved.
121
 
Furthermore, Roberts argues that treaties and declarations can represent opinio juris 
because they are statements about the legality of action, rather than examples of State 
practice.
122
 In fact all of the above three views are relevant since none can subsist 
without the other one, and will be referred in the subsequent chapters. 
c. General principles of law 
General principles of law are those principles commonly recognised by civilised 
nations
123
 as so fundamental as to become a part of international law.
124
 Among such 
principles regarded as established international law
125
 are the binding force of 
peremptory norms of jus cogens,
126
 estoppel,
127
 equity
128
 and pacta sunt servanda and 
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good faith.
129
  In theory, the evidence for these principles is to be found in the domestic 
law of those States that represent civilised nations. This may be seen as a directive to 
the Court to fill any loop-hole in the law and prevent any shortcomings by reference to 
the general principles. Although it was asserted that Article 38(1) (c) forms an integral 
part of general international law,
130
 nowadays, the increased intensity of treaty-making 
and institutional relations between States have lessened the significance of general 
principles.
131
  
As to the principle pacta sunt servanda, it is translated from the Latin as „promises must 
be kept‟, which is an expression signifying that the agreements and stipulations of the 
parties to a contract must be observed.
132
 Hiller acknowledged that pacta sunt servanda 
constitutes a higher rule of customary law as it is difficult to imagine how a system of 
international law could operate without it. It lays down the rule of fairness and 
reciprocity, and makes the use of deception inadmissible.
133
 One who has violated a rule 
has no right to demand its fulfilment by other parties and may not claim the benefits 
arising from the violated rule. The aggrieved State may withdraw from its reciprocal 
right and obligation with the violating State. Moreover, if a State considers an act to be 
inconsistent with a certain rule, similar behaviour by another subject shall be regarded 
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as running counter to that rule.
134
 Finally, this rule of fairness and reciprocity is, in fact, 
one of the elements of successful treaty implementation, especially particular treaty, 
because it draws equal rights and obligations for parties to the treaty. 
In the legal sphere, States are legally bound under this principle to implement what the 
law prescribes even if the government of the State changes or if it is not currently 
disposed to fulfil the requirements of the treaty.
135
 Thus, States should to identify firstly 
their actual circumstances and interests within the scope of a particular treaty.  
d. Judicial decisions and juristic writings 
Article 38(1) (d), which provides subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
The teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations,
136
 which are 
sourced from treaties and legal periodicals may be used as a subsidiary means of 
establishing the existence of international legal rules.
137
 It is, however, disputable as to 
whose work is regarded as the most qualified, but it is posited that the principle of 
customary international law will ultimately decide such disputes.
138
In terms of 
influence, it is difficult to tell what influence these teachings have on the development 
of the law.  
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Other than the four elements recognised by Article 38 (1), there are other factors for the 
ICJ to consider as the source of contemporary international law.
139
 Among those factors 
to be considered by the ICJ are, for example, resolutions made by the UNGA as 
indicative of customary international law. The ICJ may also consider the draft articles 
on international law published by the International Law Commission as authoritative 
statements on international law, although those kinds of materials do not have a binding 
nature.
140
  
4.6.2 Determination of Article 38 in terms of application 
Following on from the discussion of the contents of Art.38 of the statute of ICJ, this 
section will discuss the method of application of the said resources by the court. 
Brownlie asserted that the said four sources of international law are expressed in terms 
of the function of the ICJ, and they represent the previous practice of arbitral 
tribunals.
141
 Accordingly, it seems clear that Art.38 does not provide a particular and 
complete list of the sources of international law, and it is rather a direction to the court 
as to the various materials it shall consider when deciding disputes submitted to it.  
Whatever the case may be, the article is arguably to be regarded as a complete statement 
of the sources of international law even though the article does not specifically refer to 
„sources‟.142  
Apart from the single reference to “subsidiary means” stated in Article38 (d), there is no 
indication in the said Article of the priority or hierarchy of the sources of international 
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law, because it was intended that the court shall consider each „source‟ simultaneously, 
given that international law must be regarded as an integrated system of legal rules and 
not merely an amalgam of various unrelated principles. So, existing relevant treaty 
provisions agreed upon by State parties shall be applied by the court. In the event of no 
prevailing provision in the treaty, a custom, which is accepted as legally binding, shall 
be applied owing to the fact that the law made by treaty and customary law have equal 
authorities as international law, and usually they are complementary. 
If neither a treaty provision nor a custom can be identified by the court, then, the 
„general principles of law‟ may be invoked, as most modern writers accept that the 
general principles of law are of secondary importance to treaties and custom.
143
  
Therefore, it shall only be utilised in the event the said two primary sources are unable 
to provide a solution.  It is important to comment on the doctrine of equity or fairness, 
which is deemed one of the general principles of law. Shaw stated that the ICJ declared 
that equity, as a legal concept, is a direct emanation of the idea of justice.  However, 
principles of equity cannot overturn accepted legal rules.
144
 
Finally, under Art.38 (d), judicial decisions and writing may be utilised only as 
subsidiary means of determining the rules of international law, because there is no 
binding precedent under international law. The decision of the ICJ has no force except 
between the parties before the court and in respect of that particular case.  However, the 
court may refer to previous judgments and it can also refer to national judgments when 
they are considering matters of international law. 
                                                             
143
Louis, Clemens. General Principles of European Law. Bundesweite Kanzlei für Strafrecht. Available at 
http://www.rechtsanwalt-louis.de/general_principles_of_european_law.htm, accessed 14 May 2009. 
144
 Shaw, Supra, footnote 3, at pp. 100-101. 
111 
 
General Assembly Resolutions are not legally binding.  Resolutions which attempt to 
declare the international legal position on certain points either of existing law or new 
law shall be judged by the normal rules of customary international norm development.  
It is recommended that the ICJ approach to the four elements in Article 38 is used by 
the riparian States and applied to the TERB. The most important suggestion to the 
riparian States of TERB is that when they meet at the negotiation table for a binding 
treaty, they visit all the four elements under Article 38. When they have reviewed the 
Article thoroughly, a strong dynamic and good treaty can be achieved. It is not 
necessary for the riparian States to insist in applying a particular provision while 
undermining the others. Instead, it is necessary to consider the entire Article 38 in a 
comprehensive manner. For example, the riparian States can refer to the signed treaties 
and other instruments between them and endeavour to amend them through revisiting 
the other three elements of Article 38 which are international custom, general principles 
of law and judicial decisions and juristic writings. Only then will the efficiency of 
international law crystallise. When other issue arise later, this method can be used to 
enforce the rules of international law between the riparian States. This issue will be 
discussed in the following subsection.    
4.7 Enforcement of international law in relation to the TERB  
Using Shaw‟s definition of international law, that is, international agreements that 
create binding rules upon the signatories, the subject of enforcement is divided into two 
types; they are enforcement of international law on the signatories of international 
agreements; and enforcement of international law on the non-signatories of international 
agreements.    However, before that a reference to the meaning of „enforcement‟, how 
international law can be enforced, and who are enforcers?  
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According to the doctrine of international law, a State has the right, in absence of 
agreements to the contrary, peacefully
145
 or by legal use of force, including military 
action
146
 to secure its international legal rights, judging the circumstances for itself.
147
 If 
that is so, the term „enforcement‟ in a strictly logical sense is a crucial problem because 
every State has a different interpretation of what legal rights mean. Reisman portrayed 
„enforcement‟ as a transformation, by community means, of an authoritative 
pronouncement into a controlling realty, which can be direct or indirect.
148
 Likewise, 
the enforcement of international law originates from the pressure that States exert upon 
one another to behave consistently and to honour their obligations.
149
 One should admit 
the fact that once States comply with their rights and obligations towards another State 
voluntarily, they are implementing international law. So, implementation of 
international law is different from enforcement. Avoiding a detailed comparison 
between implementation and “enforcement” of international law, suffice it to say, 
                                                             
145
 As with any system of national law, many violations of international law obligations occur. However, 
unlike in national law, at the international level solutions are almost always sought through diplomacy 
and influenced by the consequences upon an offending State's reputation. Though violations may be 
common in fact, States try to avoid the appearance of having disregarded international obligations. There 
are two ways of enforcement by peaceful means; firstly through alternative dispute resolution (hereinafter 
the ADR), and secondly, by recourse to the ICJ. Decisions made through ADR can be from mediation, 
reconciliation and arbitration, and may be binding or non-binding in nature depending on the nature of the 
agreement between the States in dispute. Alternatively, upon mutual consent, States may submit their 
disputes to the ICJ if the ADR process failed to bring the parties to the final solution. The judgments 
given by the ICJ in these cases are binding, although it possesses no means to enforce its rulings. The 
duty of the court is to give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may 
be authorised by or in accordance with the UN Charter to make such a request. Some of the advisory 
cases brought before the Court have been controversial with respect to the Court‟s competence and 
jurisdiction. Charney, Supra, footnote 73, at p.. 545-546. 
146
 Uniting for Peace Resolution, Nov. 3, 1950, G.A. Resolution 377, A-RES-377(V), reprinted at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html [accessed 27 May 2010]. also Akehurst, M., 1991. A 
Modern Introduction to International Law. Kent, Harper Collins Academic, p. 7. also Joyner, C. C., 1985. 
Public International Law. The American Journal of International Law, 79(1), at pp. 183-185. also Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.  
147
 Potter, P. B., 1969. Bases and Effectiveness of International Law. The American Journal of 
International Law, 63(2), at p. 270-272. 
148
 Reisman, W. M., 1969.The Enforcement of International Judgments. The American Journal of 
International Law, 63(1), at p. 6. 
149
 Shaw, Supra, footnote 3, at p. 252. 
113 
 
recourse to enforcement is only necessary if implementation has not occurred.
 150
 The 
establishment of compulsory international adjudication has being characterised as 
imperative
151
 albeit as a long-range goal.
152
 Nevertheless, international enforcement can 
be an instrument for preserving the current minimum order and for laying the 
groundwork for future institutionalisation of the world community.
153
  
Potential enforcers range from international organisations, functional agencies, regional 
organisations or nation-States acting jointly or severally, to non-governmental 
organisations, individuals and elites.
154
 Not all of these entities have direct control over 
the assets of the target State. Also powerful States frequently find it easier if it is 
directed by an authoritative organisation. Similarly, the UN Charter recognises two 
methods of enforcement; enforcement by peaceful means and enforcement by recourse 
to use of force. The former is allowed and preferred based on Article 2 (3) of the UN 
Charter,
155
 whereas the latter, without prejudice to Chapter VII of the Charter, is not 
allowed.
156
  
With regards to the first type of enforcement of international law was on the signatories 
of international agreements,if there was a reliable binding treaty between the riparian 
States of the TERB, it would be sufficient to only discuss the first type of enforcement. 
Nevertheless, it is considered that the existing treaties between the riparian States are 
not comprehensive enough to be regarded as reliable, and Turkey has rejected the 
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UNWC 1997. Therefore, the second type of the enforcement will be discussed as well. 
Before going into detail with regards to the above two stages, it is imperative to 
differentiate, for the purpose of this subject, between international agreements which are 
of general nature and international agreements which are of particular nature. The 
justification is to distinguish between international agreements in terms of 
implementation.  
Based on significant study of the nature of different international agreements, it can be 
argued that agreements such as the 1997 UN Convention, concluded by a large number 
of States, are more general than those entered into by a small number of States for the 
purpose of regulating their relationship with respect to particular and definite matters. 
This is due to the fact that this type of agreements relies merely on good will thatmakes 
the agreements difficult to be implemented. Therefore, it can be considered that such 
agreements to be of a general nature. On the other hand, the particular agreements made 
and concluded between States, for example, the Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly 
Relations between Iraq and Turkey in 1946 (hereinafter the TFNRIT 1946) along with 
its protocols
157
 are, found to be, more focused than the general agreements due to the 
fact of containing particular, clear, and precise provisions, which make the treaties more 
easily implemented. Therefore, one could consider such agreements as of particular 
nature.   
As far as enforcement of international law on the signatories of international agreements 
is concerned, the basic rule concluded is that international law represented in 
international agreements whether general or particular, as indicated above, will become 
legally binding and enforceable only on those States that formally accept the agreement 
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by duly signing them. In short, if international agreements of a general nature enter into 
force they will be legally binding and enforceable upon the ratifying States. This fact 
leads to an important question as to whether the UNWC 1997 alone can be successful in 
regulating the relationship between the riparian States of the TERB, and accordingly 
avoiding any rise of disputes between them. Before considering this question, it is 
important to examine the main provisions of the UNWC 1997. All these will be covered 
in Chapter Five.    
The second type of enforcement of international law is on the non-signatories of the 
international agreements. The general rule is that international law represented in 
international agreements whether general or particular as previously mentioned are 
deemed to be soft law, i.e. not legally binding and accordingly not enforceable, unless 
they have been duly accepted by the parties to them as stated earlier. 
However, owing to the fact that international general agreements such as 1997 UN 
Convention offer through their provisions general guidelines to the riparian States, as 
stated earlier, in which these agreements, even without the required acceptance to them 
by the concerned parties, are being increasingly invoked in international forums.  On the 
other hand, regarding the particular agreements made and concluded between the 
riparian States, they in fact do not amount to international agreements unless signed by 
the riparian States, i.e. they must be, initially, formally agreed upon by them in order to 
be of international nature. 
Finally, a significant question arises here with respect to the function or importance of 
international law in general. International law represented by international agreements 
along with customary law and other sources, cannot be legally and technically binding 
116 
 
upon the States and accordingly enforceable, unless it has been formally accepted to be 
practiced by them, and even then there are problems respecting implementation. Hence, 
the core matter to advocate is how States can take advantage of the benefits of 
international law? This question is in fact directly related to the main hypothesis of the 
thesis, which proposes that international law is the principal instrument to support Iraq 
to achieve its legal entitlements to equitable and reasonable use of its transboundary 
waters.
158
 
The most important feature of international law is that it is the only law that can be 
agreed upon between the States. For instance, in case the riparian States wish to make 
and conclude any particular agreement between them to manage the TERB, each State 
would like its national law to be the governing law of such an agreement. This is in fact 
normal, but for the purpose of avoiding any dispute with this regard, i.e. choosing the 
governing law of the agreement to be made, international law is the best and only law to 
be the governing law to the said agreement to be made. This is because of the nature of 
international law can take into account the interests of all States without discrimination. 
Therefore, international law will satisfy all the riparian States and, hence, should be 
used to make and conclude any agreement between them.   
In addition, international general agreements, although not legally binding and 
enforceable unless accepted by the States, nevertheless offer general agreements for the 
riparian States and a legal framework as a basis for settling any disputes or conflicts 
between them.  In other words, the international law helps and assists the States in an 
indirect form to resolve their disputes and arranging relationships in general. Rieu-
Clarke argued that although international law is not perfect, it can most precisely 
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communicate expectations and produce confidence between States.
159
 Such confidence 
comes from the notion of legal norms: the ability to present rights and obligations, and 
the consequences resulting from a breach of those norms, otherwise known as State 
responsibility.
160
 Thus, failure to comply with a rule of international law gives rise to 
international and legal responsibility,
161
 although the existence of a State presupposes 
sovereign control and jurisdiction over a territory. Hence, States can get advantages 
from the function of international law through the establishment of a framework in a 
particular treaty for identifying States‟ rights and obligations within the international 
legal system. 
4.7.1 Particular Agreements made and concluded between the riparian States 
It has been argued that States should not solely rely on the international legal rules 
represented in international general agreements along with customary law and other 
sources of international law. Such rules do not have effective enforcement mechanisms 
due to the fact that they offer only general agreements for water allocation.  However, 
There is a need to make particular agreements, whether treaties, conventions, protocols, 
or joint minutes and the like, between the States on the basis of international legal rules 
and principles, for the purpose of settling different particular issues between them. This 
is the main door to get legally binding and efficient rules established between the 
riparian States. Those rules should be well drafted within a well-formulated structure of 
a treaty that is accepted and signed between the riparian States. Analysing those 
agreements made between the three riparian States will be undertaken in Chapter Six so 
that it would institute good bases for treaty structure formation, which will be addressed 
in Chapter Seven.   
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4.8 Conclusion  
The main focus of this was to examine the significance of international law pertaining to 
inter-State relations and the application of international law. International law is a body 
of rules, which are legally binding on States in their intercourse with each other, 
primarily through international agreements binding upon the signatories. As the primary 
subject of international law, States are privileged with independence, legal equality and 
peaceful co-existence rights. Besides those rights, States have the obligations to refrain, 
peaceful dispute settlement, and the obligation to cooperate are corresponding 
obligations of States. 
As far as sovereignty is concerned, it was argued that since Iraq is a Member State of 
the United Nations, it should enjoy sovereignty over its territorial jurisdictions, like any 
other sovereign State bound by the UN Charter, despite the 2003 US invasion.  The 
UNSC Resolution 1483 reinforced Iraq‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity despite the 
current occupation, chaos and disorder conditions.  
In discussing Iraq‟s rights, firstly it was argued that the political independence of Iraq in 
terms of its transboundary water is believed to be manipulated by Turkish policymakers 
due to the lack of transparent relationship between the two riparian States. Secondly, the 
equality of legal rights and obligations of States was discussed, with reference to the 
UNGA doctrine of one State, one vote, irrespective of the realities of power. Iraq is 
enjoying this right by virtue of the UN Charter. Thirdly, Iraq‟s right to peaceful 
coexistence is not established due to Turkish interference with the daily activities of the 
Iraqi government on one hand and military violations across the border on the other.  
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A difficulty was found in distinguishing the Turkish obligation to refrain, as a strong 
State, towards her weaker neighbouring State of Iraq on the basis of the facts given in 
the above. However, as far as international peace and security are concerned, 
international law imposes an obligation on the riparian States to prevent conflict and 
settle disputes by peaceful means. Finally, it was argued that not all the burden of 
responsibility lies with Turkey, but Iraq also has an obligation to co-operate with 
Turkey, so that international peace and security would be maintained enabling 
international economic stability and progress, and the general welfare of nations in the 
region. 
In respect of the customary international law, both States assertions and political 
decisions have become an increasingly significant source of modern international law. 
When no applicable treaty exists, international custom will be applied since both treaty 
and customary international law are complementary, and have equal authorities as 
international law. It can emphasised that the four elements prescribed by Article 38 for 
drafting a good dynamic treaty without undermining any one of them. Only then the 
efficiency of international law can be seen clearly.  
It is further concluded that international law represented in international agreements, 
whether general or particular, will become legally binding and accordingly enforceable 
upon those States that formally accept the agreement made between them by duly 
signing them. On the other hand, the unsigned treaties, whether general or particular, 
will bind non-signatories only if they amount to customary law. 
Finally, it was argued that there is a need to make particular agreements, like treaties, 
conventions, protocols, or joint minutes, between the TERB States on the basis of the 
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said international legal rules and principles, for the purpose of settling different 
particular issues between them. It has been argued that States should not solely rely on 
the international legal rules represented in international general agreements along with 
customary law and other sources of international law; as such rules do not have 
effective enforcement power or mechanisms due to the fact that they offer only general 
treaties for water allocation.   
Next Steps  
It was stated that as an international general agreement, the 1997 UN Convention, 
which received a high response in international forums, adds a high value to the 
function of international law, and in fact offers good general agreements to the riparian 
States. Thus, it is very essential to: 
Vigorously examine the main provisions of the 1997 UN Convention corresponding to 
the main findings in international law in the current Chapter. This proposal will be 
addressed in Chapter Five.  
This step will establish main grounds for analysing those treaties, protocols and joint 
minutes made between the three riparian States in order to identify their positive and 
negative elements for the riparian States in Chapter Six  
Later, the thesis will bring recommendations on how to build a new phase of 
transboundary water management to the TERB in Chapter Seven.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW IN THE ‘TERB’ 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This Chapter will specifically be dedicated to the application of international water law 
within the framework of the regional water management. In the absence of a well 
established treaty between the riparian States, this Chapter relies on the customary 
international water law based on the works of the ILC and the principles provided under 
the UNWC 1997. Subsequently, the Chapter will examine the status of persistent 
objector under current practice in international law and the impact it has on the UNWC 
1997.
1
 
International water law (hereinafter IWL) is also known as international watercourse 
law, the international law of water resources, is a term used to identify those legal rules 
that regulate the use of water resources shared by two or more States.
2
 Article 2 
paragraph (a) of the UNWC 1997 broadly defines the word „watercourse‟ as a system of 
surface water and groundwater constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a 
unitary whole.
3
 An international watercourse is a system of surface water and 
groundwater which is situated in more than one State. Such a watercourse forms a 
unitary whole and normally flows into a common terminus.
4
  
                                                             
1
 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997 (not 
yet in force), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997)  
2
 Wouters, Patricia., et al. 2005. Sharing Transboundary Waters: An Integrated Assessment of Equitable 
Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model. International Hydrological Programme, IHP VI, Technical 
Documents in Hydrology, (74), at p. 15. 
3
 Article 2, Paragraph (a) of UNWC 1997. also McCaffrey, S. C., 1998.The 1997 United Nation on 
International Watercourses. The American Journal of International Law, 92(1), at p.  97. 
4
 Article 2 of UNWC 1997.   
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While historically there have been some disagreements as to the extent of the 
watercourse system covered, particularly the issue whether to include the complete river 
basin with all associated tributaries and groundwater systems, a broader definition had 
to be conceived in recent years.
5
 In other words, State practice in the field of 
international watercourses was concerned almost exclusively with international rivers 
and lakes shared with other States, due to a poor understanding of the hydrological 
cycle.
6
 Subsequently, when technology advanced and a better understanding of 
hydrology transpired, the definition of the term „watercourse‟ included not only the 
main surface water channel and the water contained therein, but also the other 
components of watercourse system in particular, tributaries and groundwater.
7
  
In congregating the abovementioned definitions, a broader applicable international 
water law can be introduced to the TERB. Thus, the applicable international water law 
in the regional context of the TERB should denote those treaty-based legal rules that 
identify the rights and obligations of the riparian States, and regulate the joint use of the 
TERB as a system of their surface and groundwater comprised by virtue of their 
physical relationship a unitary whole. In so doing, all the social, economical and legal 
grounds should be taken into account other than political strategy issues. It has been 
argued under international custom section that in the absence of treaties to determine 
and harmonise States together to a particular matter, customary international law can 
play a very important role to govern interstate relations,
8
 which will be discussed below.  
                                                             
5
 Shaw, M. N., 1997. International Law. (4
th
 Edition). Cambridge University Press atp. 616. 
6
 McCaffrey, Steven C., 2001. The Law Of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses. Oxford 
University Press, at p. 34. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Chapter Five, Supra, heading International Custom, at p. 100. 
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5.2 Customary international water law 
According to Caponera, rules of customary international law of fresh water resources 
and general principles can play a very important role not only when agreements exist, 
but even when there is no agreement governing the relations of States sharing an 
international river, lake, or drainage basin.
9
 The reason is that from the standpoint of 
customary rules of international water law, riparian States of any basin may be 
confronted with problems which are also beyond the reach of existing agreements 
among them. Most international river treaties have tended, and probably still tend, to 
deal only with certain water use or management issues. While the utilisation of the 
TERB multiplies or faces complexity, existing rules in the treaties in force may become 
inadequate. Some problems could be compared to circumstances similar to those 
grounds that falls under Articles 61 and 62 of the VCLT 1969.
10
 However, the subject 
of force majeure is not discussed in this thesis, but how customary international rules 
can assist the riparian States identifying rules for governing the development and 
conservation of the joint use of Basin when there is no practicable legal binding treaty 
between them.  
In considering international customary rules, it is important to examine the provisions in 
the UNWC 1997 in order to identify the applicable customary international rules 
applicable to the riparian States. The reasons why such importance is given to the 
UNWC 1997 are elucidated in the work of the ILC on the UNWC 1997 discussed 
below.  
                                                             
9
 Caponera, Dante A., 2003. National and International Water Law and Administration. Netherlands, 
Kluwer Law International., at p.176.  
10
 Article 61 provides for supervening impossibility of performance. Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
May 23, 1969 (entered into force Jan. 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969)  
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5.3 Work of the ILC on the UNWC 1997 
The impetus for the ILC‟s work on international watercourses came in 1970 when the 
UNGA recommended the commission take up the study of the law of the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses with a view to its progressive 
development and codification.
11
 Among the most difficult issues that were handled in 
that session were balancing the right to „equitable and reasonable utilisation‟ of an 
international watercourse with the obligation „not to cause significant harm‟ to other 
watercourse States. The next issue was the relationship between the UNWC 1997 and 
the existing and future agreements relating to a specific watercourse. The last issue was 
a mechanism to be used for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
12
  
The significance of this work is that prior to the UNWC 1997, the international 
community did not have a set of rules codified at inter-State level.
13
 Thus, after 25 years 
of ILC codification efforts, the intricacies of the subject matter as well as of the 
importance that States ascribed to transboundary watercourses became a clear in the 
adoption of the UNWC 1997.
14
 Furthermore, the Convention codifies many of the 
principles deemed essential by the international community and procedures that would 
assist in the management of transboundary freshwater.
15
 Despite critics to the UNWC 
                                                             
11
 Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Supra, footnote 1. also UN General 
assembly, Law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, 1971, resolution 2669 (xxv) 
on progressive Development and codification of the rules of international Law relating to international 
watercourses, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, II(2). Document A/Cn.4/244/Rev.1, 
available at: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm [accessed 10 May 2010] also Abdo, M., 2005. The 
Relevance and Contribution of the UN Convention toward resolving the problems in the Nile Basin. 
CEPMLP Internet Journal, 15, Article 8, at pp. 1-19. By the year 1974, the Commission had begun 
preliminary work on the subject. It established a subcommittee whose report proposed that the views of 
the governments be sought on various issues. Kibaroglu A., 2002. Building A Regime for the Waters of 
the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin. London, Kluwer Law International, at p. 139. 
12
 Ibid., p. 141.    
13
 Abdo, Supra, footnote 11, at p. 2. 
14
 Eckstein, G., 2005. A Hydrological Perspective of the Status of Ground Water Resources Under the 
UN Watercourse Convention. Columbia J. of Environmental Law, 30(6), at p. 531.  
15
 Giordano, Meredith A. & Wolf, Aaron T., 2003. Sharing waters: Post-Rio international water 
management. Natural Resources Forum, (2), at pp.163-171. 
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1997,
16
 it was proposed that the UNWC 1997 could be used as a legal model for 
bilateral or basin wide agreements, since it codifies a number of rules of customary law 
that apply to international water courses.
17
  
It began with the most imperative principle, which is the principle of equitable 
utilisation.
18
 Many upstream States argued that the draft articles unjustifiably limited 
their rights to use and to develop international watercourses.
19
 Therefore, it would 
remain without legal effect in general and customary international law.
20
 At the same 
time, several downstream States argued that the articles insufficiently protected their 
interests, and even criticised the ILC formula in some cases for allowing upstream uses 
that inflict significant harm to downstream States.
21
 Some States, however, abstained 
from the vote,
22
 and subsequently, few States ratified the agreement.
23
  However, one 
                                                             
16
 B. Wohlwend considers the work of the ILC as a possible attempt of the ILC to provide support to the 
recognition of the Helsinki Rules, as in fact, the contents of its Draft adds little or nothing thereto. 
Bogdanovic, Slavko., 2001. UN Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses. Yugoslav Association for Water Law, at p. 18. 
17
 Ibid., at p. xi. 
18
 Article 5 of UNWC 1997. 
19
 Kibaroglu, Supra, footnote 11, at p. 141.   
20
  Turkish Delegation, Mr.. Iskit. The Official Record of the UNGA. 1997. UNGA Sixth Committee, 62nd 
meeting, at p. 12. Available at www.un.org/ga/, accessed 14 August 2007. 
21
 Kibaroglu, Supra, footnote 11, at p.141. also McCaffrey, Supra, footnote 6, at p. 376. also the 
presentation made by Mr.. Al-Witri, the Iraqi Delegation. He said that his delegation had voted in favour 
of UNWC 1997 because it allowed the codification of international law on the uses of international 
watercourses. Riparian States of such watercourses should cooperate constructively to meet the needs of 
all in accordance with existing agreements, UNWC 1997 and international law, whether or not they were 
parties to UNWC 1997. The modification made to the definition of the term "Watercourse State" by the 
International Law Commission in article 2, subparagraph (c), was unnecessary. A provision should have 
been added to article 33 concerning arbitration and binding legal solutions to disputes between 
watercourse States which could not be resolved by other means. Finally, his delegation feared that the 
number of 35 States established for the entry into force of UNWC 1997 would be insufficient to 
guarantee its application. The Official Record of the UNGA, Supra, footnote 20. 
22
 A number of States who abstained or voted against the text drew attention to a lack of consensus on 
several of its key provisions, such as those governing dispute settlements. A number of speakers said 
there was a lack of balance in its provisions between the rights and obligations of the upstream and 
downstream riparian States. Concern was also expressed that UNWC 1997 had deviated from the aim of 
being a framework agreement. Press Release, May 21, 1997, G.A., GA/9248, reprinted in 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19970521.ga9248.html [accessed 26 May 2010]  
23
 After the political debate on the Draft Articles in the UN, B. Wohlwend said: “…the outcome is most 
disappointing in that the terminology carefully carved out and the logical sequence engineered, by the 
ILA in drafting of the Helsinki Rules, have been totally lost to the effect that, notwithstanding the large 
representation of States in the various ILC sessions, very few ratifications, if any, should be expected.”  
Slavko, Supra, footnote 16, at p.18. 
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can argue that the ICJ not only disregarded those critics, but also went one step ahead to 
recognise to the principles laid down by the UNWC 1997.
24
 In the Gabikovo-
Nagymaros case between Hungary and Slovakia, the Court quoted the judgment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of navigation on the River Odder 
from 1929: 
“Community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a 
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect 
equality of all riparian States in the use of the whole course of the 
river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any riparian 
State in relation to the others….Modern development of 
international law has strengthened this principle for non-
navigational uses of international watercourse as well as evidenced 
by the adoption of UNWC 1997 of 21 May 1997 on the law of the 
Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses by the UN 
General Assembly.
25
   
For McCaffrey, such a development was considered as an exceptional privilege granted 
by the ICJ to the development of international law of water resources particularly the 
UNWC 1997.
26
 
Hence, for those international watercourses without even a partial treaty regime with 
respect to water use, there is no immediate alternative but to fall back on applicable 
                                                             
24
 The UNWC 1997 consists of thirty-three articles and an annex on arbitration and comprises the 
following parts: Part I, Introduction (Articles 1-4); Part II General Principles (Articles 5-10); Part III 
Planned Measures (Article 11-19); Part IV, Protection, Preservation, and Management (Article 20-26); 
Part V, Harmful Conditions and Emergency Situations (Articles 27-28); Part VI, Miscellaneous 
Provisions (Articles 29-33); Part VII, Final Clauses (Articles 34-37); and Annex on Arbitration. 
McCaffrey, S., 2001. The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational uses 
of International Watercourses. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, 1(3-4), at p. 32. 
also Kibaroglu, Supra, footnote 11, at p.142.  
25
 Reports of judgments, advisory opinions and orders in the case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
project. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovak), Sep. 25, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 
162 (1998)    
26
 McCaffrey, Supra, footnote 6, at p. 185. 
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rules of customary international law.
27
 McCaffrey suggests that the negative votes of 
China and Turkey are probably attributable to their positions as upstream States in 
ongoing controversies rather than to a dispassionate assessment of the law.
28
 So, their 
objections should be seen as political rather than a bona fide legal case, with regards to 
the fact that Turkey has the Great Anatolia Project mainly to support its economic 
strength as discussed in Chapter Three.  
It is worth mentioning that the thesis is only considering the applicable international law 
at the TERB level. Bearing in mind that both Syria and Iraq have ratified the UNWC 
1997,
29
 it will justify examining the principles provided by the UNWC 1997 in more 
detail, to contribute to the better joint use of the TERB by the riparian States. To fulfil 
this objective, the following sections will discuss the scope, substantive norms, 
obligation to inform, consult and engage in good faith negotiation and dispute 
settlement mechanisms.   
5.3.1 Scope of the UNWC 1997  
The UNWC 1997 applies to use of international watercourses and groundwater for 
purposes other than navigation, and to measures of protection, preservation, and 
management related to those uses. Not much further discussion is required beyond the 
explanations given in the earlier section. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to revisit 
Articles 1 and 2 of UNWC 1997. The first clearly specifies the scope, while the second 
has properly defined all the important terms; watercourse, international watercourse, 
watercourse State, and Regional economic integration organisation. Also, in line with 
this scope, a new definition was created for the application of international water law 
                                                             
27
 Caponera, Supra, footnote 9, at p.177. 
28
 McCaffrey, Supra, footnote 6, at p. 315.  
29
 Meredith, Supra, footnote 15, at p. 168. 
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for the riparian States of the TERB in the same section, McCaffrey states that this 
definition not only accords with hydrological reality, but also calls to the attention of 
States the interrelationships among all parts of the system of surface and underground 
water that makes up an international watercourse. Thus, it should be clear immediately 
that impacting on one part of the system will generally affect other parts.    
5.3.2 Substantive norm: (Equitable utilisation and No-Significant Harm) 
The term “substantive rules” normally defines those customary or treaty rules that deal 
with the creation, definition, and regulation of rights and duties.
30
 Under the 
1997UNWC the most fundamental principle of international water law is the principle 
of equitable and reasonable utilisation and participation.
31
 This principle emerges from 
the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty under which a state has a sovereign right to 
the water resources of an international river basin subject to the corresponding 
sovereign rights of other states.  
Article 5 of the UNWC 1997 which reads as follows:  
Paragraph one: “Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilise an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an 
international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a 
view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof and benefits therefrom, 
taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with 
adequate protection of the watercourse.” 
                                                             
30
 Vinogradov, S., Wouters, P. & Jones, P., 2003. Transforming Potential Conflict in to Cooperation 
Potential: the Role of International Water Law. PCCP Publications, 2, at p. 17. Available at 
http://www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001332/133258e.pdf, accessed 16 November 2008. 
31
 Ibid. 
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Paragraph two: “Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and 
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such 
participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the obligation to 
cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present 
Convention.” 
The above two paragraphs of Article 5 are regarded as the cornerstone of the law of 
international watercourses. This is requiring that a State must use an international 
watercourse in a manner that is equitable and reasonable with reference to other States 
sharing the watercourse.
32
 Article 6 of UNWC 1997 explains how States are to 
determine what constitutes equitable and reasonable use by providing a non-exhaustive 
list of factors to be considered in the determination of an equitable and reasonable use.
33
 
In addition to physical factors of the watercourse States concerned, the factors relevant 
to equitable utilisation include protection, development and economy of use of the water 
resources of a watercourse and the cost of measures taken to that effect.
34
 The next 
chapter will discuss Article 6 in detail.  
                                                             
32
 McCaffrey, McCafrey, Supra, footnote 6, at p. 250.  
33
 Article 6 provides that factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization are: 
1.Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of 
article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including: (a) Geographic, 
hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character; (b) The social 
and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; (c) The population dependent on the 
watercourse in each watercourse State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse 
States; (e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (f) Conservation, protection, development and 
economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use. 
2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this article, watercourse States concerned shall, when 
the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation. 
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of 
other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be 
considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole. 
34
 Shaw, M. N., 1997. International Law. (4
th
 Ed). Cambridge University Press, at pp.618-619. On the 
facts how to determine equitable utilisation of an international watercourse it  requires taking into account 
all relevant factors, social and economic needs of watercourse States, population dependent on the 
watercourse States, existing and potential uses, conservation, protection, development and management of 
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As to the principle of “no significant harm”, Article 7 paragraph (1) of the UNWC 1997 
provides that watercourse States shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to 
other watercourse States.
35
 McCaffery stated that the term „all appropriate measures‟ is 
no different from the term „due diligence‟ on the grounds that it carries the same 
meaning but in different words.
36
 Most writers believe that Article 7 reflects general 
principles of law, and current customary international law. For example, Shaw viewed 
this article as a reflection of customary law, since it requires watercourse States to 
exercise due diligence
37
 to utilise an international watercourse in such a way as not to 
cause significant harm to other watercourse States.
38
 Under this Article, the standard of 
responsibility for a State causing significant harm seems to be due diligence rather than 
strict liability
39
 within the framework of the UNWC 1997. However, Articles 20 to 23 
regulate pollution under reasonable and equitable use with a due diligence standard. 
State responsibility
40
 is the area of public international law governing a breach of 
international law, resulting from an internationally wrongful act attributed to a State 
which has legal consequences. Therefore, the „State responsibility‟ principle requires 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
water resources and availability of alternatives to the planned of existing uses. Slavko, Supra, footnote 16, 
at p.22. 
35
 The Official Record of the UNGA, Supra, footnote 20. 
36
 McCaffrey, McCafrey, Supra, footnote 6, at p. 254. 
37
 Due Diligence is a term used for a number of concepts involving either the performance of an 
investigation of the performance of an act with a certain standard of care. It can be a legal obligation, but 
the term will more commonly apply to voluntary investigations.  
38
 Shaw, Supra, footnote 40, at pp.619-620. 
39
 Strict liability in its general meaning makes a person responsible for the damage and loss caused by 
his/her acts and omissions regardless of culpability (or fault in criminal law terms, which would normally 
be expressed through a mens rea requirement; see Strict liability (criminal)). Strict liability is important in 
torts (especially product liability), corporations law, and criminal law. For analysis of the pros and cons of 
strict liability as applied to product liability, the most important strict liability regime, see product 
liability.  
40
 Freestone stresses that the notion of strict liability with the notion of State responsibility must not be 
confused under international law. He states “While the rules and principles of international law regarding 
State responsibility deal with the occurrence and the consequences of internationally wrongful acts, strict 
liability involves the financial accountability of States under international law for the harmful 
consequences of acts which are not unlawful under international law.”  Freestone, David., & Hey, Ellen. 
1996. The precautionary principle and international law: the challenge of implementation, International 
environmental law and policy. London, Kluwer Law International, at p. 60.  
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that States use due diligence in environmental planning in order to avoid harm to 
another State.
41
 So how does one identify due diligence within the transboundary 
context? Rieu-Clarke suggested that there is an international minimum standard 
required of all States to meet their international obligations in which States must 
establish and enforce sufficient legal, administrative and technical measures to fulfil its 
obligations to other States.
42
 When such required minimum standard of care is in the 
field of State‟s obligation, the obligation on States may differ depending on the potential 
for harm, and the economic, human and material resources available to the State. Due 
diligence therefore appears to provide for differentiated standards of care for developed 
and developing States, tied directly to their particular circumstances.
43
  
Article 7 paragraph (2) advocates compensation for the Watercourse State that has 
suffered harm as a result of the activities of another State.
44
 McCaffrey states that this 
part of the Article 7 gives precedence to equitable utilisation over the no-harm doctrine, 
and is thereby consistent with actual State practice. Therefore, any harm to another 
riparian State should merely be one factor to be taken into account in determining 
                                                             
41
 Tanzi concludes that State responsibility issues, on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination in 
the access to national remedies set forth in Article 32 were such domestic remedies for environmental 
damage are available for nationals of the origin States, the foreign States whose nationals or residents 
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of compensation.  
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whether the harming State‟s use was equitable.45 However, to Tanzi it seems that 
paragraph (2) is a continuation of paragraph (1) of the same article on the basis of the 
level of general law, the nature of the present obligation of prevention as one whose 
violation can only be invoked for lack of due diligence, and not for the complete harm 
caused.
46
 It is further evaluated that the environmental provisions of the UNWC 1997 to 
be understood as a universal framework agreement, and one cannot expect either the 
level of detail or the degree of protection that one might find in a bilateral or regional 
instrument.
47
   
5.3.3 Obligation to inform, consult and engage in good faith negotiation  
In order to properly establish the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, there 
must be a mechanism for cooperation. Cooperation is the essential feature of the whole 
Convention and is enunciated in Article 8,
48
 which provides that watercourse States 
shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit 
and good faith in order to attain optimal utilisation and adequate protection of an 
international watercourse.
49
 While Vinogradov argues that this article not only 
harmonises the substantive with procedural rules laid down by the UNWC 1997,
50
 
Tanzi looks at the Article as a clear example of customary international law of the 
general obligation of a State to cooperate.
51
 So, as the principle of a general obligation 
to co-operate set out by the exchanging of data and information, on notification, 
consultation and negotiating planned measures: it is part of „protection, preservation and 
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management‟ and no harmful conditions and emergency situations. In addition, 
according to Tanzi, this Article could go further in requesting to open up negotiations 
over the alleged uncooperative attitude of co-riparian States.
52
 As far as the element of 
good faith is mentioned in this Article, it is sound to state that the term „good faith‟ does 
not add significantly to article 8, since the principle of good faith not only applies to the 
fulfilment of any international obligation
53
 but is already explicitly codified in the UN 
Charter and in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties
54
 as was seen in 
Chapter Four.  
One critic states that this Article is naive for not forming provisions to make 
cooperation compulsory for the purpose of prevention, control and reduction of 
transboundary impact. In other words, it only demands consultation with the affected 
State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss questions of 
compensation that provided by Article 7 paragraph (2).
55
 Nevertheless, such an analysis 
seems to be more on literal interpretation of the law, while both McCaffrey and Tanzi 
analysed the Article vigorously for what was the intention at the time of drafting the 
article in UNWC 1997. For McCaffrey, the provision laid down by Article 7 paragraph 
(2) is a universal agreement,
56
 and each State‟s location and circumstances are different, 
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that is why the language cannot be said compulsory on all the parties. However, when 
two or more watercourse States enter into a treaty based on the UNWC 1997, then the 
element of cooperation and good faith will be critically accounted for. That is precisely 
what Tanzi believes is an„international obligation‟.57 Furthermore, it has been 
established in Chapter Four that a State‟s cooperation is one of the general obligations 
under international law although no specific mechanism is established. In other cases 
than the present UNWC 1997, the nature of inter-State cooperation should be well 
understood between the cooperating States based on the needs of each State and the 
necessity to cooperate in the subject matter.       
Once the right of equitable utilisation and the obligation not to cause significant harm 
are well established as substantive norms, the next step is how to implement them. Are 
there procedural rules to implement the said two norms in a systematic way?  
5.3.4 Implementation Instruments and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
Implementation instruments are the procedural rules which constitute the driving 
mechanism of the majority of international watercourse agreements. They provide a 
roadmap for implementing the substantive rules for the management of the watercourse. 
Procedural rules establish a range of obligations, from a general obligation to cooperate 
as provided by Article 8,
58
  to obligations concerning data and information exchange, 
which is Article 9,
59
 with the exception of data vital to national defence or security in 
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Article 31,
60
 and prior notification as provided by Article 12.
61
 As to the consultation, 
Article 24 paragraph (1) states that “watercourse States shall, at the request of any of 
them, enter into consultations concerning the management of an international 
watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint management mechanism”. 
Article 24 (2) states; “for the purposes of this article, „management‟ refers, in particular, 
to: (a) Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse and 
providing for the implementation of any plans adopted; and (b) Otherwise promoting 
the rational and optimal utilization, protection and control of the watercourse”.  
As long as the above Article is concerned, management is a provision believed by many 
specialists to be too modest in view of the importance of joint commission. 
Nevertheless, the article does not go as far as to create an obligation to establish joint 
commission,
62
 but only encourages States to create international mechanisms.
63
 Rieu-
Clarke concluded that the study of treaty practice shows that States are not obliged 
under general international law to establish joint institutions relating to their 
international watercourses.
64
 Although States rarely have similar enough legal, social 
and economical backgrounds to enable them to reach an equitable and satisfactory 
agreement on joint management procedures, yet, in the case of TERB, the riparian 
States are strongly recommended to establish a joint commission for the management of 
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the TERB, as will be further discussed in Chapter Seven. Finally, dispute settlement 
mechanism set by Article 33 can be a backup for article 24, if States fail to establish 
joint management. The importance of dispute settlement is discussed in the following 
section.   
The UNWC 1997 provides the same standard of dispute settlement mechanisms as 
implementation instruments.
65
 Article 33 paragraph (1) states that in the event of a 
dispute between two or more parties concerning the interpretation or application of the 
present Convention, the parties concerned shall, in the absence of an applicable 
agreement between them, seek a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means in 
accordance with the provisions of UNWC 1997.
66
 While Article 9 provides that 
conflicts are to be prevented by exchanging data and information, and through 
communication and consultation.  If the parties fail to settle the dispute by any of these 
means, then a State unilaterally has recourse to an impartial fact-finding commission.
67
 
Article 33 requires the States to declare upon becoming parties to the UNWC 1997 that 
they accept as compulsory the submission of disputes to the ICJ or to arbitration in 
accordance with procedures set out in the Annex to UNWC 1997.
68
 This is one of the 
reasons why Turkey rejected the UNWC 1997, because it does not want to be bound by 
the decision of an impartial third party, as will be discussed shortly. Even though the 
meaning of the independent fact-finding commission is not very clear, because 
arbitration and judicial settlement are binding in nature, and regarded as a last resort, it 
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is agreed that the variety of mechanisms available such as diplomatic and judicial to the 
parties ensures that if States are willing, disputes can be solved peacefully.
69
  
5.4 Turkish Persistent Objection to the UNWC 1997 
As previously mentioned, Turkey voted against the UNWC 1997.  When examining the 
legitimacy of such action and its impacts on Iraq and Syria, one question arises: can 
Turkey be considered as a persistent objector to the UNWC 1997?  
First of all, Thirlway argued that what a State declares should be evaluated with 
reference to the occasion on which the statement was made.
70
 In the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, Judge Lachs stated the general principle that a dissenting State 
is entitled to contest a rule if it can demonstrate its persistent objection to that rule either 
as a member of a regional group or by virtue of its membership of the international 
community.
 71
 Within traditional doctrine, the ICJ has recognised that the passage of 
only a short period of time is not necessarily a bar to the formation of a new rule.
72
 
Because of this, the question is sometimes raised as to whether the word „custom‟ is 
suitable to a process that could occur with great rapidity. Today, there is a widespread 
agreement, as Schiffman mentioned, that based on a considerable scholarly interest, it is 
useful to recall that questions of persistent objector status are in practice quite rare. 
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According to the persistent objector rule, if a State objects to the establishment of a 
norm while it is becoming law and objects persistently and continually up to the present, 
it is exempt from that rule.
73
  
There is also a school of thought that considers the concept of „persistent objector‟ of no 
value in international law.
74
 Accordingly, a State may act with subjective opinio juris, 
but it quickly becomes evident whether the rest of the community believes this act to be 
consistent with international law. Therefore, it really does not matter whether a State 
believes itself to be conforming to international law or not, because the interactions that 
occur over that issue with other actors in the system will demonstrate what is the 
consensus on the particular rule. Furthermore, unless the State explicitly asserts itself as 
a persistent objector to the rule, the quality of that State's actions will be judged by the 
rest of the actors in the system. Eventually, the behaviours that establish norms and 
rules that are acceptable to the majority of States will be the ones that attain the status of 
law.  
As Professor D'Amato has asserted, norms which are no longer considered acceptable 
will be replaced or modified.
75
 Charney clearly takes a stricter stand against the 
persistent objector, positing that a State should be bound by a norm if it did not show 
any objection when the norm was being established.  However, because the amorphous 
nature of customary lawmaking makes difficult to fix the precise date at which any 
customary law norm is established, a State‟s ability to object the norm in a timely 
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manner is limited.
76
 Even if the objecting State meets the time requirement of the rule, 
still it faces other barriers, such as the requirement that persistent objection must be 
continuous to the present day and if any significant gap in the series of objections is 
evident, it loses the position.
77
 Finally, Charney mentions that the ICJ has referred to the 
persistent objector rule in two judgements, but only as dicta, and decided the cases on 
other grounds to confirm that State practice and other evidence do not support the 
existence of the persistent objector rule.
78
 To apply this to the case of Turkey, firstly it 
has not shown objections to the rules prescribed in the UNWC 1997 from the time the 
ILC began meeting for the purpose of UNWC 1997, but rather it was actively involved 
in drafting the articles of UNWC 1997.
79
 Further, Turkey seems unlikely to be 
consistent in its treaty practice with respect to Iraq. Therefore, claiming its persistent 
objection to the UNWC 1997 could weaken legal grounds. A discussion on the grounds 
for Turkish inconsistency follows. 
The Turkish delegate argued that in regard to article 6 that while the deletion of the 
word “pedagogical”, yet drafting of articles 5 and 7 created qualms. For example, in 
Article 5, the word „interests‟ could give rise to various interpretations and looks too 
vague vis-à-vis the importance of the article. As for the text of article 7, despite the 
improvements made by the Chairman, the term „duly taking account‟ lacks accuracy, 
particularly concerning the relative priority of the principles stated in articles 5 and 7. 
Consequently, it is not acceptable to recognise the group of Articles in question and 
therefore, this matter should be put to the vote.  
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Mr.. Iskit, the Turkish delegate, stated further that his delegation would vote against 
article 33 and its annex on arbitration, as they believed it inappropriate that a framework 
convention should provide for compulsory measures for the settlement of disputes and 
that the issue should be left to the discretion of the States concerned. He concluded from 
the discussion that there was no consensus on the major or fundamental provisions and 
articles of the draft convention. While Article 5 expressed essential principles and 
concepts on issues such as equitable, reasonable and optimal utilisation, as a whole it 
remained unacceptable to the Turkish delegation, which had expressed objections or 
reservations concerning the preamble, article 2, paragraphs (a) and (b), article 3, article 
10, the whole of part III except for article 11, articles 22, 23 and 32, and article 33 and 
its annex. That is why the Turkish delegate requested a vote on the draft convention as a 
whole, and wished to explain before the voting the fundamental reasons for its decision 
to oppose it.
80
   
However, Article 5 of the treaty of TFNRIT 1946, which is still in force, provides that 
“the High Contracting Parties undertake, in conformity with the provisions of Article 33 
of the United Nations Charter, to settle by peaceful means all disputes which may arise 
between them and to refer to the UNSC, in conformity with the provisions of Article 37 
of the Charter, any disputes which they may fail to settle by these means.”81 See 
Annex 1 for the full text of TFNRIT. The wording used in this Article does, in fact, 
stand in conformity with the Article 33 (1) of the UNWC 1997 which states that „In the 
event of a dispute between two or more parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention, the parties concerned shall, in the absence of an 
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applicable agreement between them, seek a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means 
in accordance with the following provisions.‟ The only difference is that the UNWC 
1997 provides a detailed mechanism for dispute settlement. Thus, it can be argued that 
such an objection puts Turkey in the position of inconsistency with its previous treaty 
with Iraq. 
Finally, Charney argues that the position of persistent objector gains the objecting State 
very little since such a position does not immunise the persistent objector from the 
pressure that other States may impose upon it to abide by the norm. This pressure can be 
in political form and at the same time the legal right of the persistent objecting State 
does not provide any defence in practice if the persistent objection violates the 
international law, which is set forth in States‟ rights and obligations that been discussed 
in Chapter Four. It is important to note that neither Iraq nor Syria are strong States 
compared to Turkey, and are less able to apply political pressure on Turkey to abide by 
the UNWC 1997; such a position could last for indefinite period thereby denying both 
Syria and Iraq equitable utilisation of the TERB.
82
  
After all, if Turkey successfully accedes to the EU, Turkey should accept cooperation 
with its co-riparian States. According to the European Union Water Framework 
Directive (hereinafter the EU WFD) if an international basin extends beyond the 
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territories of the EU, the WFD encourages Member States to establish cooperation with 
non–Member States and thus manage the water resource on a basin level.83 
5.5 Competence of the UNWC 1997 
This section examines two issues regarding the UNWC 1997.  Firstly: whether the 
UNWC 1997, which recently received its nineteenth ratification,
84
 is competent to 
reflect customary international law. Secondly, whether the 1997 UN Convention alone 
can be successful in regulating the relationship between the riparian States, and 
accordingly prevent disputes arising between them? 
As far as the competence of the UNWC 1997 is concerned, there are differing views. 
Firstly, Giordano and Wolf were not very enthusiastic about the UNWC 1997 in 
general. They argued that the approval of the UNWC 1997 by UN member States does 
not resolve many legal questions. For example, as far as the binding nature of the 
convention, so far only seventeen countries are party to it, which is well below the 
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requisite 35 instruments of ratification, acceptance, accession or approval needed to 
bring the UNWC 1997 into force.
85
 
Next, the UNWC 1997 offers general rules to co-riparian States, however, Eckstein 
argued that the language used in the UNWC 1997 is vague
86
 with some contradictions 
in the terms used that could result in disagreements on how to interpret the principles 
contained therein.
87
 Moreover, the way the enforcement mechanism is structured 
provides no practical back up for the guidance provided by the UNWC 1997. For 
instance the ICJ hears only cases on very specific legal points, and with the consent of 
the involving parties. So, it will be very rare for cases like Gabcikovo-Nagymaros on 
the Danube River between Hungary and Slovakia to happen.
88
  
However, Wouters believes that the UNWC 1997 provides predictable and pragmatic 
mechanisms by which States can lawfully develop their shared international waters, 
especially in the circumstances where no other agreement exists.
89
 It is suggested that 
accession to the UNWC 1997 has another advantage, which is to enhance the 
opportunity for cooperation as well as attract international financing for the 
development of the water resources within the entire basin.
90
 So, although Meredith and 
Wolf have made valid comments on what has happened so far and how politics have 
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affected in inter-State relations in managing their shared waters, their focus on the 
negative aspects of the UNWC 1997 could undermine the importance of the UNWC 
1997. One should not forget that the spirit behind the UNWC 1997 is to make the 
riparian States of any basin reaches an outstanding conclusion that rebuts the three 
above arguments. Thus, there should be no specific reason why the riparian States of 
TERB come to entering a treaty that meets their needs equitably no matter what 
circumstances prevail. In this context, Kibaroğlu referred to a conclusion made by Wolf 
that in almost all of the disputes that have been resolved, particularly in arid or exotic 
river basins, the paradigms used for negotiations have not been „rights-based‟ at all, 
neither on relative hydrography nor specifically on chronology of use but rather „needs-
based.‟ Later on she defined the word „needs‟ to one or a combination of irrigable land, 
population, or the requirements of a specific project, or a sector.
91
 At last, the evolution 
of watercourse treaty practice has witnessed a transition from a model of restricted 
sovereignty to a more restrictive definition of sovereignty under the theory of 
community of interest or a community of property model.
92
 The allocation of water 
resources based on equitable apportionment under the community of interest theory is 
actually based on a concept of equitable participation under the theory of community of 
property.
93
 
On the whole, international water law tends to address the efficiency of existing uses 
and allocations, while ILC Draft Article 10 emphasises a „special regard‟ for „vital 
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human needs.‟ Thus, through cooperation, existing allocations would satisfy equity 
principles by responding to existing demand. Reaching equity in transboundary water 
allocations requires increasing conservation and efficiency, improving watercourse 
management and protection and adapting economic structures to satisfy water needs.
94
 
Such a need is the main impetus towards accepting the UNWC 1997 by the international 
community, because of the following reasons. 
First of all the UNWC 1997 is the first ever universal convention on water resources. 
The success of the UNWC 1997 does not actually depend on the ratification of it by the 
required number of States
95
 as provided by article 36,
96
but rather its importance that 
symbolises its status as the most authoritative guideline of general principles and rule 
governing the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.
97
 On the other hand, 
Wouters‟ focus majors in cooperation potential by prioritising hydro-legalism over 
hydro-politics. Wouters argued that a solid foundation for the legal response to water 
scarcity is provided by the UNWC 1997. The reasons are both the substantive norms 
laid down by Articles 5 and 7, and the well developed body of procedural rules in a 
comprehensive framework devoted to address the multitude of issues arising out of 
present and future conflicts over water. Thus, when management of transboundary 
watercourses become an issue, the UNWC 1997 is designed as an authoritative 
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statement of relevant international law to play a major role in solving those 
transboundary issues.
98
  
To that extent, the effects of international law will have immense influence to solve 
future transboundary conflicts as well as the current conflicts.
99
 Therefore, if States are 
bound by the principles of international law underlined by the UN Charter, the UNWC 
1997 is unlikely to deviate from international law since the latter one emphasises the 
role of former one, but in water issues. In a view expressed by McCaffrey, when he 
referred to the UNWC 1997, he said: 
“Consideration of UNWC 1997 would not be complete without 
briefly looking at the question of the extent to which UNWC 1997 
reflects rules of customary international law. In my view, it may be 
said with some confidence that the most fundamental obligations 
contained in UNWC 1997 do indeed reflect customary 
norms……While the International Law Commission does not take 
a position whether a particular article or paragraph of one of its 
drafts is a codification of international law or an effort to 
progressively develop that law, it seems reasonable to conclude on 
the basis of state practice that at least three of the general principles 
embodied in UNWC 1997 correspond to customary norms. These 
are the obligations to use an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner, to use such a watercourse in such 
a way as not to cause significant harm to other riparian states, and 
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to notify potentially affected riparian states of planned measures on 
an international watercourse.” (McCaffrey) 100 
From the arguments mentioned in the above, it can be stressed that the UNWC 1997 
reflects customary international law that can be binding on Turkey. Although 
considering the seventeenth ratifications to UNWC 1997 might not be enough to make 
the UNWC 1997 enter into force, one can pretend that  as a consequence of more water 
scarcity and conflicts between States in the future, States will come forward to 
cooperate and recognise the UNWC 1997 and abide by it. 
On the other hand, if the number of the States which voted for the UNWC 1997 is 
considered, which are 103 votes; it can be argued that the UNWC 1997 was globally 
accepted and will become a primary resource for transboundary water law. The high 
number of votes shows how the international community is desperate to codify rules 
governing their shared watercourses, since it is the main problem of the whole world in 
the twenty first century. At the same time it shows how attractive the UNWC 1997 is in 
the eyes of the international community, which is the realisation of more than twenty 
five years of thorough and successful work by the ILC. Thus, the UNWC 1997 may no 
longer be categorised as a particular international law, but progressively within the 
framework of general international law.  
In addition, Lammers concluded that the UNWC 1997 is believed to be a remarkable 
achievement because it purports to create a global treaty regime laying down the basic 
international legal principles governing the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses. Also it promotes an optimal integrated management of the water 
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resources of an international watercourse while striking a fair balance between the rights 
and obligations of both upstream and downstream watercourse States.
101
 
Before considering this question, let us firstly assume that the UNWC 1997 has been 
signed by the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as required by Article 36 of the 
UNWC 1997.
102
  Not forgetting that only two of the TERB riparian States have signed 
the UNWC 1997, namely Iraq and Syria, means that the UNWC 1997 is unlikely to be 
successful due to the refusal Turkey to sign it, and as a result, UNWC 1997 will not, ab 
initio, be legally binding and accordingly enforceable upon all TERB states. 
However, supposing that the State of Turkey had duly signed the UNWC 1997, which 
resulted in making it legally binding, and accordingly enforceable upon it, or that the 
provisions of UNWC 1997 have become binding and accordingly enforceable for 
reasons other than formally accepting it, for example, its key principles are reflecting 
customary international law, what will happen next? The fact that international general 
agreements will become legally binding and accordingly enforceable is not alone 
sufficient, but rather calls for another matter to be taken into account. That matter is 
represented in the implementation of the provisions of contained in the UNWC 1997, 
i.e. the possibility and feasibility of those implementation instruments. Referring to the 
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UNWC 1997, its provisions are not that easy to be implemented even if it becomes 
binding and accordingly enforceable due to two main reasons as follows. 
Firstly, the UNWC 1997includes provisions that correspond to general agreements to 
riparian States. The provisions of those agreements are vague and use contradictory 
language that result in varied and indeed conflicting interpretations of the principles 
contained therein.  
Secondly, as a result of the fact above, there is no practical enforcement mechanism to 
back up the UNWC 1997. Therefore, it can be concluded that, it is not sufficient for the 
purpose of effecting the implementation of UNWC 1997 and other general conventions, 
to be legally binding and enforceable upon the signatories. It is, in addition to that, 
required to contain particular, not just general, provisions accepting different 
interpretations, and furthermore there shall be a practical enforcement mechanism to be 
clearly stated in UNWC 1997 for the purpose of implementing it successfully. 
Furthermore, that the UNWC 1997 was signed by only 12 countries in 2002 is another 
obstacle to implementation, when at least thirty-five instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, accession, and approval are needed to bring the convention into force. 
So, international legal rules represented in international general agreements do not have 
effective enforcement power, and only offer general rules for water allocation. Also, 
since it was argued earlier that the UNWC 1997 alone may not be sufficient to govern 
transboundary water management of the TERB, because the riparian States do not have 
control over alteration of its provisions. Nevertheless, relying on its provisions will be 
necessary to create a proper legal binding treaty between the riparian States.   
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5.6 The application of lex lata and lex ferenda  
In identifying the legal rights of the riparian States, a reference to a State practice is 
decisive to identify the basis of the riparian States‟ legal rights. It is argued that State 
practice is clearly descriptive, and opinio juris is inherently ambiguous in nature 
because statements can represent lex lata (what the law is, a descriptive characteristic) 
or lex ferenda (what the law should be, a normative characteristic). Robert argued that 
only statements of lex lata can contribute the formation of custom.
103
 However, modern 
custom seems to be based on normative statements of lex ferenda seen as lex lata for 
three reasons:  
First of all, attempts to distinguish lex lata and lex ferenda often rely on differentiating 
between codification and progressive development of the law. Codification means the 
formulation and systemising of rules that already exist in the form of practice accepted 
as law, which is  lex lata, while progressive development is an overtly political act 
concerned with formulations of what the law should be  lex ferenda. However, even 
though codification is meant to be scientific, not political, formulating a general rule 
from actual practice necessarily entails some level of law creation. Codification 
involves legal judgements because it seeks to form a coherent rule in the face of 
inconsistent practice, which requires some crystallisation of lex ferenda.
104
 
Secondly, it is difficult to distinguish between codification and progressive development 
by examining the language of treaties and declarations. For example, treaties and 
resolutions might form customs when expressed in obligatory language, such as „must‟ 
rather than aspirational terms, such as „should‟. However, Robert said that the ICJ has 
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relied on resolutions couched in both mandatory and non-mandatory language. Further, 
mandatory language is still ambiguous because it can represent a moral, treaty, or 
customary obligation. Thus, whether a declaration or treaty provides statement of what 
the customary law is or should be, cannot be determined by reference to mandatory 
language alone.
105
  
Thirdly, treaties and resolutions often use mandatory language to prescribe a model of 
conduct and provide a catalyst for the development of modern custom. Also, treaties 
and declarations do not merely declare the current State practice on moral issues, but 
rather they often reflect a deliberate ambiguity between actual and desired practice, 
designed to develop the law and to stretch the consensus on the text as far as possible. 
As a result, modern custom often represents progressive development of the law masked 
as codification by phrasing lex ferenda as lex lata.
106
  
Prior to the UNWC 1997, considering the work of the ILA on the rules of international 
water resources, Wohlwend regards the Helsinki Rules as declaratory, in the sense that 
they show what the rules of international law are or should be. Even though the 1966 
Helsinki Rules are considered soft law, nevertheless their content should be given more 
weight than mere recommendation because it forms part of lex lata today.
107
 Wouters 
also stated that “for many nations, the Helsinki Rules are considered to embody the 
essence of the international rules that apply in the field of transboundary water law.”108 
Hence, the ILA acted as midwife in the codification of the law regarding international 
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watercourses when the UN General Assembly referred International Law Commission 
for such works.
109
  
5.7 Conclusion  
Chapter Five was dedicated to the application of customary international water law and 
its substantive norms laid down in the UNWC 1997. Before those norms were 
discussed, the researcher endeavoured to create a comprehensive definition of 
applicable international water law in the regional context of the TERB. The applicable 
international water law in the regional context of the TERB should denote those treaty-
based legal rules that identify the rights and obligations of the riparian States, and 
regulate the joint use of the TERB In so doing; all the social, economical and legal 
grounds should be taken into account other than political strategy issues.  
Later, the Chapter discussed customary international water law and the significance of 
the work of ILC on the UNWC 1997. The most important outcome of the ILC‟s work 
was that it codified international water law through a set of rules at inter-State level for 
the international community, which did not expressly exist in the past.  
Within the subjects of the substantive norms, both the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation, as laid down by Article 5, and the principle of no significant harm 
provided under Article 7 were analysed in detail. Next, the chapter dealt with the issue 
of the Turkish persistent objection to the UNWC 1997. It was found that generally a 
dissenting State is at liberty to challenge a rule in question if it can demonstrate its 
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persistent objection to that rule by virtue of its membership in the UN or as a member of 
a regional group based on their national interests. However, when applying the above to 
the Turkish case, it can be seen that Turkey is inconsistent in its treaty practice with 
respect to Iraq because it agreed with the Articles of the 1946 Friendship Treaty, but not 
with the similar provisions provided by the UNWC 1997. Therefore, Turkey has weak 
legal grounds to claim its persistent objection to the UNWC 1997.  Finally, it was 
argued that the number of the States ratifying the UNWC 1997 is likely to increase 
because of the compelling fact that water resources are finite and all have the right to 
access such precious resources. As the number of the ratifying States increases, it 
becomes closer in representing general customary international law. Hence, States may 
still be bound by it even though are not party to the UNWC 1997. 
Furthermore, the Chapter focused on the competency of the UNWC 1997 by analysing 
whether the UNWC 1997 and its content of substantive and procedural rules actual 
represent customary international law. It was emphasised that since the substance of 
UNWC 1997 adheres to binding instruments within the framework of general 
international law, it may no longer fall under particular international law, especially 
when water scarcity and conflict between States forces them to cooperate under the 
UNWC 1997 and abide by it.  
Finally in considering the issue whether the 1997 UN Convention is a self-sufficient in 
regulating the management of the TERB between the riparian States, the researcher 
discovered that international legal rules represented in international general agreements 
do not have effective enforcement power, and only offer general rules for water 
allocation. Having realised that the UNWC 1997 only reflects progressive particular 
international law, it can be suggested that the UNWC 1997 alone may not be sufficient 
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to govern transboundary water management of the TERB, because the riparian States do 
not have control over the alteration of its provisions. Nevertheless, relying on its 
provisions will be necessary to create a proper legal binding treaty between the riparian 
States. This conclusion, contributes to the argument about the great importance of 
particular agreements to be made and concluded between the riparian States, because 
they will have a control over the contents of any agreement made between them, i.e. 
they will be able to state particular provisions that serve the interests of each of them, 
which will not be subject to different and conflictive interpretation.  
Next Step 
In the application of international water law in the context of the Tigris and Euphrates 
River basin, this conclusion provides the cornerstone for the question: How can the 
UNWC 1997 strengthen the legal framework at the regional level of the Tigris-
Euphrates riparian States? Before answering this question, it is imperative to examine 
the legal positions of the riparian States, which will be discussed in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER SIX 
LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTER-STATE RELATIONSHIPS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
While Chapter Four focused on the applicable international law to the riparian States of 
the TERB, Chapter Five examined the applicable international water law in the regional 
context of the TERB. This Chapter will examine the legal positions of the riparian 
States in light with the previous two Chapters. At the end of this Chapter, a foundation 
will be laid for the creation of a proper and reliable binding treaty between the riparian 
States of the TERB. The value added by this chapter is the identification of the common 
issues between the riparian States and consideration of how their legal positions can be 
approached and pursued. At first, a historical analysis of the past and present treaties 
and protocols between the riparian States of the TERB will be discussed. 
6.2 Past and present treaties and protocols between the riparian States of the 
TERB 
Numerous articles and books have mentioned that there is no specific and binding treaty 
between Iraq, Syria and Turkey as a three party treaty, but bilateral treaties are 
observed. That is especially occurred when these States thought it necessary to 
cooperate or at least avoid tension, they have met for negotiations. The significant 
cooperation negotiations are be mentioned below:  
In 1946 the first important bilateral treaty between Iraq and Turkey was made, which 
states that Turkey has to consult with Iraq before building any construction on the 
Euphrates so that the needs of the two countries can be satisfied. It was more on 
cooperation that Art. 5 of the Protocol No 1, which is relative to the regulation of the 
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waters of the Tigris and Euphrates and of Their Tributaries, states that prior notification 
about water development projects will be passed to Iraq in order that these works may 
as far as possible, be adapted, by common agreement, to the interests of both Iraq and 
Turkey.
1
   
In 1964, Turkey and Syria have undergone a kind of cooperation that Sahan considered 
„unsuccessful‟. She based her argument on historical grounds with the case of the 
unsuccessful Turkish proposal to link the rivers Orontes and Euphrates, the Syrian 
Government viewed the process as accepting the Turkish occupation of Sandjak 
d‟Alexandrette and therefore refused.2  
In 1965, Turkey, Syria and Iraq held further negotiations for cooperation, which were 
unsuccessful. The reasons were that Iraq demanded 18 billion m
3
/year of water from the 
Euphrates river, Turkey demanded 14 billion m
3
/yaer, and Syria demanded 13 billion 
m
3
/yaer. However, actual total supply is 32 billion m
3
 at Hit, which makes the combined 
demand 1.4 times higher than the supply.
3
 
In 1967, Syria and Iraq experienced a similar attempt at cooperation that was 
categorised as „unsuccessful‟. This time Iraq demanded 16 billion m3/year from the 
Euphrates, while Syria wanted to concede a maximum of 9 billion m
3
/year to Iraq,
4
 half 
of that demanded by Iraq in 1965. 
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In 1975, there was conflict between Syria and Iraq which was followed by some 
cooperation between the States after third party intervention. The conflict started when 
Syria filled the barrage of Tabqa (capacity 14.2 billion m
3
) after its completion, this 
barrage together with the barrage in Turkey is said by Iraq to reduce the flow by 9 
billion m
3
, from the original of 28 billion m
3
. The Arab League and Saudi Arabia 
offered to mediate after Syria moved armed forces from its border with Israel to the 
Iraqi border. Saudi mediation efforts were finally successful helped by pressure from 
the USSR on both Syria and Iraq. Later, a declaration of principles was made but was 
not followed by official signature. It is believed that there was a secret agreement signed 
by the two governments. Although other factors besides water resources were very 
important in this crisis they are not relevant to this thesis and therefore not discussed 
here.   
During the 1980s, there was some co-operation between all the riparian States, but these 
too proved ineffective. The factors were many, starting from the tensions between the 
riparian states due to PKK armed opposition to the Turkish government which was 
closely linked to the GAP in the South East of Turkey where the majority of the 
population is Kurdish.
5
 In addition, the eight year Iraq-Iran war made Iraq busy with the 
war, while Syria was a supporter of Iran. However, one cannot ignore the fact that all 
three riparian States agreed to a joint technical commission for the exchange of 
information in early 1982 despite the sporadic nature of the tri-partite meeting.  
In 1982, Iraq and Turkey formed a Technical Committee which resulted in some 
exchange of technical information. This was considered a good step forward for the 
riparian States since they had taken steps to ensure that there was a dialogue between all 
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three of them. The most significant shift in approach came in 1980, when Iraq accepted 
Turkey‟s proposal to place an emphasis on the scientific and technical aspects of their 
differences, which led to the signing of a Joint Economic Protocol whereby a Joint 
Technical Committee was set up to consider the water issues. At its third annual 
meeting in 1983, Syria too joined and the Committee met sixteen times, including 
ministerial level meetings, until 1992.
6
 
In 1987, Turkey, Syria and Iraq had another round of negotiation on a protocol for 
cooperation. According to the protocol, Turkey will leave 500 m
3
/s (16 billion m
3
/year) 
of the Euphrates to the downstream States. This was linked to security questions, 
indirectly including the Kurdish PKK issue. In the same year, Turkey and Syria signed 
the Protocol of Economic Cooperation, secured for Syria a minimum amount of flow in 
the Euphrates in exchange for Syria cooperation on border security.
7
 Kibaroglu states 
that the protocol was not devoted to water issues, and in any case was regarded as a 
temporary arrangement.
8
  
 
In 1990 a conflict arose between Iraq and Turkey as a result of the negative impacts of 
the first phase of the filling of the Ataturk reservoir. The level of the river sank by one 
metre at the Syrian border, which resulted in an estimated loss of 15% of crops in Iraq. 
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Later the same year, Iraq and Syria signed a treaty giving Syria 42% and Iraq 58% of 
the Euphrates flow regardless of the flow variation from year to year.
9
 
In 1990 another conflict arose between Syria and Turkey. Syria began the construction 
of a dam on the Orontes, the only river flowing into the Turkish area of the 
Alexandrette. Turkey demanded that Syria control Kurdish activities, give up the area of 
the Alexandrette, and provide Turkey a definitive sharing of the Orontes.
10
  
In 1991, when Gulf War I broke out, a conflict occurred between Iraq on one side and 
Turkey and Syria on the other side. Both Turkey and Syria had signed agreement in 
1987 on the filling of the Ataturk Dam, allowing 500 m
3
/s water flow to Syria.
11
  When 
the dam project completed in 1991, Turkey began the plan as agreed earlier and during 
January 1991 Turkey was filling the Ataturk dam and Syria continued using water 
normally but Iraq faced water shortages alone while at the same time Iraq was being 
bombed by the allies.  
In 1992, another negotiation for cooperation took place between Turkey and Syria. 
Turkey asked that the protocol of 1987 be modified to include a reference to the link 
between Damascus and the Kurdish PKK. The Turkish minister of interior Ismet Sezgin 
asked the Syrian President Assad: “When I return to my country, will I be able to say 
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that the Kurdish problem is resolved?” “You will be able to say that there is a true 
cooperation in order to resolve this problem?
12
 This problem continued until the 
Turkish-Syrian protocol in 1998 as mentioned earlier.    
In 1993, there was another conflict between Turkey, Syria and Iraq as a result of the 
negative impacts of filling of the Birecik dam, during which the water flow decreased to 
300 m
3
/s. Turkey argued that the annual average remained 500 m
3
/s as agreed, but 
because Syria and Iraq have limited storage capacity, the timing was vital and impacted 
on the growing season.
13
 
In 2008, Turkey, Syria and Iraq made a diplomatic initiative to establish a „Water 
Institute‟14 that is hoped to develop cooperation among the countries and the exchange 
of developments in water technology.
15
 What is very clear is that the agreement has not 
yet been put into effect. However, what is not clear is the nature of the agreement 
between the riparian States and how it reflects the proper joint-use of the TERB. What 
is the extent of the legal implications of the prospective agreement? Does the 
prospective agreement meet the international standards of basin management provided 
under the customary international law and in light of the UNWC 1997? It is premature 
to reply to all those questions without having analysed the terms of the prospective 
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agreement.
16
 However, a report states that, in his recent visit to Iraq, the Turkish 
President Abdullah Gul discussed Iraq‟s need for more water, for both agriculture and 
domestic consumption to help Iraq in its fights against severe drought. It was further 
stated that this visit showed the Turkish are willing to cooperate after both Iraq and 
Syria have been repeatedly asking Turkey to allow more water from the TERB to flow 
over the dams that constructed by Turkey for its economic objectives.
17
 This report 
indicates that there are signs of cooperation on the part of Turkey. Nevertheless, it is 
important to examine the above treaties, protocols and joint meetings, to identify the 
drawbacks of the abovementioned instruments and how virtually identify solutions for 
them, as follows. 
There is no sole treaty on the use of the Euphrates River between all the three riparian 
States that can be considered as the main mechanism of regulating the River. Most of 
the above recorded protocols are between two of the three riparian States. Thus, one 
cannot argue that each of those treaties can be considered as a comprehensive treaty 
while the third riparian State is absent, since the latter‟s consent to the treaty is decisive. 
Therefore, signing a comprehensive treaty between the riparian States is a matter of 
necessity. This will be discussed further in Chapter Eight.   
Most of the protocols, if not all, are made during the times of conflict whether internal, 
such as Turkish-PKK conflict, or international such as the Iraq-Iran war, Arab-Israel 
conflicts, the Gulf Wars, and the Iraq-Syria conflict (non-water issues). Each of those 
                                                             
16
 The researcher had tried his best to obtain some information from the Iraq‟s water ministry officials for 
the cause of the current thesis while attending the World Water Forum 5, held in Istanbul, Turkey, from 
March 16
th
 to 22
nd
 2009. The researcher was told that all these information are neither subject to the 
access in public domains nor are they available for academicians and researchers to view. The reason was 
that they must be kept confidentially since most of them are connected to political deals.    
17
 Iraq, Turkey 'open new page' by discussing tough issues. 2009. Earth Times, 24 March. Available at 
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/261360,iraq-turkey-open-new-page-by-discussing-tough-issues--
summary.html, accessed 22 April 2009.   
 
162 
 
protocols covers other issues that were considered more important for national security 
to each of the riparian States. Therefore, the issues regarding the Euphrates River were 
of lower priority than the other issues. The Euphrates River was only remembered when 
the countries had particular interest in it or suffered water shortages. As a result, each 
riparian States had continued with their own national development projects, giving less 
significance to the rights of the other riparian States. However, in the twenty-first 
century, the nature of conflict has shifted to another direction, in which every State is 
attempting to develop so that they can benefit from globalisation and circumvent its 
challenges. Certainly water issues will account for the lion‟s-share of the challenges 
faced by States. Therefore, States‟ attitudes should be determined towards that direction, 
which can be again manifested in signing a formal and binding treaty.   
During this time, Iraq has been busy with its internal and international conflicts that 
have caused Iraq to move backwards in terms of development. Meanwhile, Turkey has 
taken advantage of the situation, and continued to build its dams and hydropower 
projects to the point of no return but to complete the entire project. Subsequently, all 
future negotiations will be based on the existing facts and GAP infrastructure, creating 
more difficulties for Iraq to negotiate for the increase in water which is necessary for its 
own development. Thus, the principles of equitable utilisation and no significant harm 
will be harder to determine between the riparian States unless there is a binding treaty 
on the management of the TERB between the riparian States.             
There is no agreement on the Tigris River per se, and each riparian State believes that it 
has the strongest argument.
18
 There are two possible reasons for a lack of formal 
agreement on the Tigris River. The first is that, to date, Syria has not substantially 
                                                             
18
 Rogers, Peter & Lydon, Peter., 1997, Water in the Arab World, Future Prospects. (Arabic). Emirates 
Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, at p. 138.  
163 
 
benefited from the river even though it comprises part of its border. As for Iraq, the 
country was facing internal instability since the 2003 invasion as well as rapid changes 
of government and new State formation. In Turkey, most of the projects on the Tigris 
River were not primarily designed to substantially reduce the amount of water entering 
Iraq except for the recent Ilisu dam project, mentioned earlier. The second reason is that 
Turkey considers both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as one basin and in view of that, 
one treaty could cover both Rivers, as will be discussed later. It is stated that 
comparable data from Iraq shows that Iraq has a larger irrigable area than Syria. 
However, by means of the canals like Thartar Canal which link the Euphrates and the 
Tigris, Iraq has the option of using the waters of the Tigris for irrigation, which would 
otherwise flow unused, in place of water from the Euphrates. Consequently, a transfer 
of water from the Tigris to the Euphrates could alleviate the water shortage in the 
Euphrates. Furthermore, as is the case with Syria, most of the Iraq's land is low-lying 
and afflicted by deposits of gypsum and salt. This topography limits Iraq‟s ability to 
impound the waters of the Euphrates; consequently, they empty into the Gulf without 
being put to use.
19
   
As far as the 2008 „Water Institute‟ is concerned, some reservations are worth 
mentioning. Iraq‟s latest position appears incongruent with the fact that the Iraqi 
government considers the equitable utilisation of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin as 
part of its sovereign rights, yet this will certainly be affected upon the completion of the 
Ilisu Dam Project. Although this reciprocal gesture is deemed as a positive sign, which 
may create room for future cooperation between the riparian States, it implies some 
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political deal has been made.  The danger with political deals is that they may only 
result in short-term or interest-based cooperation operating in the „game theory‟ already 
discussed in Chapter Three. Whereas cooperation based on States‟ observance of their 
international rights and obligations is more likely to be sustained in the long term. 
Moreover, it is mentioned that transfer of technical expertise from Turkey to the other 
riparian States. This statement suggests that the riparian States have taken negotiations 
back to square one by focusing on purely technical and technological issues. However, 
the doctrines of equitable utilisation and no significant harm are now part of customary 
international law, and it is about to become settled jurisprudence as has been discussed 
in Chapter Six. Despite this, there is no evidence of serious efforts on the part of Turkey 
to agree on identifying the legal positions of each riparian State.  
When mentioning the exchange of expertise, accordingly it gives the impression that the 
only problem between the riparian States is the lack of technology and information.
20
 
While it is true that access to technology and information can enhance cooperation, one 
cannot ignore the necessity of building a legal and institutional regime through which to 
cooperate. Without such a regime all efforts to update technology and exchange 
information will be in vain. That is why it is essential to create a legal framework at the 
TERB level as the main mechanism to regulate the TERB management prior to any 
information exchange, technology transfer or other innovative plans. Hence, although 
the establishment of the „Water Institute‟ is a great step forward, there appears little 
chance of success without consideration of the above. 
                                                             
20
 Ibid. 
165 
 
In order to examine the legal positions of the riparian States, it is necessary to analyse 
how claims and legal positions differ and how claims may be considered as legal 
positions. 
6.3 States’ Origins of Claims and Considerations 
An abundance of articles over the last decade have discussed the considerations of the 
Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi governments towards the TERB. Some articles were analytical 
while others quoted from the official statements. They are briefly summarised below:   
6.3.1 Considerations by the Turkish Government  
The Turkish considerations can be described in three terms, they are; the „unity‟ of the 
TERB, their sovereign rights, and interest exchange. All these three will be examined 
below: 
As far as the term „unity‟ is concerned, Turkey would prefer the Euphrates and the 
Tigris to be considered as single transboundary river basin where the waters should be 
allocated according to the objective needs.
21
  That is because of two reasons: firstly, the 
two Rivers join at Shatt al-Arab and empty into the Gulf as a single river.
22
 Secondly,  
even before they reach Shatt al-Arab, in the Midland, they are artificially joined through 
the Tharthar Canal so some of the Iraqi land irrigated from the Euphrates can be 
irrigated by means of water transferred from the Tigris. In hydrology, this claim by 
Turkey has a value, since a river basin refers to the entire geographical area drained by a 
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river and its tributaries; an area characterized by all runoff being conveyed to the same 
outlet.
23
 Thus, Euphrates and Tigris can be considered as one since they merge in Shatt‟l 
Arab.  
Although Turkey has the abovementioned consideration, yet in practise it was 
refereeing to each Tigris and Euphrates Rivers separately rather than making one 
tripartite agreement to the utilisation of this [single] Basin. This was clearly shown in 
the previous section that Turkey had most of negotiations and with Iraq and Syria each 
separately for the utilisation of the TERB, and both Iraq and Syria among themselves. 
Only recently the three riparian States had joint talks together. This practice by Turkey 
can be interpreted that although Turkey considers the TERB as one basin, it had 
accepted separate negotiations and signing separate protocols with Iraq and Syria on the 
utilisation of the TERB. Tomanbay suggested that this situation would be an easy way 
of sharing two river branches of one basin and with two different downstream States.
24
  
In the context of sovereign rights, Turkey has provided different interpretations of what 
is transboundary and what is international river. The interpretation removes the 
international aspect from the term transboundary to reduce the TERB to mere territorial 
water, with the corresponding State‟s sovereign rights over its territory. Thus, Turkey 
considers the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as transboundary and not international 
rivers.
25
 It is understood that Turkey considers transboundary rivers as rivers that are 
transcending the State‟s boundary with no international effect on it and the State enjoys 
full sovereign rights to utilise its territorial water. This can be witnessed from the 
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Turkish claim of sovereign rights over the two Rivers, when the Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel‟s response a press conference in 1992 over the watercourses saying: 
“This is a matter of sovereignty. We have every right to anything 
we want... Water resources are Turkey's, and oil is theirs. Since we 
don't tell them „look, we have a right to half of your oil,‟ they 
cannot lay claim to what's ours... These cross-border rivers are ours 
to the very point they cross the border”. (Süleyman Demirel)26 
According to Daoudy, Turkey still declining from considering the Euphrates and Tigris 
as international rivers, to which international customary principles, such as equitable 
and reasonable utilisation, apply. This was clearly evident in the debates at the Fifth 
World Water Forum held in Istanbul in March 2009.
27
  Article 2 of the UNWC 1997 
provides that “„International watercourse‟ means a watercourse, parts of which are 
situated in different States”, in which both the Tigris and Euphrates fall under such a 
definition. In this context it can be argued that Turkish consideration for the two Rivers 
are undermining the application of customary international law, although it has voted 
against the UNWC 1997.  
Furthermore, Turkey chose this definition in order to enjoy more freedom on how to use 
the waters, and since the rivers have their source in Turkey, it maintains that it has rights 
over them. As a result of such an interpretation, as Kangarani argued, the Turkish 
government have played a game of delaying tactics so that most of GAP‟s infrastructure 
construction get near completion and to reach the  point of no-return. This game can be 
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clearly seen from the statement “if the rivers were considered as international, a 
trilateral agreement would have had to be signed before GAP could have been 
implemented. For Turkey, conceding 500 m
3
/s (which is 15.8 billion m
3
/year) to the 
downstream States is seen as an act of good neighbourliness, not a legal obligation.”28  
According to Sahan, Turkey nevertheless respects certain aspects of international law 
such as not causing appreciable harm to „prior rights‟ of utilisation, in other words 
Turkey will not cause too much harm to users who have already been using the water.
29
 
The term „too much harm‟ could be interpreted as „significant harm'. In fact, it can be 
understood from the statements conveyed by some Turkish officials that this theory is 
favoured by Turkey, as Fathallah  believes that if Turkey persists with this position, it 
will remain in endless dispute with Syria and Iraq over the Euphrates.
30
 
As far as the exchange of interests is concerned, Turkey proposed the principle of 
„comparative advantage‟ which can be achieved through an agreement with Iraq and 
Syria based on technical considerations, water should be developed for the maximum 
benefit of all.
 
According to this, Turkey uses the water to develop irrigation, thus 
covering the nutritional needs of the countries of the TERB as well as supplying them 
with hydro-electric power, though Iraq is capable to supply Turkey with oil, a vital 
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resource for Turkey's economy.
 31
 Hence, one could argue that Turkey is attempts to 
divert from the equitable utilisation and non-significant harm issues of the TERB to a 
mere goods exchange treaty. While it is true that oil is decisive for the economy of any 
State, it cannot be looked upon in the same way as water, when there are watercourse 
flows into Iraq by nature. The trade of oil for water could only be comparable if there 
was no natural water flow to Iraq, and Iraq needed to import water as any other 
commodity. Therefore, if the said Turkish proposal of „comparative advantage‟ is 
agreed upon by the three riparian States, Turkey will be allowed  to maximise the 
utilisation of its waters ignoring Iraq‟s need for water , and this will not secure a fairer 
water supply to Iraq when the petroleum productions in Iraq stops in the future.  This 
will make Iraq falling at the mercy of Turkey directly and place Iraq in misery for 
domestic water and food demand. At that time there might not be much room for Iraq to 
rely on customary international law for acquiring enough water.  
6.3.2 Considerations by the Syrian Government  
As a weaker downstream State compared to Turkey, Syria has the following 
considerations towards the TERB:  
Syria agrees with the Turkish considerations that the two Rivers compose one basin that 
crosses more than one State. However, it disagrees with the narrow transboundary 
interpretation by Turkey to the rivers. It argues that, since both rivers cross the boundary 
of different sovereign States both Rivers should be considered as international rivers, 
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regardless of the location of the States.
32
 This is based on what is meant by 
„international watercourse‟ provide by Article 2 of the UNWC 1997. Therefore, the 
upper riparian State should not harm or affect in any way the flow or the quality of the 
shared waters in its use of an internationally shared river.
33
  
Moreover, Syria argues that the historical rights of Syria to use that water need to be 
protected since the people are living on the Euphrates River for thousands of years. If 
the water flow is substantially decreased to cause migration, then it will be the end of 
the civilisation in the area.
34
 One may argue that this position by Syria does not mean 
that Syrians should be given priority over the Turkey in utilising the Euphrates River, 
otherwise, it will stand in contradiction to the Article 10 of UNWC 1997 which states 
that in the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international 
watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
35
 Instead, Syria suggests that no 
water development projects should be undertaken without the prior consent of the other 
riparian countries. This suggestion has the validity of the fact that if there is no prior 
consent from the downstream States on the projects carried out by the upstream State, 
the downstream States will face water quality and quantity problems since the upstream 
State cannot be aware of the impact of the projects. Therefore, prior consents are 
significant for future inter-State relationships.  
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Finally, Syria argues that when the TERB is considered as one basin, then Syria has the 
total downstream rights to the Euphrates, and Iraq the equivalent rights to the Tigris. 
This is not applicable claim, because Iraq cannot depend on the Tigris River alone to 
satisfy its water needs, as will be discussed in the Iraq‟s considerations below.    
6.3.3 Considerations by the Iraqi Government  
Similar to the Syrian claims, and other than claiming historical right to utilise the two 
Rivers in Iraq, it is not a big for Iraq whether the TERB is considered as one „basin‟ or 
two. What is more important for Iraq is to look at the Rivers separately and 
independently considered and should be shared equitably between the riparian States. 
Iraq does not agree with Syrian position that Euphrates should be for Syria and Tigris 
for Iraq, but rather Iraq needs to receive water from both Rivers. Furthermore, only 
when the two rivers are considered separately, Iraq can then ensure that it receives 
sufficient water from Euphrates as well as from Tigris to meets its national needs.
36
  
It was stated that the focus of Iraq on the Euphrates River comes from the numerous 
problems linked to the utilisation of the Tigris, for example, the River traverses the 
north of Iraq, which is Kurdish territory. Should this area become more independent, it 
would mean that Baghdad would lose control over its water resources.
37
 However, one 
cannot pretend that the Kurds will get an independent state especially in the post 2003 
invasion, where the Kurds accepted remaining with the new federal State of Iraq but as 
an autonomous region.
38
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Another issue raised by Iraq is that the Tigris River has a higher salt content than the 
Euphrates that will make difficult for Iraq to use this water without mixing it with less 
salty water from the Euphrates especially for soils that are already naturally salty. Also, 
the majority of Iraqi irrigation schemes, as well as many villages, are situated along the 
Euphrates.
39
 
In short, it is difficult to identify the agreeable legal position between the riparian States 
due to their different approaches on defining the „basin‟ and its two Rivers 
notwithstanding with the fact that Article 2 of UNWC 1997 provides lucid interpretation 
of which it reflects customary international law.  Table 4 below shows the riparian 
States‟ consisting and conflicting claims over the TERB.  
Table 2. The similarity and differences of approaches by the riparian States 
Considerations Turkey Syria  Iraq 
One Basin Yes Yes No 
Two independent rivers No No Yes 
International character of the TERB No Yes Yes 
Historical Rights  No Yes Yes 
Equitable Utilisation  No/Yes Yes Yes 
Non-Significant Harm Yes 
(appreciable 
harm) 
Yes Yes 
In order to avoid potential conflicts, which come from the riparian States‟ fundamental 
disagreements over the TERB, it is suggested that the riparian States have to deal with 
the problem on a regional scale, taking into account the needs and the capacities of all 
States. This goal would be best reached through establishing a treaty based body by the 
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three riparian States that strengthens the legal and technical framework relying on the 
applications of customary international law, and governs the Joint Technical Committee 
to ensure the achievement of such a crucial task. This will be further discussed in 
Chapter Seven, but first the legal positions of the riparian States should be examined in 
order to establish the basis for the riparian States‟ legal rights.   
Regarding the issue of how the legal positions of the riparian States are formed under 
international law it was mentioned in Chapter Four that international law is largely 
concerned with conflicting international claims as a matter of daily practice, which may 
enunciate a legal norm
40
 that can materialise in a form of treaty which is able to 
establish new binding rules on all the States, regardless of the attitudes of any particular 
State as a matter of necessity.
41
 According to this argument, the legal status of 
transboundary water problems between the riparian States of TERB can have clearer 
stands for conflict resolutions. It is suggested that after the 1980s it was increasingly 
difficult to relegate economic, social, and environmental issues to the status of problems 
that can be solved without recourse to the international law. Unlike realist theorists, 
those taking a functional approach did not assume that these issues posed trivial 
problems for compliance.
42
 For that reason, reference to the application of international 
law becomes intrinsic fact for solving every inter-State problem through entering into 
treaties for conflict resolutions. For the TERB, such treaties can consolidate both States‟ 
rights and obligations towards utilising the TERB, and shrinks the chances of 
disagreements or taking different approaches. Since international law is largely 
concerned with States‟ rights and obligations, it will be much easier further to rely on 
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the UNWC 1997 in identifying the legal positions of the riparian States of the TERB. 
The reasons are; firstly, it represents general customary international law, and secondly, 
both Iraq and Syria are parties to UNWC 1997. Thirdly, although Turkey has voted 
against UNWC 1997 the main principles of UNWC 1997 still apply because its 
persistent objection has no value due to its inconsistent treaty and State practice.  
From this perspective, water resources issues between the riparian States can only be 
solved when the riparian States of the TERB are ready to enter into a formal and legal 
binding treaty on the utilisation of the Basin. Another justification to rely on UNWC 
1997 as the basis for the said treaty, Cohen believes hat drafting treaties depend upon an 
official body of law in order to survive political disagreement between the riparian 
states.
43
 Therefore, the UNWC 1997 should be considered as the main source of law 
forming the legal position of the riparian States. in the following section, the substantive 
norms and procedural rules provided by the UNWC 1997 will be examined with respect 
to the legal positions of the parties which are namely equitable utilisation, no significant 
harm, and the procedural rules.  
a. Recalling the principle of Equitable Utilisation 
As discussed in Chapter Five, Article 5 of the UNWC 1997 sets out the principle of 
equitable utilisation as not only a right to an equitable allocation but also as a positive 
duty to reasonably participate in the protection and development of the watercourse.
44
 
Thus, Article 5 contains the fundamental rights and obligations of the riparian States by 
utilising and developing the watercourse in a manner that will result in optimal 
utilisation of the watercourse consistent with its protection. Also, the States should 
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participate and cooperate in an equitable manner, in the use, development, and 
protection of the watercourse. 
It was found in Chapter Five that this Article represents customary international law and 
therefore should be binding on all the riparian States. Another important aspect of the 
Article is that it requires the consideration of equity and reasonableness in the uses of 
any particular watercourse and a weight given to each factor, depending on the nature of 
the specific watercourse together as a whole, and no priority should be given to any 
particular use. Thus, Article 10 specifies that “in the absence of agreement or custom to 
the contrary, no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other 
uses.” Further, Article 10 adds that in case of conflict between uses of international 
watercourse, resolutions should be resolved in accordance with Article 5, equitable and 
reasonable utilisation, and Article 7, no appreciable harm with “special regard being 
given to the requirements of vital human needs.” As to the „priority of use‟ case, there is 
no evidence that both Iraq and Syria have claimed it.  
As far as Article 5 is concerned, Turkey does not recognise the Article as legitimate, not 
because of its inconsistency with international law, but because of the wording of the 
Article itself.  This was clearly seen when the Turkish delegation stated that 
“...Concerning article 5, the word [“interests”] could give rise to various interpretations 
and was too vague, in view of the importance of the article....”45 This statement suggests 
that Turkey cannot comply with a norm that is vague and therefore reserves the right to 
reject it ab initio before the issue of compliance comes about. However, the word 
„interests‟ does not seem to be problematic for Turkey in Article 5 of Protocol No. 1 of 
the TFNRIT 1946 which reads: “Turkey shall keep Iraq informed of her plans for the 
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construction of conservation works on either of the two rivers or their tributaries, in 
order that these works may as far as possible, be adapted, by common agreement, to the 
interests of both Iraq and Turkey.”46  
Although, the abovementioned two Articles are different in application, the spirit behind 
the word „interests‟ in both Articles is encouraging States to cooperate. Based on the 
debate made by the Turkish delegation it could be argued that Turkey is more likely to 
recognise the Article if the wording of the article is made clearer. Besides, in 1990s 
Turkey has proposed to both Syria and Iraq the „Three Staged-Plan for Optimum, 
Equitable and Reasonable Utilization of the Transboundary Watercourses of the Tigris-
Euphrates Basin‟,47 as will be further discussed in Chapter Seven. Therefore, when Iraq, 
Syria and Turkey are willing to sign a binding treaty to manage the TERB, they can 
reconsider the wording of Article 5, and draft it in such a way that all the riparian States 
are happy with it. Furthermore, since both Iraq and Syria are parties to the UNWC 1997 
Convention, it can be concluded that the first fundamental legal right of the riparian 
States is to utilise the water from both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers equitably 
considering all the social, economical and vital human need factors.   
b. Recalling the no Significant Harm principle 
In expanding the substantive protection of the usage of international rivers, Article 7 
embodies the principle of international law that requires riparian States to exercise due 
diligence to prevent causing significant harm to co-riparian States.  Turkey does not like 
the language used in Article 7 not because of the principle itself, but rather because of 
the mandatory nature of language is used in the Article.
48 
That is normal for Turkey, as 
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the strongest riparian State, to dislike mandatory language as it may affect its interests 
in the TERB. However, when a particular norm under international law is widely agreed 
to reflect customary international law, the dissenting State cannot easily ignore it. 
Furthermore, Turkey has been shown to have failed in its attempt to become a persistent 
objector.  It does not seem appropriate for a State to agree with only the first half of a 
particular norm while ignoring the second half, especially when Turkey expressed its 
interest not to cause too much harm to the downstream States, as mentioned earlier. 
Thus, it can be argued that Turkey agrees in principle with the article, but disagrees with 
how it should be applied, and it brings more relief for both Syria and Iraq to negotiate 
further with Turkey on these grounds. 
c. Procedural obligations  
Exchange of information composes an important part of procedural obligations. It can 
be understood from the Turkish delegation‟s statement, that Turkey does not oppose 
Article 11 which provides for information concerning planned measures. The Article 
states “Watercourse States shall exchange information and consult each other and, if 
necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition of an 
international watercourse.” Also Article 5 of Protocol No.1 in the TFNRIT 1946 reads 
“Turkey shall keep Iraq informed of her plans for the construction of conservation 
works on either of the two rivers or their tributaries, in order that these works may as far 
as possible, be adapted, by common agreement, to the interests of both Iraq and 
Turkey.”49 The latter article is, in fact, more illuminative than the former, because the 
former merely provides for the general application of the article. However, the latter 
article brings two conditions for the sake of the article; they are common agreement, 
and interests of both Iraq and Turkey. Hence, as far as the Turkish-Iraqi relationships is 
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concerned, if Turkey intends to comply with this article, then its objection to Article 12 
of the UNWC 1997 should be an error since the UNWC 1997 article calls for protecting 
the common interests of the parties through avoiding significant adverse effect upon 
other watercourse States. The article reads: “Before a watercourse State implements or 
permits the implementation of planned measures which may have a significant adverse 
effect upon other watercourse States, it shall provide those States with timely 
notification thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available technical data 
and information, including the results of any environmental impact assessment, in order 
to enable the notified States to evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures.”50  
Such inconsistency suggests two possibilities. The first is that, at the time of the 
processing the ILC Draft Articles, the Turkish delegation was not aware of the 1946 
treaty between Iraq and Turkey.  The second scenario is that Turkey chose to ignore its 
previous treaty with Iraq. Since the first scenario is incongruous with the character of 
the Turkish delegation, the second scenario seems more likely. The GAP was under 
construction for about two decades at the time of voting for the UNWC 1997, and of 
course, Turkey would not vote for a convention that is not in accordance with its 
interests. Therefore, Turkey objected Article 12 and the rest of articles under Part III of 
UNWC 1997. 
Such an error suggests that Turkey may not object any form that regulate notifications 
of planned measures and exchange of information that might be necessary for the 
riparian States, notwithstanding the fact that Turkey is at the point of no return with the 
GAP. However, international law is concerned with protecting all the States equally 
through both conceptualising and realising the rights and obligations of States. In short, 
                                                             
50
 Law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, 1971, U.N.G.A. Res.2669 (xxv), 
A/Cn.4/244/Rev.1, reprinted at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/8_3.htm [accessed 10 May 2010] 
179 
 
like both Iraq and Syria, Turkey is also bound by this obligation especially if it is made 
more precise to protect the interests of Iraq and Syria accordingly.  
d. Dispute settlements 
Article 33 paragraph (1) of the UNWC 1997 provides that in the event of a dispute 
between two or more parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present 
Convention, the parties concerned shall, in the absence of an applicable agreement 
between them, seek a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means in accordance with 
the provisions of UNWC 1997. Moreover, Article 9 provides that conflicts are to be 
prevented by exchanging data and information, communication and consultation and, if 
parties fail to achieve the settlement of disputes by any of these means, then a State 
unilaterally has recourse to an impartial fact-finding commission,
51
 Article 33 requires 
the States to declare upon becoming parties to the UNWC 1997 that they accept as 
compulsory the submission of disputes to the ICJ or to arbitration in accordance with 
procedures set out in the Annex to UNWC 1997.
52
  
Apart from Article 33 of the UNWC 1997, Turkey does not seem to have difficulties in 
dispute settlement issues even if it is compulsory under both the UN Charter and the 
1946 Treaty, in which Article 5 provides that the High Contracting Parties undertake, in 
conformity with the provisions of Article 33 of the UN Charter, to settle by peaceful 
means all disputes which may arise between them and to refer to the UNSC, in 
                                                             
51
 Ibid. 
52
 McCaffrey, Steven C., 2001. The Law Of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses. Oxford 
University Press, at p. 261. 
180 
 
conformity with the provisions of Article 37 of the Charter, any disputes which they 
may fail to settle by these means.
53
  
Article 33 of the UN Charter states: (1) The parties to any dispute, the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, 
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means 
of their own choice. (2) The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon 
the parties to settle their dispute by such means. At the same time, Article 37 of the UN 
Charter reads: (1) Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 
fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security 
Council. (2) If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide 
whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it 
may consider appropriate.  
The above procedures are not binding on the parties unless the parties agree otherwise, 
and Turkey as a powerful State does not like decisions of a binding nature. However, 
Article 36 (3) of the UN Charter reads “In making recommendations under this Article 
the UNSC should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule 
be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the 
provisions of the Statute of the Court.”   
However, after applying Article 5 of the TFNRIT 1946, Iraq can depend on this on this 
Article to bring the matter to the ICJ through support of the UNSC to precede its future 
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disputes with Turkey. While it is often argued that the ability of international law and 
the ICJ to bind State actors is weak, and that the dualist nature of many legal regimes 
limits the enforcement of international norms, records show that the ICJ actually has a 
great record of securing compliance, despite some notable failures.
54
 Besides that, the 
ICJ decisions are binding in nature which removes another excuse for Turkey to escape 
from its obligation. In summary, like Iraq and Syria, it can be argued that Turkey does 
not object the dispute settlement if a consensus is reached on how to establish 
mechanisms to solve disputes. This matter is related to States‟ compliance of 
international obligation as will be discussed below.  
6.4 State’s Compliance of international obligation 
In practice, agreements among asymmetrically powerful actors are rarely perfectly 
voluntary, and the decision to conform to prescribed behaviour might rest on an 
amalgam of State obligation and felt coercion.
55
 Such circumstances make it more 
complex to demand a particular State complies with its international obligation. Thus, it 
will be difficult to examine the actual legal positions of States towards a particular issue 
if one or more States do not comply with international law. 
As to the definition of compliance, it encompasses those State activities aimed to fulfil 
the purpose and objectives of the treaty regime. Compliance is an integral component of 
implementation and refers to a State‟s behaviour in terms of its conformity with treaty 
commitments.
56
 There is another definition that distinguishes compliance from the 
above definition and treaty implementation. It states that behaviour of a given subject 
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may still be in compliance with prescribed behaviour up until the actual behaviour 
departs significantly from prescribed behaviour, at which point it is regarded as 
noncompliance or violation.
57
 Since part of this thesis examines the treaty practice 
between the riparian States of the TERB, the researcher subscribes to the first definition 
of compliance.  
There are two levels of compliance, first order and second order. The first order refers 
to compliance with standing, substantive rules often embodied in treaty arrangements
58
 
or in conventions like the principles of equitable utilisation and no significant harm 
embedded in Articles 5 and 7 of the UNWC 1997. It is difficult to establish an 
underlying rate of compliance since it is unclear how to measure the rate. Therefore, 
researchers looking for the same set of behaviours disagree over whether law, rules, and 
agreements effectively govern most foreign policy actions, or whether such 
considerations have little effect on State behaviour. Not only that, some States may 
become a non-compliance party to a treaty or vote against a particular convention for 
the excuse that, according to Wouters, there may be ambiguity and indeterminacy in the 
treaty language, limitations on the capacity of the parties to carry out their undertakings, 
and the temporal dimension of the social, economic, and political changes contemplated 
by regulatory treaties.
59
 The reasons for such ambiguity is that all the sovereign States 
have the inherent right to interpret the law in accordance with their understanding and 
interests, they can attempt to change it, and they can choose to ignore it so long as they 
are prepared to accept the very real political, economic, and even military consequences 
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that may result.
60
 The best example is the statement made by the Turkish delegation 
regarding Article 7 of the UNWC 1997.  
“...As for the text of article 7, despite the improvements made by 
the Chairman, the expression “duly taking account” still lacked 
precision, particularly concerning the relative priority of the 
principles stated in articles 5 and 7. Consequently, his delegation 
could not accept the cluster of Articles in question and requested 
that the matter should be put to the vote.”61  
The second order compliance, however, is compliance with the authoritative decision of 
a third party, such as a panel of the World Trade Organization, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, or the International Court of Justice.
62
 
When talking about compliance under international law, to realists, the decentralised 
nature of the international legal system is its prime defect. For them, international 
agreements lack restraining power, especially since governments generally retain the 
right to interpret and apply the provisions of international agreements selectively. 
Realists view the activities of major powers and the pursuit of important interests as 
highly unlikely to be constrained by legal authority or prior agreement. For that reason, 
they typically assume that international law is merely an epiphenomenon of interests or 
is only made effective through the balance of power. This position makes realists 
especially sceptical about the rule of law and legal processes in international relations.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter initially discussed the past and present treaties and protocols between the 
riparian States of the TERB from the 1946 to 2008. It argues that there is no sole treaty 
on the uses of both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers between all the three riparian States 
to be considered as the main mechanism of regulating the entire Basin. Most of the 
above recorded protocols are between only two of the three riparian States, hence it is 
emphasised that those treaties cannot be considered as comprehensive while the third 
riparian State is absent, since the latter‟s consent to the treaty is decisive. This highlights 
the necessity for the signing of a comprehensive treaty between the riparian States. 
Furthermore, most of the protocols, if not all, are made during the times of conflict and 
which therefore focus on other issues that were considered more important for the 
national security to each of the riparian State. Therefore, the Euphrates River issues 
were seen as of a lower priority than the other issues. However, sooner or later water 
issues will certainly become the major challenge faced by States and require a change in 
attitude towards the direction of accepting joint use of the TERB, which can be again 
materialised in signing a formal and binding treaty.   
The Chapter has further examined the riparian States‟ claims vis-a-vis their legal 
positions on the TERB. It was suggested that claims come from rights that can 
guarantee entitlements, which is dependent on a State‟s consideration or perspective on 
a particular matter. Thus, States can have different considerations on a matter without 
reflecting the realities that could leave room for conflict.   
When discussing the Turkish view that the TERB comprises one basin, it was argued 
that the fact that each River crosses the territory of two different States notwithstanding 
the fact that they merge again in one State may counter this consideration although from 
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strict hydrological definition it is considered as one basin. The reason is that the 
dependence on the rivers will be different from one State to another based on different 
political, social and economical factors of each States. Another factor is that the Turkish 
contribution to the Euphrates is about 89%, while the other 11% comes from Syria, 
which means that both Turkey and Syria contribute to the water entering Iraq. Finally, 
although the Tigris forms part of the border to Syria, no material advantages from the 
Tigris River are received by Syria. In other words, Iraq is the main beneficial 
downstream State of the Tigris River after Turkey.  
Next, unlike Iraq and Syria, the Turkish approach to deem the TERB as a transboundary 
watercourse with no international character seems not only to contradict the definition 
and modern understanding of what transboundary river basin means, but also 
undermines the rights of the other sovereign States which is not allowed by international 
law. Unlike Turkey, both Syria and Iraq claim historical rights over the TERB are 
similar. However, Syria argues that the Euphrates River should be utilised by Syria after 
Turkey and Tigris should be for Iraq. So, they believe that the two rivers should be 
considered differently and for two different downstream States. As to the case of Iraq, it 
argues that no matter how the two Rivers are considered, Iraq needs water from both the 
Rivers to survive. Also, Iraq argues that the imminent creation of an independent 
Kurdish State would necessitate a claim for more water does not bear out; since it now 
appears that the Kurds are content to remain under Iraq as an autonomous state. Thus, it 
was suggested that in order to avoid potential conflicts, which come from the riparian 
States fundamental incongruities over the TERB, it is suggested that the riparian States 
have to deal with the problem on a regional scale, taking into account the needs and the 
capacities of all States. 
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As to the principles of the equitable utilisation, it was argued that since both Iraq and 
Syria are the parties of the UNWC 1997 Convention, it can be concluded that the first 
fundamental legal right of the riparian States is to utilise the water from both the Tigris 
and Euphrates Rivers equitably considering all the social, economical and vital human 
need factors. It is nonetheless argued that Turkey in principle agrees with the article 
itself, but disagrees with how the compensation should be made, and this allows for 
both Syria and Iraq to negotiate further with Turkey on this ground. Next, as to the 
exchange of information, international law is concerned with protecting all the States 
equally through both conceptualising and realising the rights and obligations of States. 
Thus, like both Iraq and Syria, Turkey should be bound by this obligation especially if it 
is made more precise to protect the interests of Iraq and Syria accordingly. Finally, like 
Iraq and Syria, Turkey does not object the dispute settlement if a consensus agreement 
is reached how to establish mechanisms to solve disputes, which may mean that Turkey 
implicitly agrees with the UNWC 1997.   
Finally, the chapter discussed States‟ compliance with international obligation. It has 
been concluded that international legal agreements are made to solve common problems 
between States that have difficulty solving them unilaterally or through political means 
alone. The initial assumption of the functionalist approach is not that States cynically 
manipulate their legal environment, but that they engineer it in sincere efforts to affect 
an otherwise sub-optimal outcome. Thus, it is imperative for the riparian States of 
TERB to consider the creation of a legal and binding treaty to govern the TERB 
regionally, and that treaty should be comprehensive enough to meet all the legal and 
institutional needs of the riparian States of TERB. This will lead to creating a new phase 
of transboundary water management of TERB, to which Chapter Seven is dedicated for. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NEW PHASE OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT OF ‘TERB’ 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The previous Chapters have identified the material disadvantages faced by Iraq because 
of the water usage by upstream riparian States.
1
 The status of international relations 
with reference to the role of international law has been discussed,
2
 and the applicable 
international law,
3
 including the UNWC 1997 were examined.
4
 Upon examining 
subjects relevant to the TERB, the legal positions of the riparian States were analysed
5
 
in order to establish a new institutional mechanism for managing the TERB governed 
by the international law. In other words, to use international law to establish a 
particular, formal and explicit agreement between the riparian States, which is binding 
and accordingly enforceable; and, furthermore, to recommend how the agreement can 
be achieved through implementing the proposed institutional mechanism between the 
riparian States.  
The current complications faced by the riparian States in managing the TERB can be 
represented by their failure over the past three decades to reach to a formal, legal and 
binding agreement capable of controlling the water management of the TERB. As a 
result, no mechanisms to enforce an agreement or to settle their current and future 
disputes exist. Furthermore, the role of international law, represented in international 
general agreements, customary international law and other resources, is to facilitate the 
                                                             
1
 Chapter Two. 
2
 Chapter Three. 
3
 Chapter Four. 
4
 Chapter Five.  
5
 Chapter Six. 
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riparian States to reach an explicit agreement by offering them the general principles, 
rules and agreements for water allocation.  
Secondly, as McCaffrey argues, international law has developed in such a way as to 
ensure equitable resolutions of international water disputes under the theory of limited 
territorial sovereignty.
6
 However, since customary international law is in progressive 
development, it may be realistic to argue that currently international law is not 
adequately equipped to impose solutions to all conflicts, such as in circumstances of 
power asymmetry and the practice of hegemony, as has been mentioned earlier in the 
thesis. In the TERB riparian States have failed to reach an agreement on the use of the 
TERB partly or entirely as a result of such imbalances. Not only does such failure have 
serious, far-reaching repercussions for the peace and prosperity of the riparian States but 
it may also threaten regional stability in the Middle East.  Needless to mention the 
emerging environmental, ecological or water security issues to this matter.
7
  
Although it is not yet too late to resort to the application of international law, it will be 
too late for States to think about cooperation on the brink of real conflict as a result of 
ignoring the worth and role of international law. Based on that notion, it is never too 
early to create a regulatory instrument model for the riparian States of the TERB not 
only to avoid future conflicts, but to facilitate negotiation processes and strengthen the 
tripartite relationships in order to achieve cooperation over the management of the 
TERB. In this chapter, it is important to consider why other proposals by the riparian 
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States to address the water issues of the TERB were not successful in the past. The most 
important proposal is the Three-Staged Plan by Turkey which will be discussed below. 
Three decades of negotiation is far long enough time to end a dispute if the parties are 
willing to solve it. However, a distinct characteristic of the conflicts over the TERB is a 
constant lack of progress.
8
 Moreover, the last period of negotiations, which 
discontinued several years ago, showed the absence of a collective political will to 
cooperate towards an equitable solution.
9
  
The previous negotiations involved various attempts to explore the political, legal and 
technical aspects of the issues and to develop corresponding approaches to settling their 
differences, all of which failed to reach a consensus on the legal concepts and criteria to 
follow. Instead, the parties chose to leave the legal issues unsettled, and turn to hydro-
politics with the hope of attaining some degree of agreement. When Syria and Iraq 
demanded for the formulation of urgent „sharing arrangements‟ depending on the 
criteria that they put forward,
10
 Turkey proposed the „Three-staged Technical Plan for 
Optimum, Equitable and Reasonable Utilisation of the Transboundary Watercourses of 
the Euphrates and Tigris Basin‟ (hereinafter the „Plan‟) at the Fourth Meeting of the 
Joint Technical Committee between 5 and 8 November 1984. It is said that Turkey 
restated this Plan at the tripartite meeting in the Ministerial Meeting on 26 June 1990 
and during the follow-up bilateral talks with Syria and Iraq in 1993.
11
 In spite of both 
Syria‟s and Iraq‟s reluctance to consider this technical approach, the Three-Staged Plan 
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of identifying the criteria for equitable and reasonable utilisation has its merits in the 
modern development of the TERB.  
The creators of the Plan claimed that only by quantifying needs will a more manageable 
method of sharing water be agreed. In the Plan, Turkey called for the establishment of a 
joint body for collecting, handling and exchanging data regarding water resources and 
land use, so that annual and seasonal variations could be incorporated into the 
estimations made to determine water allocations. In such a development, data sharing 
would facilitate the negotiation process and promote the creation of many cooperative 
structures. Hence, data gathering through joint efforts would enable the riparian States 
to become accustomed to cooperation and to proceed with discussions over water 
allocations. Along with reaching a set of agreed criteria in data-sharing, negotiations 
could move on to issues of coordination of projects and the creation of joint projects. 
Although Kibaroglu states that the plan is evolutionary and forward-looking in nature, 
since it could be revised according to prevailing conditions and developed further 
through an interdisciplinary dialogue with the inclusion of the relevant stakeholders, the 
Plan was coolly received by Iraq and Syria because they were afraid their sovereign 
rights will be affected.
12
 Thus, they became reluctant to accept the Plan for its criteria at 
that time.
13
  
Both Iraq and Syria considered that the joint studies for optimal utilisation of water and 
land resources are an infringement on their sovereignty because, later, Turkey will be in 
the position to establish that certain agricultural practices in Iraq and Syria are less 
efficient than those in Turkey, and therefore their water needs less justifiable.
14
 It is not 
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the main task of this chapter to discuss and analyse the potential positive and negative 
aspects of the Plan, since both Iraq and Syria rejected it, and now are both parties to the 
UNWC 1997 which provides for equitable utilisation. The task of this Chapter is rather 
to propose a new legal and institutional framework for managing the TERB more 
efficiently by the riparian States. This Chapter recommends for the establishment of a 
special commission, which will be discussed in details in the next section, agreed and 
sponsored by the three riparian States, but has an independent nature, in terms of 
management and decision making perspective, from any of the riparian States. 
However, before discussing the nature of the commission, it is important to consider 
that although there were particular agreements made and concluded between the 
riparian States, but they were not successful in terms of resolving the disputes taking 
place between them. This could be due to failure to make a multilateral agreement 
between the riparian States. It is unclear whether this happened due to the difficulty of 
negotiation increasing when number of parties increase, or due to severe lack of 
understanding and political relationships.  
In fact, perfect formation of a treaty requires good environment. The researcher 
admitted that there are obstacles represented in political aspects and deals resulting in 
concluding non-explicit agreements that can lead to conflict over water resources.  
Work by Just and Netanyahu led the researcher to review the standard approaches to the 
allocation of rights in water disputes, as well as the usual obstacles that prevent States 
from reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Just and Netanyahu considered that the 
doctrines and agreements for water apportionment among countries are based on six 
main apportionment theories; they are: prior appropriation, the Harmon Doctrine, 
riparian rights, mutual development theory, the linkage principle, and the Helinski 
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Rules, on which the work of ILC is based.
15
 Also, the goals of formal contracts and 
apportionment theories include equitable and efficient allocation of water through river 
management. However, Just and Netanyahu believe there are obstacles to the formation 
of sustainable treaties that assure proper allocation and are beneficial to all 
participants.
16
 These obstacles include the following.  
Firstly, there is an issue of asymmetric information. The countries involved in disputes 
usually have asymmetric access to necessary information or data because of differing 
ability to process data. Information available to one country but unavailable to others 
gives the former a better position in negotiating with other riparian countries. In other 
words, one country can use the information or data to formulate a strategic advantage 
over another country.
17
 
Secondly, enforcement limitation is another problem. An agreement requires 
enforcement in order for it to be successful, but this requires monitoring which has three 
major limitations: high costs, technical feasibility or the lack thereof, and sovereignty. 
International legal rules do not have effective enforcement power, and only offer 
guidelines for water allocation. A nation may decide not to expose itself to the 
international court or accept a third party ruling.
18
   
Thirdly, issues pertaining to sovereignty will never end. Typically, it is in a country's 
best interest to protect its absolute sovereignty and a decision that decreases the right of 
a country to have control over a river basin is not going to be accepted.
19
 As a result, 
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such circumstances lead to conflicting national and international interests. While 
negotiating a basin related treaty, a country often faces competing pressures from 
domestic regions and neighbouring countries. Domestic interest groups often oppose the 
international position and complicate the negotiations.
20
 
Fourthly, asymmetric country characteristics affect the ability of a country to bargain 
for its share of water in the river basin, since there are differences in the national per 
capita income, natural resources, military power, etc. among states. 
21
   
Finally, upstream and downstream considerations, such as the geographical location of a 
State are decisive for State‟s power and holding key control and solution. The State that 
controls the source of the water potentially holds a powerful position in the negotiation 
process. For example, Syria has a dominant position over Jordan as it controls four 
major sources of the Yarmouk River that flows into Jordan.
22
 The same case applies to 
the current thesis for Turkey since it controls the sources of both Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers and has developed major projects on both rivers, as indicated earlier in Chapter 
Three.  
7.2 Tigris and Euphrates Rivers Commission 
Today, it is widely accepted that institutions play a key role in promoting international 
cooperation and thus preventing and mitigating conflict. For example, it has been found 
that the institutional capacity, defined as the existence or absence of a water commission 
or treaty, within a basin appears to be a very good indicator of water conflict and 
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cooperation. It is seen that basins without treaties were significantly more prone to 
conflict than basins with treaties.
23
 
It is undoubtedly the case that the help of a third party is often necessary in international 
disputes. Parties to a dispute may be unable to communicate effectively or, in a desire to 
avoid looking weak, may wish to make settlement offers through a third party. 
Conversely, proposals may be easier to accept if they are made by third parties. The 
disputants may sometimes be under international pressure to accept third party 
assistance. Whatever the reasons might be, parties do sometimes turn to third parties to 
help them end their conflict.
24
 The reason for referring to a third party is their 
independence and impartiality. Although the concepts of independence and impartiality 
are closely linked, both independence and impartiality have their own specific meaning 
and requirements. Independence literally means free from undue bias or preconceived 
opinions.
25
 In practice independence refers to a party‟s relationship to others and 
involves both individual and institutional relationships. Impartiality, on the other hand, 
is a principle of justice, which holds that decisions should be based on objective criteria, 
rather than on the basis of bias, prejudice, or preferring the benefit to one person over 
another for improper reasons.
26
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However, as to the role of the third party in the Nile Basin Initiative, Foulds argued that 
the involvement of third parties, such as the World Bank, the United States, and 
Canada, in environmental conflicts further complicates the issues of political, social, 
and economic interests, and hinders regional cooperation. Furthermore, autocratic 
government control over civil society prevents the emergence of vibrant NGOs with 
respect to economic projects and political programs. Consequently, both domestic and 
international NGOs become not prevalent, while the influence of third parties 
strengthens. The role of third parties, such as the World Bank, continues to create a 
schism between the project planners and those individuals directly implicated by its 
construction or implementation. Therefore, due to the involvement of third parties, 
especially when the NGOs become absent, and the aspects of Nile Basin politics, the 
Nile Basin Initiative will fail to achieve the intricate goals of conflict resolution and 
regional cooperation.
27
  
Based on the above notion, the researcher emphasises that the riparian States need to 
agree on allowing this commission some degree of independence, although not a third 
party in decision making process in managing the TERB. This commission can be 
named as Tigris and Euphrates Rivers Commission (hereinafter the Commission) to 
carry out both technical and legal matters related to the management of the TERB. The 
advantages of initiating this Commission are immense, such as avoiding hegemony 
problems. When the parties are willing to jointly establish this Commission, it means 
that they are willing to solve their interstate water problems. As a result, a fairer 
decision and better governance will become the custom for the riparian States. Another 
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benefit of the Commission is that it can create an environment for friendly relationships 
between the three riparian States, especially after examining the legal positions of the 
riparian States emanated from State‟s rights and obligations and customary international 
law (referred as „Task 1‟ in figure 7). Besides that, its main function is to govern two 
important aspects of the TERB, these are, directing Joint Technical Committee (referred 
as „Task 2‟ in figure 7), and contributing to Treaty Making Process (referred as „Task 3‟ 
in figure 7),
28
 which will be discussed below:            
 7.2.1 Directing Joint Technical Committee  
The said Joint Technical Committee established by the riparian States held several 
meetings for exchange of information, but such a committee could not bring the riparian 
States into any binding agreement on the TERB. In addition to political issues, sort of 
lack of trust has been observed between the riparian States arising from doubts over the 
credibility of information submitted by the other co-riparian States. Thus, based on the 
information submitted, the demand for water exceeded the actual supply of water 
available in the basin. The above factors made the function of the joint technical 
committee ineffective and therefore there are two options for the riparian States to 
follow: supervising the existing joint technical committee, or establishing separate 
technical committees for each State. As far as supervision is concerned, the 
Commission can administrate the Joint Technical Committee proceedings and set up 
rules and guidelines for the meetings. Each riparian State could establish its own 
technical committee to work only in their respective territories and submit all the 
necessary information to the Commission for data processing. Upon referring to its own 
or external experts, the Commission can establish the final set of information about the 
TERB.  
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7.2.2 Treaty Making Process  
Based on a prior agreement, the Commission partakes or even supervise the treaty 
making process between the riparian States especially in resolving legal issues between 
the riparian States. For example, to identify what is the legal positions of riparian States 
are relying on the rights and obligations of the States under international law, which was 
discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis. Furthermore, upon consultations, the 
Commission can work and advice on defining crucial terminologies that each riparian 
State had own approach different from the others, such as the internationality of the 
TERB, whether the two Rivers should be regarded as a transboundary rivers that are not 
international or otherwise, as discussed in Chapter Six. In this context, the UNWC 1997 
can be used to guide drafting of the scope, substantive norms, and procedural rules and 
dispute settlement mechanism of the new treaty between the riparian States. The 
riparian States can agree on new terminologies and definitions, such as „watercourse 
States‟, groundwater ...etc. according to their geographical criteria. This practice may 
relieve Turkey from the predicament of signing the UNWC 1997 which is, in any case, 
not entered into force yet.  
It is imperative for the parties to initially agree on the definitions and the substantive 
norms. In fact there are fundamental disagreements between the riparian States over the 
status of the term „watercourse States‟ after the inclusion of „Party to this Convention‟ 
before adopting the UNWC 1997. Unlike Turkey, both Iraq and Syria were unhappy 
with the inclusion of „Party to this Convention.29  Besides that, there are two other 
important disputed subjects that need to be settled.  
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It is worth mentioning that considerations should be given to the fact that each river has 
its own importance to Iraq and Syria. For Iraq both the Rivers are important, while Syria 
benefits mostly from the Euphrates. This issue can be settled between the riparian States 
and the term „the Basin‟ should be defined clearly for the TERB. Thus, the riparian 
States need to agree on the definition that addresses the interests of all riparian States. 
For this purpose, they may refer to an outside expert opinion or to the ICJ, since the 
Member States are able to furnish all the necessary information to the Court for an 
advisory opinion in accordance with Article 65 (1) and (2) of the Statute of the Court.
30
 
Since all the three riparian States are Member State of the United Nations and by virtue 
of Article 93 of the Charter of the United Nations is ipso facto a party to the Statute of 
the Court.  
Furthermore, the riparian States can proceed with discussing the substantive norms such 
as equitable utilisation and no significant harm, and how to compare it with the 
equitable utilisation. When discussing the procedural rules, as Caponera argues, 
conflicts arising from the absence of reciprocal information on any intended works 
could be prevented if the co-riparian States entered into a comprehensive water 
agreement. Based on prevailing international water law, including the Helsinki Rules 
and the UNWC 1997, such an agreement should include a specific duty to provide 
advance notification of any intended works. The establishment of a joint basin 
institution to act as a recipient of relevant information and to evaluate the possible harm 
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which might result from unilateral water resources development would facilitate the 
implementation of the agreement.
31
  
Other than the above, the Commission may advise on essential provisions to be 
included in the treaty, such as monitoring, exchange of information, enforcement, and 
conflict resolution. As far as the monitoring provisions are concerned, they are often 
made to include provisions for data-sharing, surveying, and schedules for collecting 
data. Besides that information sharing generally builds good will and confidence 
between countries and enhances agreements. Some States classify river flows as 
classified information, and others use the lack of mutually accepted data as a stalling 
technique in their negotiations. Most monitoring clauses contain only the most 
rudimentary elements, perhaps due to the time and labour costs of gathering data.
32
 
Data collection by the treaty signatories can provide a solid basis for later discussions.  
In this context, a lesson can be learnt from the Indian and Bangladeshi experience where 
they previously could not agree on the accuracy of each other‟s hydrological records, 
but eventually agreed on Ganges flow data and based a workable agreement on that data 
in 1977.
33
 The cooperation between engineers and council members of different nations 
can result in the formation of an epistemic community, another positive outcome of data 
gathering and sharing. Treaties do not yet include provisions to monitor compliance, but 
such additions may bolster trust and increase the strength of these epistemic bonds. 
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Last but not least, enforcement mechanisms are necessary provisions for the treaty to be 
successful. In this context, the riparian States should agree on the enforcement 
mechanism provisions. If there are misunderstandings between the riparian States, then 
conflict resolution mechanisms will help to solve disputes between the riparian States. 
Conflict resolution must further be clearly stated to resolve disputes through technical 
commissions, basin commissions, government officials, or third party intervention.  
After all, it is true that cooperative water resources management is complex in any 
international river basin. In the Nile Basin, which is characterised by water scarcity, 
poverty, a long history of dispute and insecurity, and rapidly growing populations and 
demand for water, it is particularly difficult. This scenario is recurring in the TERB 
region. Therefore, comparative knowledge and practice to the water use of the Nile 
Basin by the riparian States would be advantageous for the riparian States of the TERB, 
as will be briefly discussed. 
The Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin, from all the nine riparian 
States
34
 have agreed to initiate a partnership and led by themselves called the Nile Basin 
Initiative (hereinafter the „NBI‟) and formally launched in February 1999. The NBI 
seeks to develop the river in a cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic 
benefits, and promote regional peace and security based on the reality that cooperative 
development holds the greatest prospects for bringing benefits to the entire region, and 
aware of the challenges. In addition to that, the NBI provides an institutional 
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mechanism, a shared vision, and a set of agreed policy guidelines to provide a basin 
wide framework for cooperative action.
35
  
One of the primary objectives of the NBI is that it aims to develop the Nile Basin water 
resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security, and peace 
for all peoples living in the basin region. Next, it endeavours to ensure efficient water 
management and the optimal use of the resources by the riparian States of the basin. 
Besides that it lays down the principle that cooperation and joint action between the 
riparian States of the Nile Basin, and through seeking win-win gains, poverty can be 
eradicated and economic integration promoted. Yet, all the planning is not alone a 
solution if they are not placed for action.
36
  
The riparian States have a strategic approach to achieving sustainable socioeconomic 
development in the basin through equitable utilisation of, and benefit from; the common 
Nile Basin water resources through means for converting this shared vision into 
concrete activities by laying the groundwork for cooperative action through a regional 
program to build confidence and capacity throughout the basin, which is called the 
Shared Vision Program. Furthermore, it arranges for pursuing simultaneously 
cooperative development opportunities to realise physical investments and tangible 
results through sub-basin activities in the region.
37
  
The NBI has reached in many successful achievements, such as proposing the Nile 
Trans-boundary Environment Action Project, which has made considerable progress, 
mainly in institutional capacities development, awareness creation, communities‟ skills 
development, and water quality monitoring. Another example is the Confidence 
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Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project. National Coordinators of this project 
have supported the National NBI Offices to coordinate NBI activities at National level, 
and these offices have worked closely with Governments in the organization of 
activities to raise awareness.
38
  
Water Resources Planning and Management Project is another successful story of the 
NBI. Under this project institutional set-up for the Decision Support System (hereinafter 
the „DSS‟) is being put in place, and its needs assessment and design initiated. National 
DSS Units are being established in all the NBI countries to enhance capability on DSS 
related fields among the Nile riparian States. As a result, good practice and guidelines 
for water policy formulation and implementation were developed, and regional training 
course on the Integrated Water Resources Management IWRM-focusing on the water 
policy aspects conducted. Also, Applied Training Project was established to make 
progress in capacity building for practitioners and trainers, mainly through appreciation 
seminars, short courses and postgraduate training. Last but not least, Efficient Water use 
for Agricultural Production was established. In this project national consultants have 
been selected in most of the NBI countries and as a result, a rapid baseline assessment 
study of the agricultural sector has been initiated.
39
 
All the above are the good and positive aspects of the NBI, and as long as the riparian 
States are willing to interact with the NBI, regional peace, prosperity and stability will 
be sustained. Thus, it is beneficial for the riparian States of the TERB to take the NBI 
into considerations for the better management of the TERB. Hence, a roadmap can be 
drawn on how the Commission can examine the riparian States‟ rights and obligations 
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and the key provisions for the new treaty that need deliberations between the riparian 
States as shown in Figure 6. The Commission‟s main function is illustrated in Figure 7.                                                                                                                                                 
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Figure 6: Roadmap for identifying State’s Rights and Obligations, 
and provisions for making Treaty.  
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Figure 7: Functioning structure of TERS  
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7.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, Chapter Seven discussed a new phase of transboundary water 
management as a new regulatory framework to manage the Tigris and Euphrates River 
Basin. It was argued that previous negotiations involved various attempts to explore the 
political, legal and technical aspects of the issues and to develop corresponding 
approaches to settling differences, all of which appeared to have failed in reaching 
agreement on the legal concepts and criteria to follow. Hence, the aim of this chapter 
was to propose a new legal framework for managing the TERB more efficiently by the 
riparian States, which could be achieved through establishing the TERB Commission. 
The recommended Commission has the duty of regulating legal, technical and 
compliance aspects, which are the three important aspects of the TERB. As far as the 
legal aspects are concerned, it was suggested that the key role of the Commission is to 
establish what exactly are the rights and obligations of the riparian States under 
international law, as the first step of identifying legal positions of the riparian States. 
Next, it was recommended that the Commission may supervise the joint technical 
committee directly with the intention of administrating the Committee‟s proceedings 
and setting up rules and guidelines for the meetings with some reference to outside 
experts if necessary. Another submission was that each riparian State, can individually 
establish its own technical committee and to work only in their respective territories. 
Upon providing all the necessary information to the Commission for data processing, it 
helps the Commission for managing the TERB. Meanwhile, each State‟s technical 
committee will act as consultant to the Commission and keep the data of the TERB in 
each territory updated for the Commission. Hence, the most reliable and dependable 
information about the TERB can be obtained. Last but not least, the treaty making 
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process should be given most significance. The main task of this process by the 
Commission is to facilitate in drafting the most appropriate treaty between the riparian 
States, identifying precise meanings for the terminologies used in the treaty with the aim 
of avoiding confusions or misinterpretations.  
Finally, the treaty should also call for underpinning cooperation in the management, 
development, and protection of the joint water use and stress on the existing and 
potential needs of the riparian States as a step towards the community of interest 
doctrine. In this context, the positive examples of the NBI are highly recommended to 
be taken into considerations by the riparian States of the TERB. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
Although water is the most abundant substance on earth, its global quantity is finite, and 
freshwater only a small fraction of the total.  Water is an essential resource, and a source 
of life, for every living creature on this planet.  Throughout the world, the economic 
benefits derived from water have always been substantial. In modern times, demand for 
the scarce resource continues to increase competition over both the quantity and quality 
of water supplies.  This has the potential to result in tension, and indeed, conflict, 
between users and across political boundaries. This situation exists at a time when more 
than half of the world‟s population is predicted to suffer the direct consequences of 
water scarcity if current development patterns continue.  
The situation in the Middle East is of particular concern to experts in the field; due to the 
lack of a clear water governance strategy, and very little cooperation, between the 
neighbouring States. The existing tensions in the region could worsen if there is no 
willingness to reach an agreement on the joint water use by the riparian States. In such 
circumstances, one riparian State exploits the water resources in the TERB as possible 
while ignoring the other States‟ riparian rights. Despite tremendous efforts by the 
experts since 1960s, a deadlock in negotiations is evidently the reason for the lack of any 
binding treaty between the riparian States over joint use of the TERB being concluded. 
As a result, each riparian State has continued the construction and operation of dam 
projects in their territories without a proper recourse and consultation with the co-
riparian States.  
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The current thesis is considering in particular Iraq‟s equitable rights to the TERB.  Iraq 
is identified as one of the five countries in the world where water supplies for irrigation 
are most threatened and where that threat could exacerbate regional instability. 
Furthermore, these problems faced by Iraq will worsen when the GAP construction is 
completed. This was the main reason for the researcher to contribute to the field, and 
particularly to advocate for Iraq‟s equitable rights to the TERB under international law. 
The researcher argues that a comprehensive legal framework, including a binding treaty, 
is the key solution to the conflict between riparian States.  This argument is set out in the 
current thesis in eight chapters, as follows. 
In Chapter One, the research process began with the hypothesis that international law is 
the principal instrument to support Iraq to achieve its legal entitlements to equitable and 
reasonable use of its transboundary waters. This was in response to the thesis question, 
„how can international water law assist Iraq in securing an equitable and reasonable 
share of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin?‟ The main objective behind 
the question was to determine how Iraq, as a new Federal State, can identify its legal 
rights to and obligations in sharing water with its neighbours; and further, to ascertain 
the maximum possible benefit provided by international law for Iraq concerning the 
equitable use of the water resources of the TERB. 
Pursuant to the above objective, three key sub-objectives provided the main impetus to 
the thesis in identifying the key legal and political factors relating to the joint use of the 
TERB. Firstly, the application of international law established the context in which to 
understand how international water law applies to the TERB. Secondly, the legal 
positions of the riparian States were determined through the application of the 
international law. Thirdly, recommendations were made on the role of international 
210 
 
water law in strengthening the legal framework for equitable utilisation of the TERB, as 
a new phase of transboundary water management and potential cooperation between the 
riparian States.  
The justifications for the thesis were twofold. Firstly, wars, economic sanctions and 
occupation over the last two decades, have left the water sector in Iraq in a very poor 
state, notwithstanding water shortages due to the GAP project upstream.  In this context, 
there is a clear need to create a legal framework capable of managing the TERB that 
secures Iraq against water shortages, and allows Iraq to reconstruct its national water 
sector. Secondly despite numerous books, academic research and articles written on the 
TERB, only a very few focussed on the legal issues, and therefore there is need for a 
doctorate research in this field. Hence, this contribution is provided through this thesis.   
Chapter Two discussed the importance of the TERB to the riparian States, the physical 
characteristics of the TERB, how the GAP affects the downstream riparian States‟ use of 
the TERB, and the current status of water demand and supply in Iraq after the 2003 US-
led invasion. It was argued that, according to the relative irrigable land area between the 
riparian States, comparable data shows that Iraq has a larger irrigable area than Syria, 
which affords Iraq priority in water supply for irrigation from Turkey. Finally, within 
Iraq much of the return flow is now drained into the Arab Gulf through the Main Outfall 
Drain, but considerable saline return flow enters Iraq from both Syria and Turkey as a 
result of their use of water from the two rivers; this raises questions regarding the status 
of GAP under both international relations and international law.   
Chapter Three emphasised the fact that, directly or indirectly, water has an influence on 
conflict in the strategic location of Middle East owing to the fact that the region has an 
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arid climate with only one percent of the world‟s available fresh water, and hydro-
geographical diversities between the riparian States. Furthermore, water shortages faced 
by Iraq have prompted many other Middle Eastern States to implement national water 
security programmes to avoid similar circumstances occuring in their territories. Next, it 
was shown that inherent hegemoneous attitudes of States are barriers to cooperation, and 
requires balance of power to counteract it. Bearing in mind that conflicts within the 
TERB involve complicated social, political and geographical issues, these along with 
poor governance additional obstacles to increased cooperation between the advantaged 
and disadvantaged riparian States.  
The chapter concluded that States are naturally tempted to power, especially when 
controlling crucial resources such as water resources, and particularly when 
accompanied by stronger economic and military power compared to the neighbouring 
States. The controlling State can become a hegemon and create what is called the 
„Rambo situation‟. Such a scenario was argued to have validity to the regional context 
between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The reason for this assertion is that Turkey has access 
to all the Tigris and Euphrates water resources as well as strong economic and military 
power; whereas the downstream States of Syria and Iraq lack those criteria. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of regularised inter-State relations that would necessitate 
recourse and reference to the application of international law, and which can effectively 
build trust and bring harmony to the TERB region. Thus, the Chapter has concluded 
that the vigorous examination of international law, its subjects, sources and its 
enforcement, and the progressive development of international water law is imperative 
in order to answer the thesis question.  
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Chapter Four examined the significance of international law pertaining to inter-State 
relations and the application of international law as a body of rules that are legally 
binding on States in their intercourse with each other, in which international 
agreements primarily create those binding rules upon the signatories. States are the 
main subject of international law, which acquires independence, legal equality and 
peaceful co-existence rights. Besides those rights, the obligation to refrain, the 
obligation to peaceful dispute settlement, and the obligation to cooperate are 
corresponding obligations of States. 
One significant part of the Chapter was to consider Iraq‟s sovereignty under 
international law. It was concluded that since Iraq is a Member State of the United 
Nations, it should enjoy sovereignty over its territorial jurisdictions and like any other 
sovereign State bound by the UN Charter despite the 2003 US-led invasion.  
Furthermore, the UNSC Resolution 1483 brought another input to consolidate Iraq‟s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity despite the persistent occupation and state of chaos 
and disorder within Iraq. 
Treaties are the primary source of international law, and are governed by the VCLT 
1969. They must be signed in a good faith; and apart from State practice, opinio juris is 
the other component of international custom. General principles of law, even those that 
are controversial, may include principles that are common to a large number of systems 
of municipal law.  
It is worth mentioning that basic rules enforcing international law that are represented in 
international agreements, whether general or particular, will become legally binding and 
accordingly enforceable upon those States that formally accept the agreements made 
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between them by duly signing them. However, enforcement on the non-signatories of 
international agreements will be still legally binding if the agreement represents 
customary law. Therefore, a State may not easily escape from an international obligation 
based on the excuse that the said State is not a signatory to an international agreement, 
such as the Turkish rejection of the UNWC 1997. Nevertheless, signing an agreement 
will consolidate a State‟s responsibility towards an obligation. Hence, there is a need to 
make particular agreements like treaties between the States, on the basis of such 
international legal rules and principles, for the purpose of settling particular issues 
between them.  It was further concluded that States should not solely rely on 
international legal rules represented in international general agreements along with 
customary law and other sources of international law; as such rules may not provide an 
effective enforcement mechanism due to the fact that they only general rules; this is 
especially true in water management. Finally, when the UNWC 1997 received a high 
response at a global level in international forums, it can be said to reflect a high value of 
the function of international law, and more importantly reflects customary international 
law.  
Chapter Five concentrated on the substantive norms provided by the UNWC 1997. They 
are namely the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, as laid down by Article 
5, and the principle of no significant harm that provided under Article 7. The main focus 
on those two articles, as well as the procedural rules in the same Convention, aimed to 
ascertain whether or not the UNWC 1997, and its content of substantive and procedural 
rules, does actually represent customary international law. It concluded that since the 
content of UNWC 1997 largely adheres to binding instruments within the framework of 
general international law, it might no longer fall under particular international law. In the 
context of more water shortages and where conflicts between States arise in the future, it 
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is likely that more States will come forward to cooperate and recognise the UNWC 1997 
and abide by it. This is based on the compelling fact that water resources are the 
property of all mankind and all have the right to access it.  
Next, it was found that States are at liberty to challenge a rule in question if it can 
demonstrate its persistent objection to that rule by virtue of its membership in the UN or 
as a member of a regional group based on their national interests. However, it was 
argued that although Turkey voted against UNWC 1997, its claim of „persistent 
objection‟ is invalidated by its inconsistent treaty and State practice; therefore the main 
principles of UNWC 1997 still apply to Turkey. Therefore, the UNWC 1997 should be 
used as the basis of the legal positions of the riparian States of the TERB.   
In Chapter Six, it was argued that there is no single effective treaty between all the three 
riparian States covering the use of water resources within the TERB. This situation 
highlights the necessity of signing a comprehensive treaty between the riparian States. 
Furthermore, most, if not all, of the protocols were made during times of conflict and 
therefore those protocols were influenced by other issues considered more important for 
the national security of each riparian State. As a result, issues regarding the water 
resources of the TERB were given a much lower priority compared to the other issues. 
However, sooner or later, water resources will come to dominate the challenges faced 
by the TERB riparian States and will require a change in attitude towards the joint use 
of the TERB and which can be formalised through signing a binding treaty.   
Later in the chapter, the legal positions of riparian States on the utilisation of the TERB 
were examined. It was argued that the Turkish view that the TERB to comprises only 
one basin is valid in terms of its hydrological definition. However, the Turkish approach 
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to deem the TERB as a transboundary watercourse with no international character 
seems incongruous with the definition and modern understanding of the term 
„transboundary river‟ and undermines the rights of the other sovereign States which is 
contrary to international law.  
Unlike Turkey, both Syria and Iraq claim similar historical rights over the TERB. 
However, Syria argues that the Euphrates River should be utilised by Syria once it 
leaves Turkish territory and Iraq should utilise the Tigris.  Using this logic, Syria 
believes that the two rivers should be considered differently for the two different 
downstream States. Iraq argues that no matter how the two rivers are considered, Iraq 
needs water from both rivers to survive. Iraq‟s argument that the imminent creation of 
an independent Kurdish State would necessitate a claim for more water is no longer 
relevant; since it now appears that the Kurds are content to remain under Iraq as an 
autonomous State. Thus, it was suggested that in order to avoid potential conflicts, 
which come from the riparian States fundamental incongruities over the TERB, it is 
suggested that the riparian States deal with the problem on a regional scale, taking into 
account the needs and the capacities of all States. 
As to the principles of the equitable utilisation, it was argued that since both Iraq and 
Syria are the parties of the UNWC 1997 Convention, it can be concluded that the first 
fundamental legal right of the riparian States is to utilise the water from both the Tigris 
and Euphrates Rivers equitably considering all the social, economical and vital human 
needs factors. It was nonetheless argued that Turkey in principle agrees with the article 
itself, but disagrees with how the compensation should be made, and it brings more 
relief for both Syria and Iraq to negotiate further with Turkey on this ground. Next, as to 
the exchange of information, it was stated that international law is concerned with 
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protecting all States equally through both conceptualising and realising the rights and 
obligations of States. Thus, like both Iraq and Syria, Turkey should be bound by this 
obligation, especially if it is made more precise to protect the interests of Iraq and Syria 
accordingly. Finally, like Iraq and Syria, it can be argued that Turkey does not object to 
dispute settlement if a consensus agreement is reached on how to set mechanisms to 
solve disputes, which may mean that Turkey implicitly agrees with the UNWC 1997.   
Last but not least, State‟s compliance with international obligations was discussed. It 
has been concluded that international legal agreements are made to solve common 
problems between States that they have difficulties in solving unilaterally or through 
political means alone. Thus, it is crucial for the riparian States of TERB to consider the 
creation of a legal and binding comprehensive treaty that can meet all the legal and 
institutional needs of the riparian States.  
Chapter Seven focussed on recommendations for establishing the TERB Commission. 
The researcher has discussed a new phase of transboundary water management as a new 
regulatory framework to manage the TERB. It was argued that previous negotiations 
involved various attempts to explore the political, legal and technical aspects of the 
issues and to develop corresponding approaches to settling the differences, all of which 
appeared to have failed to reach a consensus on the legal concepts and criteria to follow. 
Hence, the task of this chapter was to discuss how the TERB Commission should 
function so as to manage the TERB more efficiently by the riparian States in the future.      
The recommended Commission would have the task of regulating the legal, technical 
and compliance aspects, the three important aspects of the TERB. Regarding legal 
aspects, it was suggested that the main task of the Commission would be to precisely 
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establish the rights and obligations of the riparian States under international law, as the 
first task of identifying legal positions of the riparian States. Next, it was recommended 
that the Commission supervise the joint technical committee directly, with the intention 
of administrating the Committee‟s proceedings and setting up rules and guidelines for 
the meetings with some reference to outside experts if necessary. Another 
recommendation was that each riparian State, would individually establish its own 
technical committee to work only in their respective territories. These committees would 
submit all the necessary information to the Commission for data processing, and would 
help the Commission in managing the TERB. Meanwhile, each State‟s technical 
committee would act as consultant to the Commission and keep the data of the TERB in 
each territory updated for the Commission. Hence, the most reliable and dependable 
information about the TERB would be obtained. Finally, the treaty making process 
should be given its most significance. The main task of this process would be to draft the 
most appropriate treaty between the riparian States, defining the most precise meanings 
for the terminologies used in the treaty with the aim of avoiding confusion or 
ambiguities in interpretations. The Treaty should emphasise cooperation as an obligation 
to establish a stronger joint regional management in matters related to the development 
of water resources and the prevention of contamination, it can be said that cooperation is 
reflected in the establishment of the Joint Water Committee. Finally, the Committee 
would also call for cooperation in the management, development, and protection of the 
shared water resources and stress the need to cope with the existing and potential needs 
of the riparian States as a step toward the community of interest doctrine. In this context, 
the positive examples of the NBI are worth considering and highly recommended to be 
followed by the riparian States of the TERB.  
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Other than the recommendations provided by through the discussions in Chapter Eight, 
this thesis identifies further issues that require actions, as follows: 
An important action for the riparian States to undertake is the recourse to the ICJ for 
identifying the actual legal positions of the riparian States. As it has been discussed in 
Chapters Six and Seven that the ICJ has the power to interpret a particular rule of 
international law, this power can help the riparian States in obtaining a clear 
interpretation and definition of controversial terms, such „transboundary‟ and 
„international rivers‟.  
Next, as been argued in Chapter Six, the US occupation of Iraq caused political 
instability and a lack of security within Iraq, while the US-Turkish relationship is 
friendly and cooperative in various aspects. Thus, if the US is directly involved in the 
riparian States‟ negotiations, a better outcome could be achieved, as it would be the 
responsibility of the US, as an occupier, to ascertain Iraq‟s, the occupied territory, 
satisfactory supply of water.  
Finally, as a recommendation beyond what has been covered in this thesis, the 
researcher proposes an international conference and forum as a mechanism for 
supporting the riparian States‟ negotiation process. Such a forum would allow external 
experts, authors and researchers to contribute their knowledge, and advise the riparian 
States. Another advantage of such a forum is that the work of adopting a legal 
framework for the TERB draws on a wider perspective that goes beyond the riparian 
States‟ approaches towards the TERB, as it is stated, „two brains are better than one‟. 
Future research 
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The researcher takes the initiative of recommending that research should be undertaken 
on introducing water legislation to Iraq, and how such legislation could improve Iraq‟s 
national water sector. 
Research examining how the national water sector in Iraq can be improved in order to 
meet its future treaty obligations on sharing waters with Turkey and Syria, is another 
recommendation for further research.           
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ANNEX I 
Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey was 
signed at Ankara, on 29 March 1946
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ANNEX II 
Law No. 14 of 1990, Ratifying the Joint Minutes Concerning the Provisional 
Division of the Waters of the Euphrates River. 
Between Iraq and Syria 
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LAW NO. 14 OF 1990, RATIFYING THE JOINT MINUTES CONCERNING 
THE PROVISIONAL DIVISION OF THE WATERS OF THE EUPHRATES 
RIVER. 
ARTICLE 1 : 
========= 
Ratification of the Joint Minutes concerning the provisional division of the Euphrates 
waters between the Republic of Iraq and the Arab Republic of Syria signed in Baghdad 
on 11 Ramadan 1409 Hegira which falls on 17 March 1989 and the Speech of the Head 
of the Syrian Delegation in the Joint Technical Committee for Territorial Waters 
delivered before signing the Joint Minutes after the addition of the expression (by the 
approval of the Two Parties) to the end of the First Paragraph of the Speech although to 
be read as the following: (the Two Brothers Arab Parties will work together for the re-
examination of it and to do the necessary modification on the condition that will be 
done with the approval of the Two Parties). 
ARTICLE 2: 
========= 
This Law is to be published in the Official Gazette and to be implemented by the 
competent ministers. 
 
                                                            JOINT MINUTES 
                                                            ============== 
On the occasion of the thirteenth session of the Joint Technical Committee for 
Territorial Twerps in Baghdad, the Two Parties Iraq and Syria held a meeting on 11 
Ramadan 1409 Hegira which falls on 17 April 1989 in the seat of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Irrigation in Baghdad to exchange the point of view around the theme 
of the Euphrates Waters in a atmosphere characterised by the sense of friendship and the 
high spirit of responsibility toward the common, vital and legitimate interests oft the 
Two Brothers Countries in the waters of Euphrates River. 
Owing to intensive discussion and consultation carried out with considerable patient and 
effort between the Two Parties, and understanding the necessity to act quickly for 
reaching a bilateral agreement between them to facilitate the fulfilment of their common 
230 
 
wish by reaching a trilateral agreement with Turkey around the division of the waters of 
Euphrates River. 
Taking note of all these, the Two Parties Iraq and Syria waiting for reaching the 
trilateral agreement with Turkey agreed in the following: 
1. The Iraq water share on the border region between Iraq and Syria is 58% as a fixed 
annual total percentage (water year) of the water of Euphrates River allowed to pass in 
Syria through the border with Turkey, and the Syrian share of water is the remainder 
quantity 42% of the water of Euphrates River allowed to pass through the border 
between Turkey and Syria. 
2. Creation of a joint committee for laying down all technical and administrative details 
to implement the Agreement in the best way to realize the common interests. 
3. The Agreement will be operative from the date of exchange of diplomatic notes 
notified of ratification in conformity with regulations. 
Written down in Baghdad on 11 Ramada 1409 Hegira which falls on 17 April 1989 in 
Arabic in two original copies with the same effect and validity wherever the Two 
Parties preserved a copy for self. 
For the Syrian Arab Republic                                                            For the Iraqi Party 
Zuheir Farah Abu Dawoud                                                                   Ghadban Ali Sahil 
Head of the Syrian party in the                                            Head of the Iraqi Party Joint 
Technical Committee for                                  in the Joint Technical 
TerritorialWaters.                                                       Committee for Territorial Waters. 
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ANNEX III 
Agreement Between Syria and Turkey 
 
 
(1) Turkey's specific demands from Syria to comply with the basic norms and principles of 
international relations singed on October 22
nd
 1996 
 
(2) Unofficial Translation of the agreed minutes between Turkey and Syria singed in 
Adana, on October 20
th
 1998.  
 
232 
 
(3)  
 
(1) Syrian-Turkish Agreement 22.10.96 
 
  
Turkey's Specific Demands from Syria 
  
In order to normalize our relations, we expect Syria to comply with the basic norms and 
principles of international relations.  In this regard, the following specific demands 
should be met: 
  
Given the fact that turkish-Syrian relations were seriously damaged by Syrian support 
for terrorism, we want Syria to accept formally its obligations and renounce its previous 
stand on this matter.  These obligations should include a formal commitment not to give 
terrorists support, sanctuary, and financial assistance.  Syria should also prosecute PKK 
perpetrators and extradite to Turkey the chief of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan and his 
collaborators. 
  
Within this framework, Syria should not: 
  
*     Permit camps for terrorist training to operate in territories under its control, 
*     Provide weapons, logistic materials to the PKK, 
*     Provide fraud identification documents to PKK members, 
*     Help terrorists in obtaining legal passage and infiltration into Turkey, 
*     Permit the propaganda activities of the terrorist organization, 
*     Allow the PKK to operate in accommodations in its territory, 
*     Facilitate the passages of terrorists from third countries (Europe, Greece, Southern 
Cyprus, Iran, Libya, Armenia) to northern Iraq and Turkey. 
  
Syria should provide: 
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*     Cooperation in all activities aimed at fighting terrorism. 
*     Abstention from inciting other countries which are members of the Arab League 
against Turkey. 
  
In light of the above, unless Syria refrains from these acts immediately, with all the 
consequences, Turkey reserves the right to exercise her inherent right of self-defense, 
and under all circumstances to demand just compensation for the loss of life and 
property.  Indeed, these views were transmitted to Syria through diplomatic channels on 
23 January 1996.  However, our warnings have fallen on deaf ears. 
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(2) MINUTES (Unofficial Translation) 
  
In light of the messages conveyed on behalf of Syria by the President of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, H.E. Mr.. Husni Mubarak and by the Iranian Foreign Minister H.E. 
Mr.. Remal Harrazi on behalf of the Iranian President H. E. Mr.. Seyid Mohammed 
Khatemi and by the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt, H.E. Mr.. AMr. 
Moussa, the Turkish. and Syrian delegations whose names of which are listed in the 
attached list (Annex 1) have met in Adana on 19 and 20 October 1998 to discuss the 
issue of cooperation in fighting terrorism.  
  
In the meeting, the Turkish side repeated the Turkish demands presented to the Egyptian 
President (Annex 2) to eliminate the current the current tension in their relations. 
Furthermore, the Turkish side brought to the attention of the Syrian the reply that was 
received from Syria through the Arab Republic of Egypt which entails the following 
commitments:  
  
1. As of now, Ocalan is not in Syria and he will definitely not be permitted to enter 
Syria.  
2. PKK elements abroad will not be permitted to enter Syria.  
3. As of now PKK camps are not operational and definitely will not be permitted to 
become active.  
4. Many PKK members have been arrested and have been taken to court. The lists 
are available, and Syria has delivered these lists to the Turkish side.  
  
The Syrian side has confirmed the above mentioned points. Furthermore, the parties 
have also agreed on the following 
points:  
  
1. Syria, on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, will not permit any activity 
which emanates from its territory aimed at jeopardizing the security and stability of 
Turkey. Syria will not allow the supply of weapons, logistic material, financial support 
to, and propaganda activities of, the PKK on its territory.  
2. Syria has recognized that the PKK is a terrorist organization. Syria has, 
alongside other terrorist organizations, banned all activities of the PKK and its affiliated 
organizations on its territories.  
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3. Syria will not allow the PKK to establish camps and other facilities for training 
and shelter, or to have commercial activities on it territory.  
4. Syria will not allow PKK members to use Syria for transit to third countries.  
5. Syria will take all necessary measures to prevent the head of the PKK terrorist 
organization from entering into Syrian territory and will instruct its authorities at border 
points to that effect.  
  
  
Both sides have agreed to establish certain mechanism for the effective and transparent 
implementation of the measures 
mentioned above.  
  
In this context:  
  
a) A direct phone link will immediately be established and operated between the high-
level security authorities of the two countries.  
  
b) The Sides will appoint two special representatives each to their diplomatic missions 
and these officials will be presented to the authorities of the host country by the heads of 
mission.  
  
c) The Turkish side, within the context of combating terrorism, has proposed to the 
Syrian side to establish a system that will enable the monitoring of security enhancing 
and their effectiveness. The Syrian side has stated that it will present this proposal to the 
authorities for approval and will inform Turkey on the result as soon as possible.  
  
d) The Turkish and Syrian sides, contingent upon obtaining Lebanon‟s consent, have 
agreed to take up the issue of the combat against PKK terrorism in a tripartite 
framework.  
  
e) The Syrian side has commits itself to take the necessary measures for the 
implementation of the points mentioned in this “Minutes” and for the achievement of 
concrete results.  
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Adana, October 20, 1998 
   
      For the Turkish Delegation                        For the Syrian Delegation 
      Ambassador Ugur Ziyal                             Major General Adnan 
      Foreign Ministry                                        Badr Al Hassan 
      Deputy Under-Secretary                            Head of Political  
Security                                                           
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ANNEX IV 
Joint Communiqué between GAP and GOLD  
Joint Communiqué between Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Southeastern Anatolia 
Project Regional Development Administration (GAP), and Arab Republic of Syria 
Ministry of Irrigation General Organization for Land Development (GOLD) 
 
 
 
23 August 2001 
Ankara-TURKEY 
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JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ 
Between 
Republic of Turkey 
Prime Ministry 
Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration 
(GAP) 
and 
Arab Republic of Syria 
Ministry of Irrigation 
General Organization for Land Development 
(GOLD) 
23 August 2001 
Ankara-TURKEY 
 Based on the invitation by H.E. Mustafa Yilmaz, Minister of State of Republic of 
Turkey; H.E. Taha al-Atrash, Minister of Irrigation of Arab Republic of Syria, 
accompanied by a technical delegation paid a visit to Turkey during the period of 
August 21-26, 2001. 
 Several meetings were held between the two ministers and their respective delegations.  
The following points are agreed upon to be realised between GAP Administration and 
GOLD: 
  A.   Training Programs 
 Three groups of training courses will be considered under this program. 
-         International training courses of GAP will be made available for the attendance of 
the Syrian experts. 
-         GAP will organize custom-made courses to be attended by Syrian experts. 
-         The two parties will organize joint courses. 
 The Basic principles regarding the training programs are as follows: 
 -         Training courses can be conducted in English, Turkish, and/or Arabic, as 
appropriate. 
-         Custom-made and joint courses can be gradually extended, upon mutual 
agreement, to the participants from other Arabic speaking countries.  These courses can 
be organized/implemented in both countries. 
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 Both parties have agreed to realize the first custom-made course in 2001, and the first 
joint course in early 2002. 
B.     Joint Projects 
GAP and GOLD will identify, plan and implement joint projects.  Scope and basic 
components (location, content and finance etc.) of these projects will be determined 
jointly by both organizations and relevant agencies.  One of the first projects could be 
the development of twin protection areas-one from each country to be studied, planned 
and implemented as a Twin Development Project.  Such projects will be carried out, 
when applicable, with the participation of other organizations from the two countries. 
C.     Exchange Programs/Partnership 
 Exchange of visits of top executives, preferably on an annual basis,  
 Exchange of experts and staff,  
 Cooperation between the GAP Agricultural Research Station in Koroklu in Turkey, and 
the Martyr Basel Al-Assad Research Center in Syria. 
 The General Directorate of Rural Services (KHGM) of Turkey can take part, under the 
coordination of GAP, in the above-mentioned programs, projects, and partnerships and 
can offer its standard courses and the services of its Agricultural Hydrologic Research 
and Training facilities within the framework of this agreement. 
 Other parties, institutions, agencies etc., can be included in the above-mentioned 
programs, projects and partnerships upon mutual consent of GAP and GOLD. 
 Gap and GOLD will appoint, within one month following the signing of this document, 
their respective contact persons who will carry out the tasks for the implementation of 
this agreement. 
New topics, programs or activities that are not included in this document can be added 
in the future, based on mutual agreement. 
 Dr. I. H Olcay UNVER                                                            Eng. Kays al-ASSAD 
            President                                                                         Director General 
            GAP                                                                                        GOLD 
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